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WYNNE v. THE UNITED KINGDOM (15484/89) [1994] ECHR 24 (18 July 1994)

In the case of Wynne v. the United Kingdom*,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in
accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the
Convention") and the relevant provisions of the Rules of
Court, as a Chamber composed of the following judges:

Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr F. Gölcüklü,
Mr F. Matscher,
Mr B. Walsh,
Mr C. Russo,
Mr A. Spielmann,
Sir John Freeland,
Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha,
Mr L. Wildhaber,

and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 24 February and
22 June 1994,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on
the last-mentioned date:

* Note by the Registrar. The case is numbered
26/1993/421/500. The first number is the case's position on
the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year
(second number). The last two numbers indicate the case's
position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its
creation and on the list of the corresponding originating
applications to the Commission.


1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 12 July 1993,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1
and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It
originated in an application (no. 15484/89) against the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the
Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on 15 June 1989 by a
British citizen, Mr Edward Wynne.

The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48
(art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the United
Kingdom recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
(Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request was to
obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case
disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations
under Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the Convention.

2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with
Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant
stated that he wished to take part in the proceedings and
designated the lawyers who would represent him (Rule 30).

3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio
Sir John Freeland, the elected judge of British nationality
(Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal,
the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On
25 August 1993, in the presence of the Registrar, the
President drew by lot the names of the other seven members,
namely Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr F. Matscher, Mr B. Walsh,
Mr C. Russo, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha and
Mr L. Wildhaber (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and
Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).

4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5),
Mr Ryssdal, through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the
Government of the United Kingdom ("the Government"), the
applicant's lawyers and the Delegate of the Commission on the
organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). In
accordance with the order made in consequence, the Registrar
received on 29 November 1993 the Government's memorial and, on
10 and 22 December 1993, the applicant's. On 27 January 1994
the applicant's submissions on Article 50 (art. 50) of the
Convention were received. The President consented to the
filing of further written submissions by the applicant on
23 February 1994 (Rule 37 para. 1, second sub-paragraph).

5. In accordance with the President's decision, the
hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building,
Strasbourg, on 23 February 1994. The Court had held a
preparatory meeting beforehand.

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government

Mr I. Christie, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Agent,
Mr D. Pannick, QC, Counsel,
Mr H. Carter, Home Office,
Ms J. Hutcheon, Home Office,
Ms H. Bayne, Home Office, Advisers;

(b) for the Commission

Mr F. Martínez, Delegate;

(c) for the applicant

Mr E. Fitzgerald, Barrister-at-law,
Mr B. Emmerson, Barrister-at-law, Counsel,
Mr A. Devine, Solicitor.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Martinez, Mr Fitzgerald
and Mr Pannick.


I. The Circumstances of the case

6. In 1964 the applicant was convicted of the murder of a
woman whom he had violently assaulted. He was sentenced to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment. At that time the doctor
who examined him found no signs of mental illness or
abnormality. In May 1980 he was released on life licence
after a positive recommendation by the Parole Board.

7. In June 1981 the applicant killed a 75 year-old woman
who was placing flowers on a family grave in a London
cemetery. He cut her throat with a knife. In December 1981
he pleaded not guilty to murder, but guilty to manslaughter on
the ground of diminished responsibility. This plea was
accepted by the court and in January 1982 a discretionary
sentence of life imprisonment was imposed (see paragraph 12
below). The trial judge considered that a life sentence was
appropriate in view of the extreme danger to the public which
the applicant represented. The court, at the same time,
revoked his life licence under section 62 (7) of the Criminal
Justice Act 1967 ("the 1967 Act"; see paragraphs 14 and
15 below). The applicant claims that he was informed in 1983
by prison officers at H.M. Prison Wormwood Scrubs that he was
subject to the regime for discretionary life sentences.

8. In December 1985 the applicant was transferred to the
hospital wing of Parkhurst Prison. Since then he has been
transferred to Gartree Prison where he is held as a
"Category A" (high security) prisoner.

9. The applicant was considered for parole by the Parole
Board in January 1989. The Board recommended that his case be
referred again to the local review committee in 1994. By
letter dated 14 August 1989 to the applicant's Member of
Parliament, the Home Office gave the following information:

"In accordance with paragraph 4 [of section 61
of the 1967 Act], the trial judge and Lord Chief
Justice were consulted in September 1987. In
the light of their views, it was decided that
[the applicant's] case should be referred to the
local review committee, as the first stage in a
formal review by the Parole Board, in June 1988.

The local review committee considered the case
at that time [June 1988] and the Parole Board
considered it in January 1989. The Board did
not feel able to recommend [the applicant's]
release and recommended instead that it should
be referred to the local review committee (as
the first stage in a further formal review) in
January 1994. This recommendation was accepted
and [the applicant] was informed accordingly.
He should have been told in February, but owing
to an oversight at Gartree I am afraid that he
was not informed until last month. You will
appreciate that I cannot forecast what the
outcome of the next review will be or say when
[the applicant] might be released. When the
Parole Board consider [the applicant's] case in
1994 the tariff will have been satisfied and the
question of risk will be the overriding
consideration. Indeed, the Parole Board will
have borne the question of risk in mind in
making their recommendation as to the date of
the next review. As you know, the safety of the
public is paramount and no life sentence
prisoner will be released if the assessment of
risk is unsatisfactory, no matter how long he
has been detained."

10. He subsequently learned that the "tariff" period fixed
by the trial judge in respect of his second offence expired in
June 1991 (see paragraph 17 below as regards the "tariff"

11. In a Home Office memorandum dated 5 June 1992 the
applicant was informed that the "tariff" in respect of his
conviction in 1964 had now been served and that his continued
detention was based on the risk he represented.

II. Relevant domestic law and practice

A. Life sentences

12. Murder carries a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment under the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty)
Act 1965. A person convicted of manslaughter may be sentenced
to life imprisonment at the discretion of the trial judge.
Such a discretionary life sentence of imprisonment may also be
passed in certain other cases where the offence is grave and
where there are exceptional circumstances which demonstrate
that the offender is a danger to the public and that it is not
possible to say when that danger will subside (see, in this
connection, the Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 25 October 1990, Series A no. 190-A,
pp. 19-20, paras. 50-53).

B. Release on licence and revocation of a licence

13. Under section 61 of the 1967 Act the Secretary of State
may release on licence a person sentenced to life imprisonment
only if recommended to do so by the Parole Board, and after
consultation with the Lord Chief Justice of England and the
trial judge if available. By virtue of section 62 (1) the
Secretary of State may revoke the licence of a person whose
recall to prison is recommended by the Parole Board.

14. Under section 62 (7) of the 1967 Act, if a person
subject to a licence is convicted on indictment of an offence,
the trial court may, whether or not it passes any other
sentence on him, revoke the licence.

15. The effect of revocation of a licence, whether by the
Secretary of State or by a court, is that the person is liable
to be detained in pursuance of his sentence (section 62 (9) of
the 1967 Act).

16. It is the duty of the Parole Board to advise the
Secretary of State with respect to, inter alia, the release on
licence under section 61, and the recall under section 62, of
persons whose cases have been referred to the Board by the
Secretary of State (section 59 of the 1967 Act; see also the
above-mentioned Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell judgment,
pp. 21-22, paras. 57-58).

C. Procedures for review of life sentences

17. Prior to 1992, in respect of both mandatory and
discretionary life sentences, the Secretary of State would
receive the views of the judiciary (the trial judge and the
Lord Chief Justice) on the period deemed necessary to satisfy
the requirements of retribution and deterrence ("the tariff
period") and of the Parole Board on the question of risk. The
Secretary of State would decide when, if at all, it was
appropriate to release the prisoner on life licence.

He accepted the views of the judiciary, in
discretionary life sentence cases, as to the length of the
tariff period. However, in mandatory life sentence cases he
formed his own judgment on that question, taking into account
the views of the judiciary (for the distinction between
discretionary and mandatory life sentences, see the
above-mentioned Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell judgment,
pp. 19-20, paras. 50-53).

18. Following the judgment of the European Court in the
case of Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell (loc. cit.) changes to the
procedures for the release of discretionary life prisoners
were introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1991 ("the 1991
Act"). Parliament decided, however, not to extend these
changes to mandatory life sentences. Under section 34 of this
Act discretionary life prisoners are now informed by the trial
judge, in open court, of the tariff period appropriate for the
offence. After the expiry of that period, the prisoner has a
right to be released on life licence if and when the Parole
Board decides that it is safe to do so. They are entitled to
appear before the Board in person, to see all the reports
placed before it, and to call witnesses and submit documentary
evidence. When the Board decides that a prisoner should be
released the Secretary of State is under a duty to do so
(section 34 (3) of the 1991 Act).

Section 34 (7) (a) of the 1991 Act specifically
excludes from eligibility for review under the new procedures
a discretionary life prisoner who is also serving a mandatory
life sentence.

19. In the debate in the House of Commons on 16 July 1991
concerning this legislation, the Minister of State for the
Home Department made the following statement concerning the
differences between mandatory and discretionary life

"Mandatory life sentence cases ... raise quite
different issues and the Government do not agree that
it is appropriate to extend a similar procedure to
these cases. In a discretionary case, the decision on
release is based purely on whether the offender
continues to be a risk to the public. The presumption
is that once the period that is appropriate to
punishment has passed, the prisoner should be released
if it is safe to do so.

The nature of the mandatory sentence is different. The
element of risk is not the decisive factor in handing
down a life sentence. According to the judicial
process, the offender has committed a crime of such
gravity that he forfeits his liberty to the State for
the rest of his days. If necessary, he can be detained
for life without the necessity for a subsequent
judicial intervention.

The presumption is, therefore, that the offender should
remain in custody until and unless the Home Secretary
concludes that the public interest would be better
served by the prisoner's release than by his continued
detention. In exercising his continued discretion in
this respect, the Home Secretary must take account not
just of the question of risk, but of how society as a
whole would view the prisoner's release at that
juncture. The Home Secretary takes account of the
judicial recommendation, but the final decision is

20. In relation to mandatory life prisoners, the Secretary
of State continues to decide the length of the tariff after
considering advice from the judiciary and any representations
which the prisoner wishes to make. After the expiry of that
period, he has power to release the prisoner on life licence
if recommended to do so by the Parole Board. The decision on
whether to release is for him alone.

21. On 27 July 1993 the Secretary of State made a statement
in Parliament explaining his practice in relation to mandatory
life prisoners. The statement emphasised that before any
mandatory life prisoner is released on life licence, the
Secretary of State

"will consider not only, (a) whether the period served
by the prisoner is adequate to satisfy the requirements
of retribution and deterrence and, (b) whether it is
safe to release the prisoner, but also (c) the public
acceptability of early release. This means that I will
only exercise my discretion to release if I am
satisfied that to do so will not threaten the
maintenance of public confidence in the system of
criminal justice".

22. In determining the principles of fairness that apply to
the procedures governing review of mandatory life sentences,
the English courts have recognised that the mandatory sentence
is, like the discretionary sentence, composed of both a
punitive period (the "tariff") and a security period. As
regards the latter, detention is linked to the assessment of
the prisoner's risk to the public following the expiry of the
"tariff" (R. v. Parole Board, ex parte Bradley (Divisional
Court) [1991] 1 Weekly Law Reports 135; R. v. Parole Board,
ex parte Wilson (Court of Appeal) [1992] 2 All England Reports
576; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
ex parte Cox (judgment of the Divisional Court of
4 September 1992); R. v. Parole Board, ex parte Creamer and
Scholey (judgment of the Divisional Court of
21 October 1992)).

23. In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte Doody [1993] 3 All England Reports 92, the House of
Lords observed that, in contrast with the position as regards
discretionary life sentences, the theory and the practice in
respect of mandatory life sentences were out of tune.

In his speech, with which the other Law Lords agreed,
Lord Mustill explained that the policy whereby murder was
treated as an offence so grave that the proper penal element
of the sentence was detention for life was inconsistent with
the practice adopted by successive Secretaries of State that a
mandatory life sentence included a "tariff" period to reflect
the requirements of retribution and deterrence. A mandatory
life prisoner knew that once he had served the penal element
of his sentence the penal consequences of his crime had been

Nevertheless, the Secretary of State was not obliged to
adopt the judicial view of the "tariff" period and it was he
who was entrusted with the task of deciding on the prisoner's
release. He was entitled to depart from the judge's advice
and to have regard to broader considerations of a public
character than those which applied to an ordinary sentencing
function. He added (loc. cit., p. 105):

"The discretionary and mandatory life sentences, having
in the past grown apart, may now be converging.
Nevertheless, on the statutory framework, the
underlying theory and the current practice there
remains a substantial gap between them. It may be - I
express no opinion - that the time is approaching when
the effect of the two types of life sentence should be
further assimilated. But this is a task for
Parliament, and I think it quite impossible for the
courts to introduce a fundamental change in the
relationship between the convicted murderer and the
State, through the medium of judicial review."

Lord Mustill considered that, having regard to the
rights which discretionary prisoners had, the Secretary of
State was required to comply with the following requirements
of procedural fairness when fixing the penal element in a
mandatory life sentence: the Secretary of State must inform
such a prisoner of the judicial advice on the length of the
"tariff", and give him the opportunity to make written
representations on that subject before he decides on the
appropriate term of years. If the Secretary of State departs
from the judicial advice, he must give reasons for doing so.


24. The applicant lodged his application (15484/89) on
15 June 1989.

He complained under Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the
Convention that he was unable to have the continued lawfulness
of his detention reviewed by a tribunal.

He also complained about a number of other matters,
including an alleged assault by prison staff in June 1985 and
his transfer from hospital to prison subsequent to
December 1985. He further claimed that he had been prevented
from defending himself and had no domestic remedies available
to him in respect of his various complaints. In these
connections he relied on Articles 6, 8, 10 and 13 (art. 6,
art. 8, art. 10, art. 13) of the Convention and Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

25. On 15 October 1992 the Commission declared the
applicant's complaint admissible in so far as it raised issues
under Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the Convention. The
remainder of the application was declared inadmissible.

In its report of 4 May 1993 drawn up under Article 31
(art. 31), the Commission expressed the opinion that there had
been no violation of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4)
(ten votes to five). The full text of the Commission's
opinion and of the dissenting opinion contained in the report
are reproduced as an annex to this judgment*.

* Note by the Registrar. For practical reasons this annex
will appear only with the printed version of the judgment
(volume 294-A of Series A of the Publications of the Court),
but a copy of the Commission's report is obtainable from the


26. The applicant alleged a breach of Article 5 para. 4
(art. 5-4) which provides:

"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the
detention is not lawful."

27. The applicant maintained that he was now detained
primarily under the authority of the discretionary sentence;
that in any event Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) applied in the
same manner to mandatory life sentences as it did to
discretionary sentences; and, further, that he ought, at
least, to be able to have reviewed the lawfulness of his
continued detention under the discretionary sentence.

The Court has examined each of these claims in turn.

A. The legal basis for the applicant's detention

28. The applicant submitted in the first place that it is
the discretionary life sentence which has become the real and
effective basis for his detention since his conviction in
1982. It was this sentence, imposed on him because of his
dangerousness, which was intended by the trial judge to be the
primary authority for this detention from then on. While he
did not suggest that the mandatory sentence had disappeared,
the judicial objective served by both the mandatory and the
discretionary sentences had become a preventive one following
his second conviction. The revocation of the mandatory life
licence was thus, in reality, the logical corollary of the
discretionary sentence.

In the alternative, he maintained that the judicial
finding in 1982 that he was suffering from a long-standing
mental disorder broke the chain of causation between the
original mandatory life sentence and his subsequent
re-detention under that sentence. His legal status was
altered to that of someone who was not fully responsible for
his actions who needed to be left in preventive detention.

He was - he claimed - thus entitled under Article 5
para. 4 (art. 5-4) to have the lawfulness of his continued
detention determined by a court.

29. For both the Government and the Commission the
mandatory life sentence continued to be operative following
the revocation of his life licence.

30. The Court notes that the applicant received a mandatory
life sentence in 1964 and was released on life licence in
1980. This, however, was revoked by the trial judge in 1982
following the applicant's conviction for manslaughter. As a
result his detention thereafter was based on both the
mandatory sentence, which remained in force, and the new
discretionary life sentence (see paragraphs 6, 7 and
15 above). The fact that he committed a further offence in
1981 and was judged to be suffering from a mental disorder at
that time in no way affected under English law the continued
validity of the original sentence or its reactivation on his
recall. It merely provided a supplementary legal basis for
his detention.

B. Entitlement to review of the lawfulness of detention
under the mandatory life sentence

31. The applicant further submitted that Article 5 para. 4
(art. 5-4) applied to mandatory life sentences in the same way
as it applied to discretionary life sentences. He maintained
that the distinction made by the Court in the case of Thynne,
Wilson and Gunnell v. the United Kingdom (loc. cit., pp. 27
and 29, paras. 70, 73-74) between these two types of life
sentence was no longer valid since it was based on the false
assumption that a mandatory sentence had as its object the
punishment of a murderer for life. In fact the mandatory
sentence had not been interpreted in this way by Parliament,
the courts, the Parole Board or by successive Home
Secretaries. Indeed recent court decisions have described the
mandatory sentence as composed, like the discretionary life
sentence, of a period of punishment (the "tariff") to reflect
the requirements of retribution and deterrence as well as a
period of preventive detention, following the expiry of the
"tariff" period. Furthermore, the procedures that have
developed to review the mandatory sentence have been founded
on the understanding that when the requirements of punishment
have been satisfied the only justification for continued
detention is dangerousness. In particular, there is a
presumption that at this point the prisoner will be released
unless he is a danger to the public.

Accordingly, he submitted, it follows from the very
nature of the mandatory life sentence that the applicant is
entitled to invoke the same protection afforded under
Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) to discretionary life prisoners
in the post-tariff stage, namely a review by a court of his
continued dangerousness.

32. The Government, with whom the Commission agreed,
contended that a mandatory life sentence was imposed as
punishment for the gravity of the offence of murder, as
perceived by Parliament. By contrast, a discretionary life
sentence was imposed because of the judicial assessment of the
offender as mentally unstable or dangerous, conditions which
may change over time. They rejected the applicant's thesis
that the mandatory sentence was handed down in part for
reasons of security and risk, pointing out that a trial judge
was obliged under English law to sentence a murderer to life
imprisonment even if he was satisfied that the murderer posed
no danger as, for example, in the case of "mercy killing".
Parliament had considered that such a grave crime deserved to
be punished by life imprisonment and had removed all
discretion as to sentencing from the trial court. The
sentencing of a murderer could thus not be characterised as a
decision of the court to confine a dangerous offender unless
and until he was safe to be released. Moreover, it was a
matter for the Secretary of State to decide if and when a
murderer should be released on licence having regard to the
public interest, in the light of stated criteria which govern
the exercise of this discretion (see paragraphs 19 and
21 above).

In sum, the requirements of Article 5 para. 4
(art. 5-4) were satisfied by the original trial procedure.

33. The Court recalls its judgment in Thynne, Wilson and
Gunnell (loc. cit.) where it held that discretionary life
prisoners were entitled under Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) to
take proceedings to have the lawfulness of their continued
detention decided by a court at reasonable intervals and to
have the lawfulness of any re-detention determined by a court.
This view was taken because of the very nature of the
discretionary life sentence which, unlike the mandatory
sentence, was imposed not because of the inherent gravity of
the offence but because of the presence of factors which were
susceptible to change with the passage of time, namely mental
instability and dangerousness. A clear distinction was drawn
between the discretionary life sentence which was considered
to have a protective purpose and a mandatory life sentence
which was viewed as essentially punitive in nature (ibid.,
pp. 27 and 29, paras. 70, 73-74).

34. The applicant is now asking the Court to reconsider its
characterisation of the mandatory sentence in Thynne, Wilson
and Gunnell on the grounds inter alia that recent English
judicial pronouncements have tended to assimilate both types
of life sentence.

35. The Court notes judicial comments to the effect that
the theory and practice of the mandatory sentence are out of
tune and that, for purposes of procedures designed to consider
the release of the mandatory prisoner as well as the standards
of fairness applicable to such procedures, the mandatory
sentence should also be seen as containing both a punitive and
a preventive element (see paragraphs 22-23 above).

However, the fact remains that the mandatory sentence
belongs to a different category from the discretionary
sentence in the sense that it is imposed automatically as the
punishment for the offence of murder irrespective of
considerations pertaining to the dangerousness of the offender
(see paragraph 12 above). That mandatory life prisoners do
not actually spend the rest of their lives in prison and that
a notional tariff period is also established in such cases
- facts of which the Court was fully aware in Thynne, Wilson
and Gunnell (loc. cit., p. 29, para. 74), - does not alter
this essential distinction between the two types of life

As observed by the House of Lords in R. v. Secretary of
State, ex parte Doody, while the two types of life sentence
may now be converging there remains nonetheless, on the
statutory framework, the underlying theory and the current
practice, a substantial gap between them (see paragraph 23
above). This is borne out by the very facts inter alia relied
on by the applicant to support his case, namely that in
mandatory life sentences the release of the prisoner is
entirely a matter within the discretion of the Secretary of
State who is not bound by the judicial recommendation as to
the length of the tariff period and who is free under English
law to have regard to other criteria than dangerousness,
following the expiry of the "tariff" period, in deciding
whether the prisoner should be released (see paragraphs 19, 21
and 23 above). It is further reflected in the decision of
Parliament to limit the application of the new procedures in
the 1991 Act to discretionary life sentences only, even in
cases like the present where the prisoner is serving both a
mandatory and a discretionary life sentence (see paragraph 18

36. Against the above background, the Court sees no cogent
reasons to depart from the finding in the Thynne, Wilson and
Gunnell case that, as regards mandatory life sentences, the
guarantee of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) was satisfied by the
original trial and appeal proceedings and confers no
additional right to challenge the lawfulness of continuing
detention or re-detention following revocation of the life
licence (see, mutatis mutandis, the Cossey v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 184,
p. 14, para. 35). Accordingly, in the circumstances of the
present case, there are no new issues of lawfulness which
entitle the applicant to a review of his continued detention
under the original mandatory life sentence.

C. Entitlement to review of the lawfulness of detention
under the discretionary life sentence

37. The applicant has, however, also contended that at the
very least Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) confers on him the
right to challenge the lawfulness of his detention on the
basis of the discretionary life sentence.

38. The Court does not accept this claim. A review of the
lawfulness of the applicant's detention following his
conviction for manslaughter (see paragraph 7 above) would be
devoid of purpose since he is also serving a mandatory life
sentence for murder at the same time and enjoys no possibility
of release until the Secretary of State considers that it is
in the public interest to do so (see, mutatis mutandis, the
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom judgment of
30 August 1990, Series A no. 182, p. 31, para. 73, and
paragraphs 19, 21 and 23 above).

D. Conclusion

39. In conclusion, there has been no violation of
Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4).


Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5
para. 4 (art. 5-4).

Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL

Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Acting Registrar

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