In the case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom,

The European Court of Human Rights, taking its decision in plenary
session in application of Rule 48 of the Rules of Court and composed
of the following judges:

 Mr. G. BALLADORE PALLIERI, President,
 Mr. G. WIARDA,
 Mr. M. ZEKIA,
 Mr. J. CREMONA,
 Mr. P. O'DONOGHUE,
Mrs. H. PEDERSEN,
 Mr. THÓR VILHJÁLMSSON,
 Mr. R. RYSSDAL,
 Mr. W. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH,
 Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE,
Mrs. D. BINDSCHEDLER-ROBERT,
 Mr. D. EVRIGENIS,
 Mr. P.-H. TEITGEN,
 Mr. G. LAGERGREN,
 Mr. L. LIESCH,
 Mr. F. GÖLCÜKLÜ,
 Mr. F. MATSCHER,

and also Mr. M.-A. EISSEN, Registrar, and Mr. H. PETZOLD, Deputy
Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 10 and 11 February, 22 and 25 to
27 April, 25 to 28 July and 6 to 13 December 1977,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1.  This case was referred to the Court by the Government of Ireland
("the applicant Government").  It originated in an application against
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland ("the respondent Government") lodged by the applicant
Government with the European Commission of Human Rights ("the
Commission") on 16 December 1971 under Article 24 (art. 24) of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("the Convention").  The report drawn up by the Commission concerning
the said application (Article 31 of the Convention) (art. 31) was
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
9 February 1976.

2.  The Irish Government's application to the Court was lodged with
the registry on 10 March 1976, within the period of three months laid
down by Articles 32 para. 1 and 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the
Convention, and referred to Article 48 (art. 48).  Its object is "to
ensure the observance in Northern Ireland of the engagements
undertaken by the respondent Government as a High Contracting Party to
the Convention and in particular of the engagements specifically set
out by the applicant Government in the pleadings filed and the
submissions made on their behalf and described in the evidence adduced
before the Commission in the hearings before them".  "To this end", the
Court is invited "to consider the report of the Commission and to
confirm the opinion of the Commission that breaches of the Convention
have occurred and also to consider the claims of the applicant
Government with regard to other alleged breaches and to make a finding
of breach of the Convention where the Court is satisfied that a breach
has occurred".

The United Kingdom is one of the States which have declared that they
recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)
(art. 46).

3.  The Registrar received twenty-five copies of the Commission's
report from its Secretary on 17 March 1976.

4.  The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as ex
officio members, Mr. P. O'Donoghue, the elected judge of Irish
nationality, and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the elected judge of British
nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and
Mr. G. Balladore Pallieri, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)
of the Rules of Court).  On 20 March 1976, the President of the Court
drew by lot, in the presence of an official of the registry, the names
of the four other members, namely Mr. H. Mosler, Mr. M. Zekia,
Mr. S. Petrén and Mrs. D. Bindschedler-Robert (Article 43 in fine
of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).

Mr. Balladore Pallieri assumed the office of President of the Chamber
(Rule 21 para. 5).

5.  On 29 April 1976, the Chamber decided under Rule 48 to relinquish
jurisdiction forthwith in favour of the plenary Court, "considering
that the case raise[d] serious questions affecting the interpretation of
the Convention".

6.  At a meeting held on 18 May 1976, the President ascertained the
views of the Agents of the Parties and of the delegates of the
Commission regarding the procedure to be followed.  He decided by an
Order of the same date that the applicant Government should have until
2 August 1976 to file a memorial, that the respondent Government
should then have until 30 October 1976 to file a memorial in reply and
that the delegates of the Commission should be entitled to present
their written observations, if any, within one month of the receipt of
the said memorial in reply.  By an Order of 19 November 1976, the
President extended the last-mentioned time-limit until 15 December.

The memorials of the applicant Government, the respondent Government
and the delegates of the Commission were received at the registry on
30 July, 28 October and 15 December 1976, respectively.

7.  By an Order of 26 July 1976, the President of the Court, having
regard to Rule 29 para. 3 and with the agreement of the two Governments
concerned and of the Commission, instructed the Registrar to make the
Commission's report public only after incorporation of changes
approved by the President and having the sole purpose of protecting
the identity of certain persons.  The report was so made public as
from 2 September 1976.

8.  The President met the Agents of the Parties and the delegates of
the Commission on 7 December 1976 in order to consult them on the
organisation of the hearings.  On 7 January 1977, he decided, with the
agreement of the Court, that the first part of the oral proceedings
would open on 7 February and would concern the following questions:

"(a) Is the jurisdiction of the Court to examine any particular issue
of fact or law limited by the original allegations of the Government
of Ireland and/or by the decision of the Commission on the
admissibility of application no. 5310/71?  In the affirmative, do
certain issues of fact or law fall outside this jurisdiction in the
present case?

(b) Has the Court jurisdiction to pronounce on the existence of the
violations of the Convention found by the Commission in its report and
which are not contested by the United Kingdom Government?  In the
affirmative, should the Court exercise that jurisdiction?

(c) Should the Court examine the cases mentioned in paragraphs 2.30
and 2.31 of the memorial of the delegates of the Commission?

(d) Is it proper in the circumstances of this case for the Court,
without further enquiry into the facts, to:

(i) confirm the conclusions of the Commission to the extent that they
are not contested?

(ii) deal only with the substance of those questions which give rise
to dispute between the Parties?

(e) Has the Court jurisdiction to review the procedural decisions of
the Commission as such and/or should the Court, when assessing the
conclusions of the Commission, have regard to the procedure followed
by the latter body?

(f) Does Article 1 (art. 1) of the Convention create any rights in
addition to those defined in Section I and can it be the subject of a
separate breach?"

Oral hearings were accordingly held in public at the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, from 7 to 9 February.  Immediately afterwards,
the Court deliberated in private.  At its request, the President, by
Order of 11 February, advised the Parties and the Commission of the
following matters to be taken into account by them during the further
procedure:

"1. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not consider
that the reasons which have been given why it should refrain from
pronouncing on the non-contested allegations of violation of Article 3
(art. 3) of the Convention are such as to preclude it from so
pronouncing.  However, the Court considers that it is already in
possession of sufficient information and materials to enable it to
make such a pronouncement.

2. The Court takes note of the fact that it is no longer invited by
the applicant Government to examine the cases mentioned in
paragraph 2.30 of the memorial of the delegates of the Commission; it
does not deem it necessary to examine them proprio motu.

3. The Court finds that is has jurisdiction to take cognisance of the
other contested cases of violation of Article 3 (art. 3) (paragraph 2.31
of the memorial of the delegates of the Commission) if and to the
extent that the applicant Government put them forward as establishing
the existence of a practice.

4. The Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to rule on the
correctness of the procedure followed by the Commission for hearing
the witnesses G 1, G 2 and G 3 in London on 20 February 1975, but that
it is empowered to assess the relevance and probative value of the
evidence so obtained."

After consulting the representatives of the two Governments concerned
and of the Commission, the President, by the same Order, fixed
19 April 1977 as the date for resumption of the hearings.

The second part of the hearings was held in public at the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, from 19 to 22 April.

9.  At the hearings of February and/or April 1977 there appeared
before the Court:

- for the applicant Government:

- Mr. F.M. HAYES, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs,    Agent,

- Mr. D. COSTELLO, S.C., Attorney General,

- Mr. A.J. HEDERMAN, S.C.,

- Mr. R.J. O'HANLON, S.C.,

- Mr. A. BROWNE, S.C.,

- Mr. J. MURRAY, Barrister-at-Law,                               Counsel,

- Mr. L. LYSAGHT, Chief State Solicitor,

- Mr. P.P.D. QUIGLEY, Legal Assistant, Attorney General's Office,

- Mr. M. BURKE, First Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
(February hearings only),

- Mrs. J. LIDDY, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign
Affairs (February hearings only),

- Mr. P. HENNESSY, First Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs,

- Mr. D. WALSHE, Office of the Chief State Solicitor,           Advisers;

- for the respondent Government:

- Mr. D.H. ANDERSON, Legal Counsellor, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
                                                                   Agent,

- Mr. I.K. MATHERS, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office,                                                  Assistant Agent,

- The Rt. Hon. S. SILKIN, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General,

- Mr. J.B.E. HUTTON, Q.C.,

- Mr. A. LESTER, Q.C.,

- Mr. N. BRATZA, Barrister-at-Law,                               Counsel,

- Sir Basil HALL, K.C.B., M.C., T.D., Treasury Solicitor,

- Mr. C. LEONARD, Treasury Solicitor's Department,

- Mr. M.L. SAUNDERS, Law Officers' Department (February hearings
only),

- Mr. W.C. BECKETT, Law Officers' Department (April hearings only),

- Mr. A.P. WILSON, Northern Ireland Office,

- Mr. N. VARNEY, Northern Ireland Office,

- Mr. N. BRIDGES, Northern Ireland Office (February hearings only),

- Mr. R. SEAMAN, Northern Ireland Office (April hearings only),
                                                                Advisers;

- for the Commission:

- Mr. G. SPERDUTI, Principal Delegate,

- Mr. C. NØRGAARD, Delegate,

- Mr. T. OPSAHL, Delegate.

The Court heard addresses by Mr. Costello for the applicant
Government, by Mr. Silkin, Mr. Hutton and Mr. Lester for the
respondent Government and by Mr. Sperduti, Mr. Nørgaard and
Mr. Opsahl for the Commission, as well as their replies to a
question put by the Court.

10.  In the course of the hearings and during the interval between the
two parts thereof those appearing before the Court produced various
documents including written submissions on Article 1 (art. 1) of the
Convention.  The Commission subsequently furnished to the Registrar
other documents which he had requested on the instructions of the
Court or its President.

AS TO THE FACTS

I. THE EMERGENCY SITUATION AND ITS BACKGROUND

11.  The tragic and lasting crisis in Northern Ireland lies at the
root of the present case.  In order to combat what the respondent
Government describe as "the longest and most violent terrorist
campaign witnessed in either part of the island of Ireland", the
authorities in Northern Ireland exercised from August 1971 until
December 1975 a series of extrajudicial powers of arrest, detention
and internment.  The proceedings in this case concern the scope and
the operation in practice of those measures as well as the alleged
ill-treatment of persons thereby deprived of their liberty.

12.  Up to March 1975, on the figures cited before the Commission by
the respondent Government, over 1,100 people had been killed, over
11,500 injured and more than £140,000,000 worth of property destroyed
during the recent troubles in Northern Ireland.  This violence found
its expression in part in civil disorders, in part in terrorism, that
is organised violence for political ends.

A. SOCIAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

13.  Prior to 1922 the whole of the island of Ireland formed part of
the United Kingdom.  In that year, following a treaty of 1921,
legislation was passed which endorsed the setting-up, with
self-governing status within the British Commonwealth, of the Irish
Free State comprising initially all of the island's thirty-two
counties.  Provision was made for six of the nine counties of the
province of Ulster in the north to opt out and remain within the
United Kingdom and they did this in 1922.  Thereafter, the Irish Free
State became responsible for the government of the remaining
twenty-six counties and, in 1937, a new Constitution was introduced
proclaiming the independence and sovereignty of the State of what is
now known as the Irish Republic.  After the Second World War it left
the Commonwealth and declared itself a republic.

14.  From the 1920's onwards, Northern Ireland, that is the
above-mentioned six counties, had a separate Government and Parliament
of its own.  In addition, the electorate of the province (meaning in
this judgment the six counties) returned twelve members to the United
Kingdom Parliament.  With certain defined matters excepted, the
Northern Ireland Parliament and Government were the legislative and
executive authorities for the six counties until 30 March 1972 when
the United Kingdom authorities resumed "direct rule" of the province
(see paragraph 49 below).

15.  Northern Ireland is not a homogeneous society.  It consists of two
communities divided by deep and long-standing antagonisms.  One
community is variously termed Protestant, Unionist or Loyalist, the
other is generally labelled as Catholic, Republican or Nationalist.
About two-thirds of the population of one and a half million belong to
the Protestant community, the remaining third to the Catholic
community.  The majority group is descended from Protestant settlers
who emigrated in large numbers from Britain to Northern Ireland during
the seventeenth century.  The now traditional antagonism between the
two groups is based both on religion and on social, economic and
political differences.  In particular, the Protestant community has
consistently opposed the idea of a united Ireland independent of the
United Kingdom, whereas the Catholic community has traditionally
supported it.

16.  The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a clandestine organisation
with quasi-military dispositions.  Formed during the troubles prior to
the partition of the island and illegal in the United Kingdom as well
as in the Republic of Ireland, the IRA neither accepts the existence
of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom nor recognises the
democratic order of the Republic.  It has periodically mounted
campaigns of terrorism in both parts of the island of Ireland and in
Great Britain.  After 1962, the IRA was not overtly active for some
years.

During the time covered by the complaints of the applicant Government,
that is from 1971 to 1975, virtually all those members of the IRA
living and operating in Northern Ireland were recruited from among the
Catholic community.

17.  Legislation designed to deal with matters affecting law and order
and the security of the State was first enacted by the Northern
Ireland Parliament in 1922 in the form of the Civil Authorities
(Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland).  This legislation
(hereinafter referred to as "the Special Powers Act") was an enabling
Act under which Regulations were from time to time made and brought
into operation.  Thus, for instance, a Regulation dating from before
1949 declared illegal certain organisations, including the IRA.  In
1950 and 1954, following raids carried out by the IRA in Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, Regulations were introduced granting powers of
entry and search.  In 1956 and 1957, in order to combat an IRA
campaign then being launched, further Regulations were made dealing
with internment, curfew, special trial procedures, firearms and
explosives control, and restriction on movement.  An account of the
particular Regulations at issue in the present case, namely
Regulations 10, 11 (1), 11 (2) and 12 (1), appears below at
paragraphs 81 to 84.

18.  The differing aspirations of the two communities resulted in the
division between the main political parties in Northern Ireland being
based primarily on their attitude to the status of the province as
part of the United Kingdom rather than on political differences of the
type commonly found in the rest of the United Kingdom and elsewhere.
The Protestant community in general voted for the Unionist Party,
which wished Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom,
whilst the Catholic community in general supported candidates
favouring a united, independent Ireland.  Given the relative sizes of
the two communities, the inevitable result of this polarisation was
that the Unionist Party, supported almost exclusively by Protestants,
had a permanent majority in the Northern Ireland Parliament and formed
the Government of the province throughout the fifty years leading up
to direct rule in 1972.  The abolition of proportional representation
in the early 1920's and the geographical arrangement of constituencies
effected a great increase in the size of the Parliamentary majority.
This situation understandably disenchanted the Catholic community.

19.  Thus, whilst only a small minority of the latter community has
ever actively supported the IRA, a very much greater proportion had
always been discontented with Unionist government and the effects of
its in-built majority.  The Catholics in the population regarded
themselves as discriminated against on various counts.  The Cameron
Commission, a body appointed by the Northern Ireland Government in
March 1969 to report, inter alia, on the causes of disturbances in the
six counties in 1968-1969 (see paragraph 23 below), considered
justified many of the grievances then felt by the Catholics, in
particular those concerned with the allocation of houses, local
authority appointments, limitations on local electoral franchise and
deliberate manipulation of ward boundaries and electoral areas.  The
European Commission of Human Rights itself came to the conclusion that
there certainly was an element of inherent bias in the whole political
system in Northern Ireland in favour of one community.

From the time of partition onwards there has always been a greater or
lesser degree of tension between the two communities, although since
the early 1920's there have been no disturbances comparable in scale
to those of recent years.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS UP TO 1969

20.  In 1963 the first moves towards a campaign for "civil rights" for
the Catholic community began to be made.  The objectives of this
campaign were, broadly speaking, the removal of the discrimination
referred to above.

At the same time, though, manifestations of Protestant violence began
to emerge.  In 1964 there was serious rioting in Belfast following a
Protestant march.  In March 1966, several petrol bombs were thrown at
Catholic schools and property.  In May 1966, a body calling itself the
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), previously unknown to the police, issued
a statement declaring war on the IRA and warning of its intention to
execute all IRA men.  Shortly thereafter, two Catholics were murdered
and two others seriously wounded in Belfast.  Three Protestants,
members of the UVF, were subsequently charged and convicted for these
attacks.  The UVF, believed by the police to have consisted of
only 5 to 6 persons, was declared illegal in June 1966 and seems to have
remained inactive from then until 1969.

During this period, there was no violent activity of significance by
the IRA, who, after 1962, appear to have concentrated on political
activity.

21.  Throughout 1967, the movement for "civil rights" for the Catholic
community gathered momentum.  The first civil rights march took place
in August 1968 without incident, but in October a clash with the
police and two days' rioting ensued after a march in Londonderry.

22.  On 22 November 1968, the Northern Ireland Government announced a
reform programme to deal with the Catholic grievances.  Nevertheless,
the civil rights movement continued its campaign and marches.  The
marches again led to clashes with the police and to violent
confrontation with Protestant counter-demonstrators, often armed with
cudgels, stones and the like.

23.  The demonstrations, disturbances and rioting continued in various
places into 1969.  In paragraph 226 of its report, presented to the
Northern Ireland Parliament in September 1969, the Cameron Commission
expressed the view that certain Protestant extremist organisations
"must ... bear a heavy share of direct responsibility for [certain of]
the disorders ... and also for inflaming passions and engineering
opposition to lawful, and what would in all probability otherwise have
been peaceful, demonstrations or at least have attracted only modified
and easily controlled opposition".  Police conduct in handling certain
disturbances was also criticised by the Cameron Commission.

24.  In March and April 1969, five major explosions thought to have
been caused by the UVF occurred at water and electricity installations
in three counties.  Units of British troops were flown into the
province.

The Northern Ireland Prime Minister, whose reform policies were
unpopular with many Protestants, resigned at the end of April.  A few
days later, his successor declared a general amnesty for persons
charged with or convicted of offences connected with the recent
political protests and demonstrations.

25.  Tension remained high; sectarian disturbances continued
periodically up to mid-August.  On 12 August 1969, a traditional
Protestant anniversary parade sparked off several days of large-scale
rioting, first of all in Londonderry and thereafter spreading to
Belfast and other places.  After 10 civilians had been killed
and 145 civilians and 4 policemen wounded, it was found necessary to
call in aid units of the British army.

The riots in August 1969 greatly exceeded in severity any that had
occurred in the previous years.  Casualties and damage to property
were extensive.  In Belfast, for instance, a large number of houses
and licensed premises, mostly Catholic owned or occupied, were burnt
down, destroyed or damaged.

26.  The Northern Ireland Prime Minister called a peace conference on
18 August which was attended by representatives of the two
communities.  On the next day, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland
Governments issued a joint declaration re-affirming, inter alia, their
commitment to reforms in the six counties.

In October, a programme of reform was announced; it included the
reorganisation of the police force and local government, measures to
prohibit discrimination in public employment, and the establishment of
a Community Relations Commission and a central housing authority.

27.  However, the publication of a government report into the
functions and organisation of the province's police force had produced
a violent reaction in Protestant circles.  On 11 October, a policeman
was shot dead by a bullet fired from a crowd of Protestant rioters in
Belfast.  He became the first member of the security forces to be
killed during the disorders of the past few years.

28.  The IRA carried out no major acts of violence in 1969.  However,
at Easter 1969 they had reactivated their forces, placing all
volunteers on full alert.  At the same time, the IRA are thought to
have gained much more support as a result of the riots and of an
accompanying loss of confidence by Catholics in the police.

Towards the end of the year, the IRA split into two wings.  For some
time there had been dissension in the movement between those who hoped
to bring about a form of socialist people's republic for all Ireland
and those who considered that such involvement deflected the IRA from
its traditional aims.  The traditionalists formed themselves into the
Provisional IRA whilst the followers of the new political doctrines
became the Official IRA.  Both factions remained organised along
military lines.

C. SITUATION FROM 1970 UNTIL THE INTRODUCTION OF INTERNMENT ON
9 AUGUST 1971

29.  The situation worsened in 1970.  The number of explosions
recorded by the police jumped dramatically from a total of 8 in 1969
to 155 in 1970.  Some explosions were caused by Loyalists - about 25
according to statistics cited by the Commission - but there is no
dispute that the majority were the work of the IRA.  In total,
23 civilians and 2 policemen were killed during the course of the
year.  None of these deaths was attributed by the police to Protestant
activity.

30.  The terrorist campaign by the IRA appears to have begun in
earnest in 1970 and to have been one primarily of bombing buildings
and attacking the security forces.  There was also undoubtedly some
terrorist activity on the part of Loyalists, directed largely against
politicians seen as hostile to Unionism and against Catholic owned or
occupied property, particularly licensed premises.  Responsibility for
certain explosions was in fact claimed by the UVF.

31.  The sharp increase in what may be termed terrorist-type activity
was not accompanied by the cessation of inter-communal street
disturbances which continued sporadically during the year of 1970 and
accounted for the deaths of a number of people.

32.  Between January and July 1971, the violence intensified, being
marked by a dramatic upsurge in terrorist activity by the IRA.
Police statistics record a total of 304 explosions, including 94 for
the one month of July.  Shooting at the security forces' patrols built
up and for the first time soldiers numbered amongst those killed.  By
9 August, 13 soldiers, 2 policemen and 16 civilians had died since the
beginning of the year.  In addition, serious and prolonged rioting
occurred in both Catholic and Protestant areas.

Apart from one explosion in which a civilian was killed, there is no
evidence of any deaths or even injuries having been caused by Loyalist
terrorists.  On the applicant Government's own approximate estimate,
Loyalist explosions accounted for only 14 out of the overall total of
304.  Furthermore, as in 1970, Loyalist terrorists used mainly pipe
bombs which were not very powerful in comparison with the devices
employed by the IRA.

The Commission stated in its report that the IRA were indisputably
responsible for the very great majority of the acts of violence during
this period.  Loyalist terrorist activity had declined; there is no
evidence that such Loyalist terrorism as did exist formed part of a
highly organised campaign in the sense that IRA activity did.  The
Commission's conclusion was that the threat and reality of serious
terrorism came almost exclusively from the IRA.

33.  On the political front during 1970 and 1971, progress was made in
implementing the reforms announced in October 1969 (see paragraph 26
above).  The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, however, resigned in
March 1971.  In June 1971, his successor proposed a number of further
steps designed to provide a positive rôle for representatives of the
minority community in the actual process of government.

D. 9 AUGUST 1971 (INTRODUCTION OF INTERNMENT) UNTIL 30 MARCH 1972
(INTRODUCTION OF DIRECT RULE)

1. The decision to introduce internment

34.  It was against the background outlined above that on
9 August 1971 the Northern Ireland Government brought into operation
extrajudicial measures of detention and internment of suspected
terrorists.  From 9 August 1971 until 7 November 1972, when certain of
the Special Powers Regulations were replaced, the authorities in
Northern Ireland in fact exercised four such extrajudicial powers:
(i) arrest for interrogation purposes during 48 hours (under
Regulation 10); (ii) arrest and remand in custody (under
Regulation 11 (1)); (iii) detention of an arrested person (under
Regulation 11 (2)); and (iv) internment (under Regulation 12 (1)).  An
account of the operation of these powers and the procedures thereunder
is given below at paragraphs 81 to 84.

35.  For some time, the possibility of internment had been extensively
canvassed in the press and amongst politicians.  Pressure had also
been mounting within the Protestant community for its introduction; in
the early months of 1971 there had been demonstrations against the
then Prime Minister because of his Government's alleged failure to
deal with the IRA threat.

The decision to introduce a policy of detention and internment was
taken on 5 August 1971 by the Northern Ireland Government, following a
meeting in London between the Northern Ireland and United Kingdom
Governments.  Prior to this, the question had been considered at the
highest level in Northern Ireland and frequent consultations had taken
place between the two Governments.

In the latter half of July 1971, as an apparent last resort to avoid
introducing internment, the security forces had intensified operations
against suspected terrorists, mounting searches and detaining for
questioning what were believed to be key figures in the IRA.
Some 90 persons were arrested but no significant results were yielded.
Prior to August 1971, the intelligence obtained by the police had
failed to provide anything but a very general picture of the IRA
organisation.

2. Reasons for the decision to introduce internment

36.  The campaign of violence carried out by the IRA had attained
unprecedented proportions by the middle of 1971.  This was clearly the
dominant factor behind the decision to exercise the extrajudicial
powers.

Three principal reasons for the decision have been cited by the
respondent Government.  Firstly, the authorities took the view that
the normal procedures of investigation and criminal prosecution had
become inadequate to deal with IRA terrorists; it was considered that
the ordinary criminal courts could no longer be relied on as the sole
process of law for restoring peace and order.  The second reason given,
which was closely related to the first, was the widespread
intimidation of the population.  Such intimidation often made it
impossible to obtain sufficient evidence to secure a criminal
conviction against a known IRA terrorist in the absence of an
admissible confession or of police or army testimony.  Furthermore, the
conduct of police enquiries was seriously hampered by the grip the IRA
had on certain so-called "no-go" areas, that is Catholic strongholds
where terrorists, unlike the police, could operate in comparative
safety.  Thirdly, the ease of escape across the territorial border
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland presented
difficulties of control.

In addition to the three "security" reasons, there was, in the
judgment of both the Northern Ireland Government and the United
Kingdom Government, no hope of winning over the terrorists by
political means, the reform programme initiated in 1969 having failed
to prevent continuing violence.

The authorities therefore came to the conclusion that it was necessary
to introduce a policy of detention and internment of persons suspected
of serious terrorist activities but against whom sufficient evidence
could not be laid in court.  This policy was regarded as a temporary
measure primarily aimed at breaking the influence of the IRA.  It was
intended that a respite would be provided so as to enable the
political and social reforms already undertaken to achieve their full
effects.

3. The decision whom to arrest, detain and intern

37.  The possibility of interning Loyalists was discussed in the
preparatory stages.  The security forces were aware of some Loyalist
terrorist activity in 1971 and also of certain Protestant extremists,
described by those forces as "rabble rousers" and suspected by them of
acts of violence or intimidation, if not of terrorism strictly
speaking.  However, the security forces did not judge at this stage
that there was any serious threat coming from the Loyalist quarter.
There was said to be no army or police intelligence then available
which indicated that any organisation other than the IRA had been
actively engaged in bombing and killing in the very recent months.

On account of the unprecedented level it had reached, and because of
its nature as a highly organised, politically motivated campaign
designed to overthrow the State, IRA terrorism was regarded as the
real menace to law and order.  Protestant terrorist activity, which
was in the main directed against the Catholic community and not the
State or the security forces, was seen by the authorities more as
sporadic and as being on a minute scale in comparison and on a much
less organised basis.

38.  In the weeks preceding the introduction of internment, the
police, in consultation with the army, were preparing lists of persons
to be arrested.  The lists included not only suspected IRA terrorists
but also persons suspected of being involved or associated with the
IRA or even, in a few cases, of possessing information about others so
involved or associated.  It was generally understood that the target
of the planned exercise was the IRA.

4. Operation Demetrius

39.  Starting at 4.00 a.m. on Monday, 9 August 1971, the army, with
police officers occasionally acting as guides, mounted an operation to
arrest the 452 persons whose names appeared on the final list.  In the
event, some 350 persons were arrested in accordance with the Special
Powers Regulations.  The arrested persons were taken to one of the
three regional holding centres (Magilligan Weekend Training Centre in
County Londonderry, Ballykinler Weekend Training Centre in County Down
and Girdwood Park Territorial Army Centre in Belfast) that had been
set up to receive the prisoners during 48 hours.  All those arrested
were subjected to interrogation by police officers of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC).  104 persons were released within 48 hours.  Those
who were to be detained were sent on to the prison ship "Maidstone" or
to Crumlin Road Prison, both in Belfast.  Prior to being lodged in
detention, 12 individuals were moved to one or more unidentified
centres for "interrogation in depth" extending over several days.

Operation Demetrius, as the Commission points out, was not a selective
manoeuvre aimed at individuals but a "sweeping-up" exercise directed
against the IRA organisation as a whole.  It is generally accepted
that because of the scale and speed of the operation, some persons
were arrested or even detained on the basis of inadequate or
inaccurate information.

5. Events subsequent to Operation Demetrius

40.  At 11.15 a.m. on 9 August 1971, the Prime Minister of Northern
Ireland announced to the public the introduction of internment.  He
stated, inter alia:

"The main target of the present operation is the Irish Republican Army
 ...  They are the present threat; but we will not hesitate to take
strong action against any other individuals or organisations who may
present such a threat in the future."

41.  Arrests continued to be made during the rest of the year, partly
of persons on the above-mentioned list and partly of persons who came
under suspicion thereafter.

The three regional holding centres were closed down in August 1971
shortly after Operation Demetrius was completed, and in
September/October 1971 police centres were established at Palace
Barracks (Holywood, County Down), Girdwood Park (Belfast), Gough
(County Armagh) and Ballykelly (County Londonderry) for the purpose of
holding and interrogating persons arrested under the Special Powers
Regulations.

42.  The introduction of internment provoked a violent reaction from
the Catholic community and the IRA.  Serious rioting broke out in
Belfast and elsewhere, there was a considerable increase in shootings
and bombings, and the security situation in general deteriorated
rapidly.  Within the minority community there occurred a further
alienation from the authorities and the security forces, together with
a rise in support for the IRA.

43.  Although surprised by the extent of this reaction, both the
Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom Governments continued their
efforts to secure political progress.  In London, the Home Secretary
announced in September 1971 his Government's determination to ensure
that the Catholic population in the province should have an active,
permanent and guaranteed rôle in the conduct of public business.  In
the same month, a meeting took place in England between the Prime
Ministers of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and the Irish
Republic.  In October, the Belfast Government published proposals for
involving the opposition in government.  However, these proposals were
considered unacceptable by the political representatives of the
Catholic community and nothing came of them.

44.  Neither internment nor the political initiatives ended the
violence.  On the contrary, the numbers of deaths, explosions and
shootings recorded by the police for each month throughout the period
from August to December 1971 were higher than those recorded in any of
the previous seven months of the year.  There was a total
of 146 persons killed, including 47 members of the security
forces and 99 civilians, 729 explosions and 1,437 shooting incidents.

45.  Apart from rioting and a small-scale bombing campaign of licensed
premises, there was apparently little serious violence by Protestants
in 1971.  Only one death occurring between August and the end of the
year, an assassination of a Protestant in September, was attributed by
the police to Loyalists.  On the other hand, intimidation of members
of the opposite community to move from their homes seems to have
become more prevalent on both sides, although the official figures
indicate that Catholics were principally affected.

46.  On the Protestant side, the increased violence at this time led
to the formation of defence associations or vigilante groups which
ultimately amalgamated in or about September 1971 to become the Ulster
Defence Association (UDA).  The UDA did not appear openly on the
streets until the spring of 1972.  There was also seen the start of a
development later to become significant, that is the holding of large,
carefully prepared parades by Loyalist organisations (see paragraph 51
below).  The latter and in particular the UDA were looked on by the
police as primarily political organisations not engaged in violence as
such.

47.  At the beginning of 1972, despite a small drop, the level of
violence remained higher than at any time before 9 August 1971.  On
30 January 1972, 13 people were killed by army gunfire in the course of
disorders taking place in the predominantly Catholic town of
Londonderry.  This incident led to a new upsurge in support for the
IRA amongst the Catholic community.

In the first three months of 1972, 87 people were killed,
including 27 members of the security forces.  Two assassinations
carried out in March, one of a Protestant and the other of a Catholic,
were the only deaths attributed to Loyalist activity.  421 explosions,
the vast majority attributed to the IRA, were caused during the same
period.

48.  From August 1971 until 30 March 1972 there had been in Northern
Ireland 1,130 bomb explosions and well over 2,000 shooting incidents.
158 civilians, 58 soldiers and 17 policemen had been killed,
and 2,505 civilians, 306 soldiers and 107 RUC members injured.

Throughout these months the numbers held under detention or internment
orders proceeded to rise until a total of over 900 persons, all
suspected of involvement with the IRA, were held at the end of
March 1972.  At the same time, the ordinary processes of the criminal
law continued to be used, against Protestants as well as Catholics,
whenever there was thought to be sufficient evidence to ground a
criminal conviction.  Thus, between 9 August 1971 and 31 March 1972,
over 1,600 people were charged with "terrorist-type" offences.

49.  In March 1972, in view of the deteriorating circumstances, the
Government in London decided that they should assume direct
responsibility for the administration of law and order in Northern
Ireland if there was to be any hope of political progress.  This
decision was unacceptable to the Government of the province and
accordingly it was announced on 24 March 1972 that direct rule from
Westminster not only on law and order but on all matters was to be
introduced.

Under the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972
(hereinafter referred to as the "Temporary Provisions Act"), which was
passed by the United Kingdom Parliament and came into force on
30 March 1972, temporary provision was made for the exercise of the
executive and legislative powers of the Northern Ireland Parliament
and Government by the United Kingdom authorities.  The Belfast
Parliament was prorogued and the Queen empowered to legislate in its
stead by Order in Council.  The executive powers of the Belfast
Government were transferred to the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland.  This was a new office created for the purpose; its holder
was a member of the United Kingdom Government and answerable to the
United Kingdom Parliament.  The legislation was enacted for a period
of one year but was subsequently extended.

E. 30 MARCH 1972 (INTRODUCTION OF DIRECT RULE) UNTIL 5 FEBRUARY 1973
(FIRST DETENTION OF LOYALISTS)

50.  On assuming direct rule, the United Kingdom Government stated
that one of their most important objectives was to bring internment
under the Special Powers Act to an end and to consider how far the
powers under that Act could be dispensed with.  On 7 April 1972, the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced the immediate
release of 47 internees and 26 detainees.  By mid-May 259 persons had
been released.  The decision to phase out internment was not dictated
by any fall in the level of violence.  Rather it was intended to open
the way for political progress by reducing tension as the first step
in the process of reconciliation.

On the political level, the United Kingdom was seeking the
establishment of an equitable form of government for Northern Ireland,
acceptable to both communities.

51.  The introduction of direct rule, together with the release of
detainees, caused resentment and dismay amongst the Protestant
community.  A two-day strike, which proved largely effective, was
immediately called by the leader of one of the extremist movements on
the Loyalist side.

Street demonstrations and marches called by the UDA appear to have
begun shortly after 30 March 1972.  The UDA was organised on
pseudo-military lines, its members, estimated at between 20,000 and
30,000 persons, giving themselves military ranks.  The UDA used its
forces to erect barricades, set up road blocks and disrupt civil life
generally.  They paraded in large numbers through the centre of
Belfast and elsewhere, many of them masked and dressed in
para-military uniforms and on occasions openly carrying weapons such
as sticks or cudgels.  Such demonstrations, however, seem rarely to
have led to physical violence.  Whilst it was illegal to block roads,
wear uniforms or carry offensive weapons, the security forces did not
attempt to arrest those taking part in UDA demonstrations since they
feared that major riots would result.  Neither were the extrajudicial
powers of detention and internment ever used, against either Catholics
or Protestants, to combat this kind of illegal activity.

According to the respondent Government, consideration was given to the
possibility of proscribing the UDA, but it was decided that on balance
no good purpose would be served by doing so, not least because most of
its members were not engaged in violence.  It is generally accepted,
however, that UDA membership overlapped, to some extent at least, with
the smaller and more militant extremist bodies which were illegal,
such as the UVF (see paragraph 20 above).

52.  Other aspects of Loyalist activity during this stage of the
crisis included the erection of barricades and the continuing
intimidation of Catholics, a problem that became particularly grave in
the summer of 1972.  There were serious disturbances in Protestant
areas in September and October 1972, with Loyalist terrorists
exchanging fire with the security forces.  The rioting in October
ceased after the UDA had ordered the confrontation with the security
forces to stop.

53.  After the introduction of direct rule, there occurred a marked
upward turn in Loyalist terrorism, evidenced by a few bombing attacks,
a large-scale build-up of arms and ammunitions, and above all
sectarian assassinations.

Sectarian assassinations, which the respondent Government term the
outstanding feature of Loyalist violence since 1972, first reached
serious proportions in the spring of 1972.  Victims seem largely to
have been chosen at random on no other ground than their membership
of, or links with, the other community.  Kidnapping and torturing
sometimes accompanied this kind of indiscriminate killing.  While both
sides committed sectarian murders, it is generally accepted that
Protestants were responsible for more than Catholics.  The police had
difficulty in detecting those responsible for sectarian
assassinations.  In particular, witnesses were reluctant to come
forward and were subjected to intimidation.  Accordingly, a
confidential telephone system was installed in August 1972, whereby
information could be given anonymously to the security forces.

54.  Although Loyalist terrorist activity had grown significantly, it
nonetheless remained that the great bulk of serious violence in this
period was attributed to the IRA (see paragraph 61 below).  The high
level of IRA terrorism did not at all abate despite the phasing-out of
internment.  In fact, there was a steady rise in explosions, shooting
incidents and casualties amongst the security forces over the period
from March until the end of May.  However, on 29 May 1972 the Official
IRA, who had been responsible for a lesser amount of violence than the
Provisionals, declared a truce which they have on the whole respected
ever since.  On 22 June 1972 the Provisional IRA in their turn
announced a truce, becoming effective on 26 June.  The Provisionals'
truce was, however, called off on 9 July following an incident arising
out of a communal argument between the UDA and Catholics about the
allocation of accommodation on a Belfast housing estate.

55.  After the breakdown of the ceasefire, Provisional IRA violence
was resumed at an increased level.  In July 1972 alone, 21 members of
the security forces and 74 civilians were killed; in addition, there
were nearly 200 explosions and 2,800 shooting incidents.  These figures
were the highest for any month in the entire emergency up to the end
of 1974.  Responsibility was attributed to Loyalists for 18 deaths and
only 2 explosions.

56.  Faced with the mounting tide of violence, the United Kingdom
Government decided to restore the presence of the security forces in
the "no-go" areas.  After due warning had been given to the civilian
population, a large-scale manoeuvre, known as Operation Motorman, was
mounted on 31 July beginning at 4.00 a.m.

Even after Operation Motorman the police were still not able to
function properly in Catholic areas.  Access to Protestant areas
remained easier for the police and they were not subject there to the
same risk of attack.  The army operated principally, and was employed
to carry out police duties, in those areas where the minority
community predominated.

57.  Nevertheless, the level of violence, although still high,
immediately fell.  In August, September and October, there was an
overall total of approximately 2,200 shooting incidents as opposed to
2,800 for July alone.  The monthly average of deaths was less than
half the July total, and the number of explosions became progressively
less.

According to the respondent Government, a development contributing to
the maintenance of this gradual reduction was the institution in
November 1972 of a revised system for the detention of terrorists.

In the months following the introduction of direct rule - including
July, the worst of these months for violence - no new internment
orders were made and fresh detentions virtually ceased.  From
September onwards, after the breakdown of the attempted ceasefire, the
number of detention orders - as before, against IRA suspects only -
increased, while the rate of releases fell.  There was, however, no
large-scale operation to re-detain and re-intern people.

58.  The political gesture of phasing out internment had not, as
hoped, elicited a positive response from the IRA; on the contrary,
violence had mounted to fresh heights.  Furthermore, the authorities
judged that the capability of the ordinary processes of law to counter
IRA terrorism continued to be impeded by a number of circumstances
such as the intimidation of potential witnesses and the difficulty of
bringing to trial those responsible for directing terrorist
operations.

The United Kingdom Government therefore became convinced that it was
necessary to find fresh means of separating known terrorists from the
population at large.  On 21 September 1972, the Government announced
that it was to set up a Commission, subsequently appointed in October
under the chairmanship of Lord Diplock,

- to consider "what arrangements for the administration of justice in
Northern Ireland could be made in order to deal more effectively with
terrorist organisations by bringing to book, otherwise than by
internment by the Executive, individuals involved in terrorist
activities, particularly those who plan and direct, but do not
necessarily take part in, terrorist acts"; and

- "to make recommendations".

Without waiting for the report of the Diplock Commission, the
Government brought into effect on 7 November 1972 the Detention of
Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (abbreviated hereafter to the
"Terrorists Order"), an Order made in exercise of the powers conferred
by the Temporary Provisions Act (see paragraph 49 above).  This Order,
which was of a temporary nature, revoked Regulations 11 (2)
(detention) and 12 (1) (internment); in replacement it instituted,
with further procedural guarantees for the protection of the
individual concerned, a new system of "interim custody" and
"detention" for persons suspected of participation in terrorist
activities.  Regulations 10 and 11 (1) (arrest) remained.  Further
details on the Order are given below at paragraphs 85 to 87.

59.  The report of the Diplock Commission was presented to the United
Kingdom Parliament in December 1972.  This report analysed the minimum
requirements of a judicial process, the effects of intimidation,
possible changes in the rules of evidence and the need for detention
without trial.  It stated, inter alia:

"The fear of intimidation is widespread and well-founded.  Until it can
be removed and the personal safety of witnesses and their families
guaranteed, the use by the Executive of some extrajudicial process for
the detention of terrorists cannot be dispensed with."

The European Commission of Human Rights, on the basis of the evidence
it had itself obtained, accepted that the findings of the Diplock
report as to the level of intimidation were generally warranted.

60.  Another contributory factor invoked by the respondent Government
in connection with the fall in violence (see paragraph 57 above) was
the intensive programme of consultations which they undertook with the
political parties in Northern Ireland on the question of the future
government of the province.  These consultations, first commenced in
July and August 1972, continued throughout the last weeks of 1972 and
the early months of 1973.  Apart from the steps taken on the security
front, the United Kingdom Government thus maintained the new emphasis
placed, since the introduction of direct rule, on attempting to find a
solution to the crisis through political means (see paragraph 50
above).

61.  The gradual reduction in the level of violence was maintained
until the end of this period.  The figures for deaths and explosions
for January 1973 were, with one slight exception, lower than for any
month since the introduction of internment.  Despite this general
reduction, though, the development of Loyalist militancy and terrorist
activity continued.

From 1 April 1972 until 31 January 1973, 398 persons were killed,
72 of these deaths being attributed to Loyalists.  The overall total
included 123 members of the security forces, the vast majority of whom
were considered to have been killed by the IRA, and an equal number of
victims of "factional or sectarian" assassinations.  Of these
assassinations, 69 were ascribed to Loyalists, 34 to the IRA, with no
attribution being possible in the remaining 20 cases.

For their part, explosions totalled 1,141; no more than a small
percentage - for example, 29 out of 691 explosions recorded between
1 July 1972 and 31 January 1973 - were regarded as being the work of
Loyalists.

The increasing Protestant militancy was further evidenced by the
statistics on intimidation, arms and ammunitions recovered, and
charges brought for "terrorist-type offences".  Thus, between
31 July 1972 and 31 January 1973, charges of the kind just referred to
were laid against 640 persons, namely 402 Catholics and
238 Protestants; within this total, 45 individuals - 24 Protestants,
including 16 in the one month of January 1973, and 21 Catholics - were
charged with murder or attempted murder.

62.  Loyalist terrorism was linked by the police with Protestant
extremist organisations, notably the UVF.  The police considered that
the UVF's membership and acts of terrorism had increased from 1972
onwards following a period of relative inactivity after its 1969
bombing campaign (see paragraphs 24 and 30 above).  It was looked on
as a well-armed and organised body.  In general, by about the middle
of 1972 the police had reasonably good intelligence as to the identity
of the violent elements on the Protestant side, but there were cases in
1972 in which it was impossible to procure sufficient evidence to
bring such persons before the ordinary criminal courts.  Nevertheless,
none of the extrajudicial orders made between the introduction of
direct rule and 5 February 1973 (see paragraph 64 below) applied to
Loyalists.

63.  Loyalist violence, however, remained on a far smaller scale than
that of the Provisional IRA who, as the above-cited figures show, were
still responsible for the great bulk of the terrorist deeds recorded.

In the view of the respondent Government and of the Commission,
Loyalist and IRA violence were to be distinguished in further respects
in addition to volume.  Loyalist terrorism consisted largely of
intimidation and sectarian assassinations, whereas the IRA campaign
also included attacks on members of the security forces and the
bombing of public places.  As indicated earlier (paragraph 37 above),
the character, aims and background of the various organisations
engaged in terrorism on the two sides differed.  The evidence suggests
that the Loyalist terrorist groups were at the time more amorphous
than the IRA.  Within the security forces there was a tendency, which
the Commission regarded as justified in many ways, to look on Loyalist
terrorists as "criminals" or "hooligans" and on the IRA as the
organised "terrorist" enemy.  The prospects of obtaining sufficient
admissible evidence for a criminal prosecution were, it seems, judged
by the security forces as being better in relation to Loyalists than
to IRA suspects.  Given the continued inability of the police to
operate normally in Catholic areas and the greater extent and
organisation of the IRA campaign, the Commission found such an
attitude "not surprising".

Finally, the statistics referred to above at paragraph 61 indicate
that action, in the form of searches, recovery of arms and the
bringing of criminal charges, was being taken by the authorities
against both sides.

64.  From 30 March until 7 November 1972 no new internment orders were
made, although it was considered necessary to make 107 detention
orders under Regulation 11 (2).  By the latter date 628 men had been
released from internment and 334 from detention, leaving 167 still
interned and 119 still detained.  Between the entry into force of the
Terrorists Order and 31 January 1973, 166 interim custody orders and
128 detention orders were made while 94 persons were released.

65.  In the context of the period from 30 March 1972 to
5 February 1973, the Commission noted in its report that subsequent to
the introduction of direct rule the extrajudicial powers appear to
have been exercised on a more selective basis and, broadly speaking,
in accordance with the following criteria:

(i) extrajudicial orders were served only on persons suspected of
involvement in serious and organised terrorism;

(ii) they were used solely as a "last resort", that is only in cases
where sufficient evidence was not available to justify prosecution
before the ordinary courts;

(iii) as a general practice, they were not made against a person in
respect of matters for which he had been tried and acquitted by an
ordinary court, provided that it had been possible to put before the
court all the relevant evidence.

66.  At the beginning of February 1973, a British soldier was shot
dead in a Protestant part of Belfast.  Shortly afterwards, on
5 February 1973, two interim custody orders were made in respect of
Loyalists.  These two men were the first Loyalists against whom the
extrajudicial powers were exercised.  According to the applicant
Government, the specific act of which one of these men was suspected
- the bombing of a bus, responsibility for which had been claimed
immediately after the event by the UVF - had caused a public outcry
and had actually forced a decision to "intern" the first suspected
Protestant terrorist.  The decision itself had been the subject of
discussions between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the
General Officer Commanding the British forces in the province and high
ranking civil servants.  The relevant higher authorities are noted in
the Commission's report as recognising that the detention of Loyalists
would lead to repercussions in the security situation.  The Commission
accepts that the risk of a severe outbreak of Protestant violence in
response was clearly a very real one.

Prior to February 1973, it seems, no recommendations had been made to
the Secretary of State for the detention or internment of Loyalists.

F. 5 FEBRUARY 1973 ONWARDS

67.  According to the applicant Government, the exercise of the
extrajudicial powers against Loyalists brought in its wake widespread
threats from the UDA.  In general, however, the pattern of violence
from February 1973 onwards can be said to have followed the previous
pattern, although at a somewhat lower level than in 1972.  The bulk of
the terrorist acts, that is most of the bombing and shooting attacks
on members of the security forces were still perpetrated by the
Provisional IRA, with the Loyalists committing the majority of the
sectarian assassinations.

From 1 February 1973 until 31 October 1974, the police registered
403 deaths, of which 116 were considered to be the responsibility of
Loyalists.  Of the 145 "factional or sectarian" murders recorded,
95 were ascribed to Loyalists and 40 to the IRA and in 10 cases no
attribution was possible.  In these twenty-two months, the number of
explosions dropped to less than 1,600 - about 330 being attributed to
Loyalists - as compared with approximately 1,400 in the one year of
1972.  For their part, shootings fell from 10,628 to 7,112, although
an increase occurred in punishment shootings such as "executions" and
"knee-cappings".

68.  On 8 August 1973, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act 1973 (hereafter abbreviated to the "Emergency Provisions Act")
came into force.  This Act, which was based mainly on the
recommendations of the Diplock Commission (see paragraphs 58 and 59
above), repealed the 1922 Special Powers Act, Regulations 10 and
11 (1) and the 1972 Terrorists Order, while retaining in substance the
procedure laid down in the latter Order.  Briefly, the extrajudicial
powers introduced under the Emergency Provisions Act were: (i) arrest
and detention for 72 hours; (ii) interim custody for 28 days; and
(iii) detention (see paragraphs 88 and 89 below for a fuller
explanation).  These emergency powers remained in force for a period of
one year unless renewed.  The Act also dealt with the trial and
punishment by the ordinary courts of certain scheduled offences, for
the most part offences concerned with violence.  One provision,
section 6, is referred to below at paragraph 136.

69.  Between 1 February 1973 and 31 October 1974, interim custody
orders were served on 99 Protestants and 626 Catholics; at all times
many more Catholics than Protestants were actually held.  Shortly
before Christmas 1973, 65 detainees, 63 of whom were Catholics, were
released.

70.  During the same period, 2,478 persons were charged with
"terrorist-type offences", the total being made up as follows:
1,042 Protestants, 1,420 Catholics and 16 soldiers.  These figures
included 60 Protestants and 66 Catholics charged with murder.  In
addition, searches were being conducted and arms recovered in relation
to both sides.

71.  While the level of violence was reduced in the years 1973 and
1974, progress on the political front was somewhat erratic.  In
March 1973, the United Kingdom Government published a White Paper
setting out proposals for the constitutional future of the six
counties.  These proposals envisaged a new regional government with
participation at "cabinet" level by representatives of both
communities.  A 1973 Act provided for the election of a Northern
Ireland Assembly before the main constitutional legislation was
enacted.  Elections, based on the principle of proportional
representation in order to ensure a fair representation for the
Catholic minority, were held on 30 June 1973.  Of the 78 members
elected to the Assembly, 51 were in favour of the proposed
constitutional changes, even though the extreme Loyalist parties had
conducted a campaign of opposition.

72.  The White Paper proposals were enacted in July 1973 in the form
of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973.  This Act empowered the
Assembly to legislate within certain limits and established an
Executive.  A Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights was
instituted to advise the Secretary of State.  The Act also
specifically provided that legislation passed by the Assembly would be
void if it discriminated on the ground of religious belief or
political opinion; in addition, discrimination by public authorities
on such grounds was expressly rendered unlawful.

The provisions of the Act relating to legislative and executive powers
required the passing by the United Kingdom Parliament of a Devolution
Order.  The Order was made on 19 December 1973 and the devolution
became effective on 1 January 1974.  This devolution, which was based
on the principle of "power-sharing" between the two communities,
marked for a certain time the end of direct rule.

73.  The Northern Ireland Executive came into office on
1 January 1974.  For the first time, a Northern Ireland Government
contained representatives of both the majority and minority
communities, but its life proved to be very brief.  In May 1974,
Protestant extremist groups combined to organise a politically
motivated strike which brought about the downfall of the Executive and
a return to direct rule from Westminster.  On 29 May, Her Majesty,
acting under the Constitution Act referred to in the preceding
paragraph, by Order in Council directed that the Northern Ireland
Assembly should stand prorogued for four months.

On 17 July 1974, the Northern Ireland Act 1974 was passed by the
United Kingdom Parliament in order to make temporary provision for the
government of the six counties.  This Act suspended the functions of
the above-mentioned Assembly and enabled laws to be made by Order in
Council, enacted that no appointments to the Executive were to be
made, and made the province's departments subject to the direction and
control of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

74.  In 1974, the United Kingdom Government appointed the
Gardiner Committee whose terms of reference were to consider what
provisions and powers, consistent to the maximum extent practicable in
the circumstances with the preservation of civil liberties and human
rights, were required to deal with terrorism and subversion in
Northern Ireland, including provisions for the administration of
justice; to examine the working of the 1973 Emergency Provisions Act;
and to make recommendations.

The report of the Gardiner Committee was presented to the United
Kingdom Parliament in January 1975.  This report critically examined
trial procedures before the ordinary courts, existing and proposed
offences connected with terrorism, the powers of the security forces,
prison accommodation, special category prisoners and detention.  When
dealing with the question of detention, the Gardiner Committee noted
at paragraph 143:

"...  We have detailed evidence of 482 cases of intimidation of
witnesses between 1st January 1972 and 31st August 1974: and there
must be many more.  Civilian witnesses to murder and other terrorist
offences are either too afraid to make any statement at all, or,
having made a statement identifying the criminal, refuse in any
circumstances to give evidence in court.  The prevalence of murder and
knee-capping make this only too easy to understand."

The Gardiner Committee, while making certain recommendations about
detention and existing detention procedures, concluded at
paragraphs 148 and 149:

"After long and anxious consideration, we are of the opinion that
detention cannot remain as a long-term policy.  In the short term, it
may be an effective means of containing violence, but the prolonged
effects of the use of detention are ultimately inimical to community
life, fan a widespread sense of grievance and injustice, and obstruct
those elements in Northern Ireland society which could lead to
reconciliation.  Detention can only be tolerated in a democratic
society in the most extreme circumstances; it must be used with the
utmost restraint and retained only as long as it is strictly
necessary.  We would like to be able to recommend that the time has
come to abolish detention; but the present level of violence, the
risks of increased violence, and the difficulty of predicting events
even a few months ahead make it impossible for us to put forward a
precise recommendation on the timing.

We think that this grave decision can only be made by the Government
 ..."

75.  The Emergency Provisions Act of 1973, the main subject of the
examination by the Gardiner Committee, was extended by Orders of
17 July 1974, 17 December 1974 and 27 June 1975.  On 7 August 1975,
the United Kingdom Parliament, acting on the recommendations of the
Gardiner report, passed the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
(Amendment) Act 1975 (hereafter abbreviated to the "Emergency
Provisions Amendment Act").  This Act, which came into effect on
21 August 1975, amended the law relating to detention without trial
(see paragraph 90 below), as well as containing further provisions
concerned with criminal proceedings, the maintenance of order and the
detection of crime in Northern Ireland.  The Emergency Provisions
Amendment Act is still in force, having twice been continued by
Parliamentary Resolution.

76.  No detailed statistics for the year 1975 are before the Court,
although a few figures as to murder charges appear in the Commission's
report.  By 19 June, the police had been able to bring criminal
charges against a total of 73 Protestants and 20 Catholics in respect
of 49 sectarian murders.

On 5 December 1975, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland signed
orders for the release from detention of the last 75 individuals held
under the emergency legislation.  Since December 1975, according to
the data before the Court, no person has been held in detention under
the extrajudicial measures in Northern Ireland.

The terrorism and violence in the province have persisted through 1976
until the present day, accounting, for instance, for the murders of
173 persons and injuries to 770 others between 1 January and
28 June 1976.

77.  The respondent Government have drawn attention, before both the
Commission and the Court, to the continuous programme of reform
implemented in Northern Ireland since 1969 in order to tackle the
problems of unfair discrimination which had prompted the civil rights
movement.  Radical changes have been made in the structure of local
government in the province: universal suffrage was introduced in 1969,
proportional representation in 1972, local government boundaries were
revised in 1973, and many important functions such as education and
housing were transferred to special area boards or to central
government bodies in the hope of ending or reducing the fear of
discrimination in the social field.  In 1969, the Northern Ireland
Government established a Parliamentary Commissioner (i.e. Ombudsman)
for Administration and a Commissioner for Complaints.  The provisions
of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973 directed against
discrimination have already been referred to (paragraph 72 above).
The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, set up under the
last-mentioned Act, began in 1975 a detailed study of the extent to
which the existing legislation provides a sufficient protection for
human rights in the six counties.  Legislation making discrimination
unlawful in the private sector was introduced in 1976.

II. EXTRAJUDICIAL DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY

78.  During the period under consideration, in addition to the
ordinary criminal law which remained in force and in use, the
authorities had various special powers to combat terrorism in Northern
Ireland.  These were all discretionary and underwent modification from
time to time, as is described below; they enabled the authorities to
effect extrajudicial deprivation of liberty falling into the following
three basic categories:

- initial arrest for interrogation;

- detention for further interrogation (originally called "detention"
and subsequently "interim custody");

- preventive detention (originally called "internment" and
subsequently "detention").

79.  In accordance with Article 15 para. 3 (art. 15-3) of the Convention,
the United Kingdom Government sent to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe, both before and after the original application to
the Commission, six notices of derogation in respect of these powers.
Such notices, of which the first two are not pertinent in the present
case, were dated 27 June 1957, 25 September 1969, 20 August 1971,
23 January 1973, 16 August 1973 and 19 September 1975 and drew
attention to the relevant legislation and modifications thereof.

A. THE SPECIAL POWERS ACT AND REGULATIONS THEREUNDER

80.  The Special Powers Act empowered the Minister of Home Affairs for
Northern Ireland, until 30 March 1972, or, thereafter and until
8 August 1973, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to take all
such steps and issue all such orders as might be necessary for
preserving peace and maintaining order.  It was an enabling Act whose
substantive provisions were contained in Regulations made thereunder.
Before direct rule, either House of Parliament of Northern Ireland
could, at the time Regulations were made, request the Governor to
annul them; subsequently, new Regulations were subject to approval by
the United Kingdom Parliament.

The number and scope of the Regulations in force varied over the
years; they could be brought into use without any legislative act or
proclamation.  Those relevant to the present case were made in 1956
(Regulations 11 and 12) and 1957 (Regulation 10).  They were utilised
to implement the policy of internment introduced on 9 August 1971 and
advice of their use was given to the Secretary-General by the United
Kingdom Government's notice of derogation of 20 August 1971 (Yearbook
of the Convention, volume 14, page 32).  They conferred the four
powers described below.

1. Arrest under Regulation 10

81.  Under this Regulation

- any individual could be arrested without warrant and detained for
the purpose of interrogation;

- the arrest could be authorised by any officer of the RUC;

- the officer had to be of the opinion that the arrest should be
effected "for the preservation of the peace and maintenance of order";

- the detention could not exceed forty-eight hours.

Exercise of the power was not conditional on suspicion of an offence
and, following a practice originating in instructions issued to the
military police in May 1970, the individual was not normally informed
of the reason for his arrest.  Although looked upon in principle as a
preliminary to detention and internment (see paragraphs 83 and 84
below), arrest sometimes had the object of interrogating a person
about the activities of others.  Some arrests, and some subsequent
detention orders, seem to have been made on the basis of inadequate or
inaccurate information.

The individual could not apply for bail (see the judgment of
12 October 1971 delivered by the High Court of Justice in Northern
Ireland in the case of In Re McElduff).  Moreover, arrests under this
Regulation could not as a general rule be questioned in the courts but
it was held in the judgment of 18 February 1972 delivered by the
Armagh County Court in the case of Moore v. Shillington and Ministry
of Defence that failure to comply with the proper procedure, including
certain fundamental principles of the common law, invalidated exercise
of the power.

On 8 August 1973 the Emergency Provisions Act (see paragraph 88 below)
repealed Regulation 10.  2,937 persons had been arrested thereunder
prior to 30 March 1972, of whom 1,711 had been released within
forty-eight hours and 1,226 had had their detention prolonged under
other Regulations.

2. Arrest under Regulation 11 (1)

82.  Under this Regulation

- any individual could be arrested without warrant;

- the arrest could be effected by any police constable, member of the
forces or person authorised by the "Civil Authority" (i.e. the
Minister of Home Affairs or his delegates);

- the person making the arrest had to suspect the individual of
acting, having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to
the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order or of having
committed an offence against the Regulations;

- the duration of the arrest was unlimited in law but limited in
practice to seventy-two hours.

Arrest under this Regulation could follow arrest under Regulation 10,
giving a total of at most one hundred and twenty hours.  The
individual was not normally informed of the reason for his arrest.

Judicial decisions show that review by the courts of the exercise of
this power was limited.  They could intervene if there had been bad
faith, absence of a genuine suspicion, improper motive or failure to
comply either with the statutory procedures or with such principles of
the common law as were held not to be excluded by the language of the
Regulation; however, they could not in general enquire into the
reasonableness or fairness of the suspicion or of the decision to
exercise the power (see the McElduff case and the judgment of
11 January 1973 delivered by the High Court of Justice in Northern
Ireland in the case of Kelly v. Faulkner and others).

Under Regulation 11 (4), the individual could apply to the Civil
Authority for release on bail and, if that Authority so directed,
might be conditionally discharged from custody by a magistrate;
however, this right was abolished on 7 November 1972 with the
revocation of Regulation 11 (4) by the Terrorists Order
(see paragraph 85 below).

Regulation 11 (1) was repealed on 8 August 1973 by the Emergency
Provisions Act (see paragraph 88 below).

3. Detention under Regulation 11 (2)

83.  Under this Regulation

- any individual arrested under Regulation 11 (1) could be detained in
prison or elsewhere on the conditions directed by the Civil Authority;

- the power to make detention orders was vested in the Civil Authority
and the initiative for them came from the police.  The respondent
Government said that they were always made on the personal decision,
before direct rule, of the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland or,
thereafter, of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or two
other Ministers;

- detention continued until the individual was discharged by the
Attorney-General or brought before a court.  Its duration was unlimited
in law but limited in practice, generally, to twenty-eight days.

The respondent Government said that detention orders were made to
enable the police to complete enquiries.  If they had sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction, the individual would be brought
before an ordinary court in which event he was entitled to at least
twenty-four hours' notice of the charge.  Alternatively, he might be
released after a limited period or be the subject of an internment
order (see paragraph 84 below).

The detainee had the limited right to apply for bail afforded by
Regulation 11 (4) (see paragraph 82 above).  The position concerning
supervision by the courts was the same as under Regulations 10 and
11 (1) (see the McElduff and the Kelly cases) and there was no other
procedure for review of the detention.

More than 1,250 detention orders were made under Regulation 11 (2),
the vast majority before 30 March 1972.  Nearly 120 orders were still
in force on 7 November 1972 when the Regulation was revoked by the
Terrorists Order (see paragraph 85 below).

4. Internment under Regulation 12 (1)

84.  Under this Regulation

- any individual could by order be subjected to restrictions on
movement or interned;

- the power to make such orders was vested before direct rule in the
Minister of Home Affairs for Northern Ireland on the recommendation of
a senior police officer or of an advisory committee.  The respondent
Government said that they were always made on the personal decision of
the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland;

- the Minister had to be satisfied that for securing the preservation
of the peace and the maintenance of order it was expedient that a
person suspected of acting, having acted or being about to act in a
manner prejudicial te peace and order be subjected to such
restrictions or interned;

- the duration of internment was unlimited.  In many cases, after
prolongation under later legislation (see paragraphs 85 and 88 below),
it lasted for some years.

Every order had to provide for the consideration by and advisory
committee of representations made by the individual.  In fact it
reviewed the position of all internees whether they made
representations or not.  The committee, composed of a judge and two
laymen, could recommend, but not order, release.

The individual had no right in law to appear or be legally represented
before the committee, to test the grounds for internment, to examine
witnesses against him or to call his own witnesses.  In fact, he was
allowed to appear and be interviewed and every effort was made to
trace witnesses he proposed.  The committee required the security
forces to produce the information in their possession but statements
of evidence against the internee so obtained remained anonymous,
apparently to avoid retaliation.  According to the Commission, the
committee probably relied on evidence not admissible in a court of
law.

The position concerning the review of internment orders by the courts
was the same as under Regulations 10, 11 (1) and 11 (2) (see the Kelly
case).

796 orders were made under Regulation 12 (1), all before the
introduction of direct rule.  Nearly 170 orders were still in force on
7 November 1972 when the Regulation was revoked by the Terrorists
Order (see paragraph 85 below).

By 30 March 1972, 588 of the 796 cases had been reviewed by the
advisory committee (although 451 internees refused to appear)
and 69 releases recommended.  Of the 69 individuals all were released
except 6 who refused to give an undertaking as to future good
behaviour.

B. THE TERRORISTS ORDER

85.  The Terrorists Order, a temporary measure made under the
Temporary Provisions Act (see paragraph 49 above), introduced an
independent review of decisions on detention for further interrogation
and on preventive detention whereas, previously, such decisions had
been taken by the administrative authority alone.  The Order revoked
with effect from 7 November 1972 Special Powers Regulations 11 (2) and
(4) and 12 (1) - but not 10 and 11 (1) - and converted existing
detention or internment orders into interim custody orders (see
paragraph 86 below).  The Order defined "terrorism" as "the use of
violence for political ends [including] any use of violence for the
purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear".

The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe was advised of the
making of this Order by the United Kingdom Government's notice of
derogation of 23 January 1973 (Yearbook of the Convention, volume 16,
pages 24 and 26).  The Order conferred the powers described below and
was repealed by the Emergency Provisions Act on 8 August 1973 (see
paragraph 88 below).

1. Interim custody under Article 4

86.  Under this Article

- any individual could by an interim custody order be temporarily
detained;

- the power to make such orders was vested in the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland;

- the power was exercisable where it appeared to the Secretary of
State that the individual was suspected of having been concerned in
the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or the
organisation of persons for the purpose of terrorism;

- detention was limited to twenty-eight days unless the case was
referred by the Chief Constable - or, as regards persons originally
held under the Special Powers Regulations, by the Secretary of State -
to a commissioner for determination, in which event it could continue
only until such determination.

The individual had to be released after twenty-eight days if his case
had not by then been referred to a commissioner but, in fact, all
cases, including those of persons originally detained or interned
under the Special Powers Regulations, were so referred.  During the
order's initial twenty-eight days and during its extension pending the
commissioner's adjudication, which could take up to six months, the
individual had no means under the Terrorists Order of challenging the
lawfulness of his detention.

Figures for interim custody orders appear in paragraph 89 below.

2. Detention under Article 5

87.  Under this Article

- where the case of an individual subject to an interim custody order
under Article 4 was referred to a commissioner, he could make a
detention order for that individual's detention;

- the commissioner had first to satisfy himself by enquiry that the
individual had been concerned in the commission or attempted
commission of any act of terrorism or the organisation of persons for
the purpose of terrorism and that his detention was necessary for the
protection of the public.  If so satisfied, he had to make an order;
if not, he had to direct the individual's discharge;

- the duration of detention was unlimited.  In many cases, after
prolongation under later legislation (see paragraph 88 below), it
lasted for some years.

Unlike the recommendation of the advisory committee under
Regulation 12 (1), a commissioner's decision to release was binding.
The Secretary of State retained independent powers to release
detainees with or without conditions and to recall to detention an
individual conditionally released by him.  He could also at any time
refer a detention order case to a commissioner for review; in that
event discharge was obligatory unless the commissioner considered
continued detention necessary for public protection.

Proceedings before a commissioner took place in private.  At least
three days before the hearing the individual had to be notified in
writing of the nature of the terrorist activities to be enquired into.
He had the right to legal aid and to be legally represented and had to
be present unless removed on grounds of disorderly conduct or of
security.  He could be required to answer questions; he had no right
to examine or have examined witnesses against him but the respondent
Government said that, in practice, cross-examination took place.
The individual had to be informed, as far as possible, of matters
dealt with in his absence for security reasons but had no right to
test evidence given at that time.  The commissioner might receive
evidence however obtained and irrespective of whether it would be
admissible in a court of law.  This procedure applied, mutatis
mutandis, both to initial references to a commissioner and to later
references for review.

Article 6 of the Terrorists Order introduced a right for the
individual to appeal within twenty-one days against a detention order
to a detention appeal tribunal of at least three members.
Procedurally the individual's position before the tribunal was similar
to his position before a commissioner; however, he was entitled to be
present only when fresh evidence was produced, which was rare as the
tribunal generally relied on the evidence furnished to the
commissioner.

Both commissioners and members of the tribunal had to have experience
of judicial office or at least ten years' experience as a barrister,
advocate or solicitor.

Figures for detention orders appear in paragraph 89 below.

C. THE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS ACT

88.  The Emergency Provisions Act, based on the recommendations of the
Diplock Commission (see paragraph 59 above), repealed with effect from
8 August 1973 the Special Powers Act, Regulations 10 and 11 (1) and
the Terrorists Order but maintained in effect - under its own
provisions - the existing interim custody and detention orders.
The emergency powers contained in the new Act were to remain in force
for one year unless renewed for a period not exceeding one year by an
Order of the Secretary of State approved by both United Kingdom Houses
of Parliament; they were in fact renewed for six-monthly periods
commencing on 25 July 1974, 25 January 1975 and 25 July 1975 and then
amended on 21 August 1975 by the Emergency Provisions Amendment Act
(see paragraph 90 below).  The Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe was advised of the new legislation, and of the subsequent
renewal and amendment of the emergency powers, by the United Kingdom
Government's notices of derogation of 16 August 1973 (Yearbook of the
Convention, volume 16, pages 26 and 28) and 19 September 1975
(document DH (75) 5, page 5).

The new Act (section 10 (5) and Schedule 1) re-enacted, in substance,
the powers contained in the Terrorists Order, retaining its definition
of terrorism.  Accordingly, the powers to make interim custody and
detention orders, and the review thereof by a commissioner and the
appeal tribunal, continued in the manner, on the conditions and
subject to the procedure described in paragraph 86 and 87 above, with
the significant differences that:

- the individual had to receive a written statement concerning the
terrorist activities to be investigated by the commissioner at least
seven (rather than three) days before the hearing;

- in addition to his optional power to refer, the Secretary of State
had to refer to a commissioner the case of anyone held under a
detention order for one year since the making of the order or for
six months since the last review.

Section 10 of the Act also provided that any constable might arrest
without warrant a person whom he suspected of being a terrorist;
detention after arrest was limited to seventy-two hours.  The Act
conferred certain other powers of arrest (sections 11 and 12) which
are not in issue in the present case.

89.  Figures for interim custody and detention orders (under the
Terrorists Order and the Emergency Provisions Act) are:

- November 1972 to 1 February 1973: 166 interim custody orders (under
the Terrorists Order);

- November 1972 to January 1973: 128 individuals detained under the
Terrorists Order and 94 released;

- November 1972 to 5 September 1973: the commissioners reviewed 579
cases (296 interim custody orders made under the Terrorists Order or
the Emergency Provisions Act; 165 former internments and 118 former
detentions under the Special Powers Regulations); they made 453
detention orders and directed release in the remaining 126 cases;

- November 1972 to 3 October 1973: 44 appeals were lodged with the
detention appeal tribunal; 34 had been heard and 25 releases directed.

D. THE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS AMENDMENT ACT

90.  With effect from 21 August 1975, the Emergency Provisions
Amendment Act, based on the recommendations of the Gardiner Committee
(see paragraph 74 above), made, inter alia, new provisions for the
detention of terrorists which have not been the subject of the present
case.  The Act reverted to the principle of detention by order of the
Secretary of State, rather than of a commissioner, such order to be
preceded by a report from a legally qualified Adviser.

91.  As indicated in the United Kingdom Government's communication of
12 December 1975 to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
(Yearbook of the Convention, volume 18, page 18), on 5 December 1975
the Secretary of State signed orders for the release of the
last 75 persons detained under the emergency legislation; all were
released forthwith except those remanded in custody on criminal
charges or serving sentences of imprisonment.  Since then, according
to the data before the Court, the power to make detention orders under
the Emergency Provisions Amendment Act has not been exercised.

III. ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREATMENT

A. Introduction

92.  As recounted above at paragraphs 39 and 41, on 9 August 1971 and
thereafter numerous persons in Northern Ireland were arrested and
taken into custody by the security forces acting in pursuance of the
emergency powers.  The persons arrested were interrogated, usually by
members of the RUC, in order to determine whether they should be
interned and/or to compile information about the IRA.  In all, about
3,276 persons were processed by the police at various holding centres
from August 1971 until June 1972.  The holding centres were replaced
in July 1972 by police offices in Belfast and at Ballykelly Military
Barracks.

93.  Allegations of ill-treatment have been made by the applicant
Government in relation both to the initial arrests and to the
subsequent interrogations.  The applicant Government submitted written
evidence to the Commission in respect of 228 cases concerning
incidents between 9 August 1971 and 1974.

The procedure followed for the purposes of ascertaining the facts
(Article 28, sub-paragraph (a), of the Convention) (art. 28-a)
was one decided upon by the Commission and accepted by the Parties.
The Commission examined in detail with medical reports and oral
evidence 16 "illustrative" cases selected at its request by the
applicant Government.  The Commission considered a further 41 cases
(the so-called "41 cases") on which it had received medical reports
and invited written comments; it referred to the remaining cases.

The nature of the evidence submitted by the two Governments and the
procedure followed by the Commission in its investigation of such
evidence are set out in some detail in the Commission's report.  The
Commission came to view that neither the witnesses from the
security forces nor the case-witnesses put forward by the applicant
Government had given accurate and complete accounts of what had
happened.  Consequently, where the allegations of ill-treatment were in
dispute, the Commission treated as "the most important objective
evidence" the medical findings which were not contested as such.

The following account of events is based on the information set out in
the Commission's report and in the other documents before the Court.

94.  In order to protect the identity of certain persons, notably
witnesses, the published version of the Commission's report (see
paragraph 7 above) incorporated changes to the original text; these
changes mainly took the form of designating such persons by letters
and/or figures.

95.  The Commission grouped the cases into five categories, according
to the place where the ill-treatment was said to have been inflicted,
namely:

(1) the unidentified interrogation centre or centres;
(2) Palace Barracks, Holywood;
(3) Girdwood Park Barracks;
(4) Ballykinler Regional Holding Centre; and
(5) various other miscellaneous places.

B. THE UNIDENTIFIED INTERROGATION CENTRE OR CENTRES

96.  Twelve persons arrested on 9 August 1971 and two persons arrested
in October 1971 were singled out and taken to one or more unidentified
centres.  There, between 11 to 17 August and 11 to 18 October
respectively, they were submitted to a form of "interrogation in
depth" which involved the combined application of five particular
techniques.

These methods, sometimes termed "disorientation" or "sensory
deprivation" techniques, were not used in any cases other than the
fourteen so indicated above.  It emerges from the Commission's
establishment of the facts that the techniques consisted of:

(a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some
hours in a "stress position", described by those who underwent it as
being "spreadeagled against the wall, with their fingers put high
above the head against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet
back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of the body
mainly on the fingers";

(b) hooding: putting a black or navy coloured bag over the detainees'
heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all the time except
during interrogation;

(c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations, holding the
detainees in a room where there was a continuous loud and hissing
noise;

(d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations, depriving the
detainees of sleep;

(e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a
reduced diet during their stay at the centre and pending
interrogations.

The Commissions's findings as to the manner and effects of the
application of these techniques on two particular case-witnesses are
referred to below at paragraph 104.

97.  From the start, it has been conceded by the respondent Government
that the use of the five techniques was authorised at "high level".
Although never committed to writing or authorised in any official
document, the techniques had been orally taught to members of the RUC
by the English Intelligence Centre at a seminar held in April 1971.

98.  The two operations of interrogation in depth by means of the five
techniques led to the obtaining of a considerable quantity of
intelligence information, including the identification of 700 members
of both IRA factions and the discovery of individual responsibility
for about 85 previously unexplained criminal incidents.

99.  Reports alleging physical brutality and ill-treatment by the
security forces were made public within a few days of Operation
Demetrius (described above at paragraph 39).  A committee of enquiry
under the chairmanship of Sir Edmund Compton was appointed by the
United Kingdom Government on 31 August 1971 to investigate such
allegations.  Among the 40 cases this Committee examined were 11 cases
of persons subjected to the five techniques in August 1971; its
findings were that interrogation in depth by means of the techniques
constituted physical ill-treatment but not physical brutality as it
understood that term.  The Committee's report, adopted on
3 November 1971, was made public, as was a supplemental report of
14 November by Sir Edmund Compton in relation to 3 further cases
occurring in September and October, one of which involved the
techniques.

100.  The Compton reports came under considerable criticism in the
United Kingdom.  On 16 November 1971, the British Home Secretary
announced that a further Committee had been set up under the
chairmanship of Lord Parker of Waddington to consider "whether, and if
so in what respects, the procedures currently authorised for
interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism and for their custody
while subject to interrogation require amendment".

The Parker report, which was adopted on 31 January 1972, contained a
majority and a minority opinion.  The majority report concluded that
the application of the techniques, subject to recommended safeguards
against excessive use, need not be ruled out on moral grounds.  On the
other hand, the minority report by Lord Gardiner disagreed that such
interrogation procedures were morally justifiable, even in emergency
terrorist conditions.  Both the majority and the minority considered
the methods to be illegal under domestic law, although the majority
confined their view to English law and to "some if not all the
techniques".

101.  The Parker report was published on 2 March 1972.  On the same
day, the United Kingdom Prime Minister stated in Parliament:

"[The] Government, having reviewed the whole matter with great care and
with reference to any future operations, have decided that the
techniques ... will not be used in future as an aid to interrogation."

He further declared:

"The statement that I have made covers all future circumstances.  If a
Government did decide ... that additional techniques were required for
interrogation, then I think that ... they would probably have to come
to the House and ask for the powers to do it."

As foreshadowed in the Prime Minister's statement, directives
expressly prohibiting the use of the techniques, whether singly or in
combination, were then issued to the security forces by the Government
(see paragraph 135 below).

102.  At the hearing before the Court on 8 February 1977, the United
Kingdom Attorney-General made the following declaration:

"The Government of the United Kingdom have considered the question of
the use of the 'five techniques' with very great care and with
particular regard to Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention.  They now
give this unqualified undertaking, that the 'five techniques' will not
in any circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation."

103.  The Irish Government referred to the Commission 8 cases of
persons submitted to the five techniques during interrogation at the
unidentified centre or centres between 11 and 17 August 1971.  A
further case, that of T 22, considered in the Commission's report in
the context of Palace Barracks, concerned the use of the five
techniques in October 1971.  The Commission examined as illustrative
the cases of T 6 and T 13, which were among the 11 cases investigated
by the Compton Committee.

104.  T 6 and T 13 were arrested on 9 August 1971 during Operation
Demetrius.  Two days later they were transferred from Magilligan
Regional Holding Centre to an unidentified interrogation centre where
they were medically examined on arrival.  Thereafter, with
intermittent periods of respite, they were subjected to the five
techniques during four or possibly five days; neither the Compton or
Parker Committees nor the Commission were able to establish the exact
length of the periods of respite.

The Commission was satisfied that T 6 and T 13 were kept at the wall
for different periods totalling between twenty to thirty hours, but it
did not consider it proved that the enforced stress position had
lasted all the time they were at the wall.  It stated in addition that
the required posture caused physical pain and exhaustion.  The
Commission noted that, later on during his stay at the interrogation
centre, T 13 was allowed to take his hood off when he was alone in the
room, provided that he turned his face to the wall.  It was not found
possible by the Commission to establish for what periods T 6 and
T 13 had been without sleep, or to what extent they were deprived of
nourishment and whether or not they were offered food but refused to
take it.

The Commission found no physical injury to have resulted from the
application of the five techniques as such, but loss of weight by the
two case-witnesses and acute psychiatric symptoms developed by them
during interrogation were recorded in the medical and other evidence.
The Commission, on the material before it, was unable to establish the
exact degree of any psychiatric after-effects produced on T 6 and
T 13, but on the general level it was satisfied that some psychiatric
after-effects in certain of the fourteen persons subjected to the
techniques could not be excluded.

105.  T 13 claimed in addition to have been beaten and otherwise
physically ill-treated, but the medical evidence before the
Commission, as the delegates explained at the hearing before the Court
on 21 April 1977, gave reason to doubt that he had been assaulted to
any severe degree, if at all.  Accordingly, the Commission treated the
allegations in regard to T 13 as concerning the five techniques only.

T 6 similarly alleged that he was also assaulted in various ways at, or
during transport to and from, the centre.  On 17 August 1971 he was
medically examined on leaving the centre and also on his subsequent
arrival at Crumlin Road Prison where he was then detained until
3 May 1972.  The medical reports of these examinations and photographs
taken on the same day revealed on T 6's body bruising and contusions
that had not been present on 11 August.  While not accepting all
T 6's allegations, the Commission was "satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that certain of these injuries ... [were] the result of assaults
committed on him by the security forces at the centre".  As a general
inference from the facts established in T 6's case, the Commission also
found it "probable that physical violence was sometimes used in the
forcible application of the five techniques".

106.  Although several other cases were referred to before the
Commission by the applicant Government in connection with the
unidentified interrogation centre or centres, no detailed allegations
or findings are set out in the Commission's report except in the case
of T 22 which was one of the "41 cases".  The medical evidence
established that when leaving the centre and on entering Crumlin Road
Prison, T 22 had suffered superficial bruising.  The Commission's short
assessment of this case, which it described as comparable to the case
of T 6, was that "there exists a strong indication that the course of
events was similar to that found in the illustrative [case]".

107.  T 13 and T 6 instituted civil proceedings in 1971 to recover
damages for wrongful imprisonment and assault; their claims were
settled in 1973 and 1975 respectively for £15,000 and £14,000.  The
twelve other individuals against whom the five techniques were used
have all received in settlement of their civil claims compensation
ranging from £10,000 to £25,000.

C. PALACE BARRACKS

1. Introduction

108.  Palace Barracks, a military camp in Holywood, County Down, on
the outskirts of Belfast, was used as a holding centre for some days
in August 1971 and then from September 1971 until June 1972.  During
this period, when it was the main interrogation centre in Northern
Ireland, some 2,000 persons from all over the province passed through
Palace Barracks.  The centre was operated jointly by the army and the
RUC.  Persons held there were photographed immediately after arriving
and, from November 1971 onwards (see paragraph 133 below), examined by
a doctor on entry as well as departure.

The interrogations - records of which were kept for filing - were
conducted solely by police, usually at least two in number, from the
Special Branch of the RUC.  These men, who were independent of the
uniformed RUC, came under the responsibility of an officer in charge
with the rank of inspector.  Many of them interrogated prisoners both
at Palace Barracks and at Girdwood Park on a rotating system.

109.  A total of 45 cases concerned with Palace Barracks were
submitted to the Commission by the applicant Government.  The
Commission examined in detail 9 illustrative cases, all relating to
the period between September and November 1971.  It also considered a
further 8 cases, included in the "41 cases"; of these 8 cases,
6 covered the months October to December 1971 while 2 concerned events
occurring in January and May 1972.

2. The illustrative cases

(a) The cases of T 2, T 8, T 12 and T 15

110.  These four men were all arrested early on 20 September 1971 at
their homes in County Tyrone and taken to Palace Barracks for
interrogation.  They were photographed and examined by an army doctor
immediately after their arrest; apart from one small scar, no injuries
were apparently found.  The next day they were transferred together
from Palace Barracks to Crumlin Road Prison.  They all alleged that at
various times they had been made to stand spreadeagled against a wall
and had been severely beaten or otherwise physically ill-treated,
particularly during interrogations.  On their arrival at Crumlin Road,
a prison doctor found contusions and bruising on three of the men; on
23 September, another doctor found similar injuries on the fourth man.
In the Commission's view, this medical evidence made "it highly
probable that all the four received their injuries while at Palace
Barracks".

Despite the absolute denials given in evidence by witnesses from the
security forces at Palace Barracks, the Commission held the following
facts, amongst others, to be established beyond reasonable doubt:

"The four men ... were severely beaten by members of the security
forces ...  The beating was not occasional but it was applied in a
sort of scheme in order to make them speak ..."

Each man instituted civil proceedings for damages and rejected the
offer of £750 made in settlement of his claim.

(b) The cases of T 9 and T 14

111.  T 9 and T 14 were arrested together by an army patrol in a
Belfast street on the night of 16 October 1971.  They were brought to
Palace Barracks for interrogation and held there until the evening of
18 October when they were transferred to Crumlin Road Prison.  On
arrival at the latter institution, they were examined by a prison
doctor.  T 14 was immediately transported to the prison hospital wing
where he spent the next three weeks.  Both men soon made statements
alleging ill-treatment at Palace Barracks.  T 14, for instance, claimed
that he had been made to stand spreadeagled against a wall while being
questioned by a Special Branch man who was kicking him continuously on
the insides of the legs.  They obtained legal assistance and were
further medically examined.

The medical evidence disclosed injuries described as "substantial" in
T 9's case and "massive" in T 14's case.  The Commission concluded that
"the proved injuries must have been caused while the two men were at
Palace Barracks".  Fourteen members of the security forces at the
centre gave evidence completely denying any knowledge of the injuries
or their causes, but these denials were not believed by the
Commission.  While viewing certain of the two men's assertions as
exaggerated, invented or improbable, the Commission made the following
finding:

"T 9 and T 14 ... were subjected to physical violence, especially
kicking and beating, during or between a series of 'interviews'
conducted by the Special Branch."

Civil proceedings seeking damages were instituted by T 14 and
T 9; their claims were settled for £2,250 and £1,975 respectively.
They also, it seems, complained to the police, but no evidence was
produced to the Commission of a police enquiry into their complaints.

(c) The cases of T 1 and T 4

112.  These two cases, although not directly connected, have certain
similarities and were grouped together by the Commission.

113.  T 1 was arrested at his home in the early hours of
20 October 1971 and taken by soldiers to Palace Barracks.  He was
questioned several times that day.  At about 6.30 p.m. he was released
without being charged.  The following morning, he was examined by a
general practitioner who found what he considered to be rather
superficial injuries.

T 1 alleged that he had been kicked and punched while being made to
stand against the wall with his weight on his fingertips.  These
allegations were completely denied by witnesses from the police.  No
corroborated evidence was produced by either side to confirm or rebut
the suggestion made by police witnesses that T 1 might have received
his injuries after his release while being "questioned" by the IRA.
T 1 did concede having had some previous contacts, albeit superficial
and undesired, with IRA members.  The Commission found inter alia:

"It cannot ... be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that [T 1] ...
received these injuries in the way alleged by him."

Although T 1 said that he had brought a civil action for damages, there
is no information as to the outcome of those proceedings.  He further
stated that after complaint to the RUC, he was told that his
allegations had been investigated but found to be unsubstantiated.

114.  T 4 was arrested by an army patrol in the street near his home in
the afternoon of 2 November 1971.  He was taken by army vehicle first
to a police station, where he stayed for less than an hour, and then
on to Palace Barracks for questioning.  He was released the same day.
He alleged that he had been kicked and beaten by soldiers when lying
on the floor of the army vehicle and thereafter beaten during
interrogation by the police at Palace Barracks.  Both the army and the
police witnesses denied these allegations.

The day after his release, T 4 saw his family doctor who found
extensive bruising to his body.  On 4 November, he was admitted to
hospital where he remained under observation for about two weeks.

The Commission considered that the medical evidence was difficult to
reconcile with the account given by T 4 of his alleged ill-treatment.
The findings of the Commission included the following:

"Bearing in mind that twelve hours elapsed from his release until his
medical examination, the statements of the soldiers and some doubt
about T 4's reliability, it cannot be concluded, solely on T 4's own
statements, that he received these injuries at the hands of the army
or the police."

There is no evidence of any civil action brought by T 4 or of any army
investigation into complaints he apparently made; the results of a
police enquiry are not known.

(d) The case of T 10

115.  T 10 was arrested at his house early in the morning of
18 November 1971 and subsequently taken to Palace Barracks for
interrogation.  The next day a detention order was served on him and
he was transferred to Crumlin Road Prison.  T 10 alleged that while at
the interrogation centre he was subjected to what the Commission terms
"comparatively trivial beatings".

He was medically examined on arrival at Palace Barracks, when entering
Crumlin Road Prison and on 20 November by his family doctor who saw
him in prison.  The latter two examinations revealed that T 10 had
suffered a perforation to the right eardrum and some minor bruising.
Despite absolute denials on the part of the five witnesses from the
security forces, the Commission found it proved beyond reasonable
doubt that T 10's injuries could not have been caused in any way
materially different from that described in his evidence.  In the
Commission's view, it was to be taken as established that the acts
complained of occurred at Palace Barracks.

T 10 did not, it seems, institute civil proceedings for damages.  On
the other hand, he complained through his lawyer against a number of
police officers, but no evidence was produced by the respondent
Government of any real police investigation.

3. The "41 cases"

116.  Within this group, there are 8 cases (T 22, T 27, T 28,
T 29, T 30, T 31, T 48 and one other) raising allegations of
ill-treatment by the army during transport to Palace Barracks and by
the police during interrogation there.  The case of T 22 had already
been mentioned in connection with the unidentified centre or centres
(see paragraph 106 above).

The medical reports show that the persons concerned had sustained
injuries in varying degrees.  No evidence, though, was obtained from
the respondent Government.  The Commission, while therefore feeling it
unsafe to make any findings on the basis of the medical reports alone,
stated in its short assessment:

"Nevertheless, in those cases in which the victims were detained
following their interrogation and were medically examined shortly
after their committal to detention (the cases of T 22, T 27,
T 48, T 29, T 30 and T 31), there exists a strong indication that the
course of events was similar to that found in the illustrative cases."

T 27, T 30 and T 31 accepted sums of £900, £200 and £750
respectively in settlement of civil claims brought.  At the time of
the Commission's report, actions for damages were still pending in the
cases of T 22 and T 29; a substantial sum was ultimately received by
the former person as a victim of the five techniques (see
paragraph 107 above).

4. The remaining cases

117.  In the absence of corroborative, including medical, evidence,
the Commission did not find it possible to examine further another
28 cases concerning Palace Barracks.  It merely confirmed that
allegations of ill-treatment had been made and that, in some cases,
compensation had been paid.

5. General

118.  The Commission considered on a number of grounds that the police
officers in command at Palace Barracks at the relevant time could not
have been ingnorant of the acts of ill-treatment found to have been
committed.  Yet, on their own evidence, these officers took no action
to prevent the occurrence or repetition of such ill-treatment.

Knowledge on the part of the higher authorities of allegations
regarding this centre was inferred by the Commission from various
facts.  Nevertheless, no evidence of police investigations into these
allegations was produced to the Commission and, apart from
Sir Edmund Compton's "supplemental" report into three Palace Barracks
cases (see paragraph 99 above), no general enquiry took place.
Furthermore, no disciplinary or criminal proceedings seem to have been
instituted against any of the police officers who either committed or
failed to react against the acts established.  No special instructions
relating to the proper treatment of persons in custody were issued to
the RUC until April 1972 (see paragraph 135 below).  Through their
inaction, the authorities in Northern Ireland were held by the
Commission to have shown indifference towards the treatment of
prisoners at Palace Barracks in the autumn of 1971.

D. GIRDWOOD PARK REGIONAL HOLDING CENTRE

1. Introduction

119.  This army camp on the outskirts of Belfast, adjacent to Crumlin
Road Prison, was used as a regional centre for holding and
interrogating suspects, 186 of whom passed through it in August 1971.
It was temporarily closed in that month and re-opened in October 1971
as a police holding centre.  The arrangements at Girdwood for
receiving, detaining, interrogating and releasing suspects were
essentially the same as at Palace Barracks (see paragraph 108 above).

2. Illustrative case

120.  Of 36 cases involving allegations of ill-treatment at Girdwood,
the Commission examined in detail as illustrative that of T 16.  It
found that this Protestant, aged over sixty and arrested in connection
with the possession of arms and a radio aerial, had been severely
injured on 13 August 1971 by army personnel during transport to
Girdwood and following his arrival there.  He had been insulted,
kicked, beaten and dragged by the hair and his evidence had been
corroborated by that of T 23 who had been arrested at the same time.
T 16's ill-treatment was not connected with his formal interrogation
which was correctly conducted by the Special Branch.  Although the
army doctor at Girdwood treated T 16 for a diabetic condition, the
Commission considered the medical examination inadequate since no
notice was taken of the injuries which were observed later by other
doctors.

T 16 instituted civil proceedings for damages and the respondent
Government indicated to the Commission that his action would certainly
be settled.  He had also complained immediately to the RUC but,
according to the applicant Government, some three years elapsed before
he was told that no action was going to be taken against the army; the
British Government attributed the impossibility of initiating a
prosecution to T 16's inability to identify his assailants.

3. The "41 cases"

121.  The Commission also considered, from the "41 cases", the cases
of T 23, T 32, T 33, T 49 and T 50, three of which dated from
August 1971, one from November 1971 and one from January 1972.  All
these persons had been released after questioning, except T 49 who had
been charged and presumably detained thereafter.  They alleged that
they had been assaulted by army personnel on arrest and during
transport to Girdwood; T 49 also complained of ill-treatment by the
Special Branch during interrogation.  Each case was submitted by the
Irish Government by means of a medical report and also, except for
T 33, the complainant's own statement; no evidence was obtained from
the respondent Government.  A medical examination, made within
twenty-four hours of release or detention, revealed injuries to each
individual.

In the Commission's view:

(a) it was fairly safe to conclude that certain of T 23's and
T 50's injuries had been caused as alleged, particularly in the case
of T 23, where the circumstances had been examined in connection with
T 16's case (see paragraph 120 above).  A strong probability also
existed for T 32 whose claim for damages was later settled for £750;

(b) although injuries had been found on T 33, it would be difficult to
consider the facts established;

(c) the allegations and injuries in the case of T 49 were comparable to
those in the Palace Barracks cases; reference was made to the
Commission's assessment of some of the "41 cases" relating to that
place (see paragraph 116 above).

4. The remaining cases

122.  In the absence of corroborative, including medical, evidence,
the Commission did not find it possible to examine further another
30 cases concerning Girdwood.  It merely confirmed that allegations of
ill-treatment had been made and that, in some cases, compensation had
been paid.

E. BALLYKINLER REGIONAL HOLDING CENTRE

1. Introduction

123.  Ballykinler was an army camp in County Down used in August 1971
for holding and interrogating some of those arrested during Operation
Demetrius (see paragraph 39 above).  It was under the overall
authority of the RUC, the army being responsible for security and the
Special Branch conducting the interrogations.  On 9 and 10 August,
89 persons were brought to Ballykinler of whom, by 11 August,
80 had been removed to a place of detention and the remainder
released.

The applicant Government requested the Commission to make findings on
all the 18 cases in respect of which they had filed statements
alleging ill-treatment at the camp.

124.  Prior to the Commission's enquiry, conditions at Ballykinler in
August 1971 had been examined by the Compton Committee (see
paragraph 99 above) and by the Armagh County Court in the Moore case.
The Compton Committee considered that certain exercises which
detainees had been made to do "under some degree of compulsion" must
have caused hardship but were the result of lack of judgment rather
than an intention to hurt or degrade; it accordingly made no findings
of deliberate ill-treatment.  In the Moore case, on the other hand,
the judge rejected defence evidence, in particular as to the origin of
the exercises, and concluded that the treatment of persons held at
Ballykinler was "deliberate, unlawful and harsh"; he awarded the
plaintiff £300, the maximum amount within his jurisdiction.

2. Illustrative case

125.  The Commission examined, as illustrative, the case of
T 3 and found that:

(a) he and other persons arrested were made (in some cases before
medical examination) to do exercises which caused considerable strain
and hardship, especially to the elderly and those in poor physical
condition;

(b) the exercises consisted partly of sitting on the floor with the
legs outstretched and the hands raised high above, or clasped behind,
the head, and partly of kneeling on the floor with the forehead
touching the ground and the hands clasped behind the back;

(c) it was not possible to ascertain the exact length of time during
which, or the degree of compulsion with which, the exercises were
enforced;

(d) allegations, concerning both T 3 and others, of specific incidents
of violence and of the use of considerable force had not been
established;

(e) the camp had been swept out, and beds removed for security
reasons, before persons arrested arrived; for a purpose not
sufficiently explained, bedding was provided only for those who had
been interrogated.

3. The "41" and the remaining cases

126.  None of the "41 cases" concerned Ballykinler.  There is no
separate section in the Commission's report on the remaining 17 cases
relating to that centre but findings on the general conditions there
were made within the context of T 3's case.

F. MISCELLANEOUS PLACES

1. Introduction

127.  121 cases involving allegations of ill-treatment at miscellaneous
places were referred to the Commission by the applicant Government.
The allegations included beating and assaults by the army or the
police at army posts, police stations, a prison, in the street, at
home or during transport at dates falling between August 1971 and
1974.  65 of these cases were in connection with interrogation.  The
Commission examined in detail as illustrative the cases of T 7,
T 11 and T 5.

2. The illustrative cases

(a) The case of T 7

128.  The Commission found that on 28 October 1971, without
provocation or resistance, this civilian had been severely assaulted
and injured in a street in Belfast by a corporal effecting his arrest.
When it was realised that his arrest had been a mistake, he was
discharged with apologies, having been given medical treatment.
Neither his evidence nor the medical evidence was disputed and the
respondent Government called no witnesses.

The soldier in question was detained for four or five days and then
admonished.  T 7's claim for damages was settled for £600.

(b) The case of T 11

129.  The Commission found that, after his arrest on 20 December 1971,
this civilian had been severely assaulted and injured by a number of
soldiers during interrogation at Albert Street Barracks, Belfast.
Neither the main facts nor medical evidence of physical injuries were
disputed, although medical opinion differed concerning mental
after-effects.  The respondent Government called no witnesses to rebut
the charges of physical ill-treatment.  Additional allegations of
harassment by soldiers after the event were found by the Commission to
be neither proved nor disproved.

T 11's claim for damages was settled for £300.  He also lodged a
complaint with the RUC which was still under investigation when the
Commission heard evidence on his case; the respondent Government
stated that they did not know the reason for the delay.

(c) The case of T 5

130.  T 5 alleged that he was kicked, punched and hooded by the army at
St. Genevieve's School, Belfast, on 13 August 1972.  He was too young
to be detained but, after arrest and questioning, he was taken,
allegedly for identification purposes, to various army posts.

A claim by T 5 for damages was settled in the sum of £236.79.  His
complaint to the RUC was unsuccessful.

In the light of its review of the medical evidence and the evidence of
the security force witnesses and of T 5, the Commission concluded that
T 5's allegations were not sufficiently established.

3. The "41 cases"

131.  From these cases, the Commission considered 28 on which the
Parties had commented.  It took the view that the evidence, in the
shape of medical reports accompanied in some cases by a statement from
the complainant, did not make it possible to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the cause of the injuries.

4. The remaining cases

132.  In the absence of corroborative, including medical, evidence,
the Commission did not find it possible to examine further the
remaining 90 cases.  It merely confirmed that allegations of
ill-treatment had been made and that, in some cases, compensation had
been paid.

G. MEASURES CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS ARRESTED OR HELD BY
THE SECURITY FORCES

1. Medical and other records

133.  From May 1970 onwards, the army rule was that the person
arrested and the arresting soldier were to be photographed together.
With regard to the practice followed during Operation Demetrius, the
Compton Committee noted that a photograph was taken of each person
admitted to a regional holding centre and that on entry to Ballykinler
and Magilligan, though not to Girdwood Park, a medical examination was
carried out and its result recorded.

As from 15 November 1971, every individual brought to a holding centre
was medically examined on arrival and departure.  Medical staff were
instructed to submit reports whenever there was evidence of a
complaint of ill-treatment.  Furthermore, after a certain time,
records were kept of the prisoner's condition during his progress
through interrogation.

2. Provisions designed to prevent ill-treatment

134.  It would appear that at the beginning of the internment
operation reliance was simply placed on the normal regulations
requiring humane treatment and forbidding the use of violence.

135.  Following the Parker report and the Prime Minister's statement
to Parliament (see paragraph 101 above), a directive on interrogation
was issued prohibiting the use of coercion and, in particular, of the
five techniques.  In addition, it made mandatory medical examinations,
the keeping of comprehensive records and the immediate reporting of
any complaints of ill-treatment.  In April 1972, army instructions and
the RUC Force Order 64/72, concerning respectively arrests under the
Special Powers Regulations and the treatment of prisoners, directed
that excessive force should never be used.  Shortly after the
introduction of direct rule, the United Kingdom Attorney-General gave
a ministerial directive on the proper treatment of persons in custody,
making it clear that where any form of ill-treatment was reported the
Director of Public Prosecutions would prosecute.  Further army and RUC
instructions of August 1972 in respect of arrest and interrogation
enjoined the proper and humane treatment of prisoners; they strictly
forbade resort to violence, the five techniques, threats or insults
and concluded with a prohibition similar to Article 3 (art. 3) of the
Convention.  In August 1973 new instructions with regard to arrests by
the army re-emphasised the need for correct behaviour.

The respondent Government submitted that steps had been taken for the
diffusion and enforcement at all levels of these orders and
directives.  However, both the Commission and the applicant Government
considered that there was a lack of satisfactory evidence as to how
the regulations were implemented and obeyed in practice.

136.  Section 6 of the Emergency Provisions Act (see paragraph 68
above) contained provisions designed to exclude as evidence before an
ordinary criminal court statements by an accused obtained by torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment; the section did not apply to the
extrajudicial procedures or to statements by third parties.

3. Complaints procedures and criminal prosecutions

(a) The police

137.  Under the Police Act (Northern Ireland) 1970, an investigation
department within the RUC had been set up to report to the Chief
Constable on all complaints against the police whatever their source.
An official committee of five members of the Police Authority of
Northern Ireland, including two Catholics and two Protestants,
examined each month the records of complaints kept by the Chief
Constable.

Where a serious criminal offence was disclosed, reports were submitted
to the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland or, after the
introduction of direct rule, to the Director of Public Prosecutions in
Northern Ireland, a newly-created office, for decision whether to
prosecute.  On 15 June 1972, the United Kingdom Attorney-General
instructed the Director of Public Prosecutions to direct the RUC to
investigate and report on any circumstances which might involve the
commission of a criminal offence by a member of the security forces.
From November 1972 onwards, all completed investigations of both
police officers and army personnel had to be sent to the Director of
Public Prosecutions.

In September 1973, new disciplinary regulations brought the
arrangements for the investigation of complaints against the RUC into
line with the arrangements existing elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
In 1975, a fresh unit was established within the RUC under the direct
control of the Deputy Chief Constable to be responsible for the
investigation of complaints.

138.  The Gardiner Committee in its report of January 1975 (see
paragraph 74 above), while expressing itself satisfied that full
investigations were made, nevertheless found a widespread belief in
Northern Ireland that complaints against members of the security
forces were not taken seriously.  It therefore recommended the setting
up of an independent means of investigating complaints.

The Police (Northern Ireland) Order 1977 established a completely
independent Police Complaints Board for Northern Ireland with
supervisory functions in the matter.

(b) The army

139.  The policy of the General Officer Commanding, as stated in the
evidence before the Commission, was that every complaint should be
investigated.  An investigator was automatically appointed as soon as
an incident was reported, even before a formal complaint had been
made.  As with the RUC, notice was also taken of allegations in the
press or from third parties.

It would seem that in the early stages of the emergency complaints
against soldiers were handled by the army authorities themselves;
later on, two RUC officers were appointed to oversee army enquiries
and subsequently investigations were actually carried out by the RUC,
at least where there appeared to be a serious criminal offence.  In
addition, complainants were encouraged to channel their complaints
through the police.  On 20 January 1972 a joint army/RUC investigation
team was created.

Complaints against the army were referred to an outside authority
- the Director of Public Prosecutions as from April 1972 - for
directions whether to prosecute.

(c) Statistics relating to complaints and prosecutions

140.  Between 9 August 1971 and 30 November 1974, 2,615 complaints
against the police were made, 1,105 alleging ill-treatment or assault;
the 23 prosecutions for assault resulted in 6 convictions leading to
fines and, in one case, a conditional discharge.

As regards the army, from 31 March 1972 to 30 November 1974,
1,268 complaints in respect of assaults or shootings had been received
and 1,078 cases of alleged assault were submitted to the Director of
Public Prosecutions.  By January 1975, directions to prosecute had
been given in 86 out of the 1,038 cases then dealt with.

Overall, between April 1972 and the end of January 1977, 218 members
of the security forces were prosecuted for assault at the direction of
the Director of Public Prosecutions and 155 were convicted.

(d) Particular instances of investigation, disciplinary action or
prosecution

141.  Soon after complaints relating to the arrests carried out on
9 August 1971 became known, nearly 1,800 soldiers, including 300 or so
who had left Northern Ireland, were interviewed in order to determine
their rôle in the arrest operation.  The Commission's report also
mentions a few other specific examples of members of the security
forces being investigated or disciplined, but these examples are not
connected with the cases submitted by the applicant Government.
No information of any investigation into the submitted cases was
vouchsafed to the Commission by the respondent Government except in
relation to the illustrative cases.  Even as regards the illustrative
cases, the Commission had before it just one item of direct evidence
- the Compton reports, filed by the applicant Government - and it
noted that in none of them had the authorities carried out a thorough
investigation of the allegations of ill-treatment; evidence as to
disciplinary action or prosecution was furnished to the Commission in
one case alone, that of T 7 (see paragraph 128 above).

4. Compensation

142.  Procedures to obtain compensation were available before the
domestic courts to all persons who considered themselves to have been
ill-treated by the security forces.  There is no suggestion that the
domestic courts were or are anything other than independent, fair and
impartial.  The respondent Government have emphasised the difference
between domestic civil and criminal law.  Under the former the
authorities are liable for any wrongful act, established on the
balance of probabilities, committed in the course of their duty by
soldiers or policemen, whether individually identified or not.
The criminal law, in contrast, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the guilt of an identified individual.  Like any plaintiff in a
civil action, a plaintiff alleging ill-treatment by the security
forces was entitled to obtain disclosure of relevant documents, for
example medical reports, in the possession of the defendant
authorities.

143.  Between 9 August 1971 and 31 January 1975, compensation
totalling £302,043 had been paid in settlement of 473 civil claims for
wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, leaving
1,193 actions still outstanding.  At the time of the Commission's
report, compensation, ranging from about £200 to £25,000, had been
paid in settlement of 45 of the 228 cases submitted by the applicant
Government.  In the only case of alleged physical ill-treatment which
seems to have been fought, namely the case of Moore v. Shillington
(see paragraph 124 above), the judge disbelieved the evidence of the
security forces.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

144.  In their original application, lodged with the Commission on
16 December 1971, and later supplemented, the Irish Government made
various allegations of violations by the United Kingdom of Articles 1,
2, 3, 5, 6 and 14 (art. 1, art. 2, art. 3, art. 5, art. 6, art. 14)
of the Convention.

145.  On 1 October 1972, the Commission declared the application
inadmissible as regards Article 2 (art. 2) but accepted the
allegations that:

- the treatment of persons in custody, in particular the methods of
interrogation of such persons, constituted an administrative practice
in breach of Article 3 (art. 3);

- internment without trial and detention under the Special Powers Act
and the Special Powers Regulations constituted an administrative
practice in breach of Articles 5 and 6 in connection with Article 15
(art. 15+5, art. 15+6);

- the exercise by the respondent Government of their power to detain
and intern persons was being carried out with discrimination on the
grounds of political opinion and thus constituted a breach of
Article 14 (art. 14) with respect to the rights and freedoms
guaranteed in Articles 5 and 6 in conjunction with Article 15
(art. 15+5, art. 15+6);

- the administrative practices complained of also constituted a breach
of Article 1 (art. 1).

146.  In addition to receiving written observations and evidence from
the two Governments concerned and to hearing their oral submissions,
the Commission also heard - through delegates and in the circumstances
more particularly detailed in its report - a total of 119 witnesses.
One hundred gave evidence in relation to the issues under Article 3
(art. 3) and nineteen in relation to those under Article 14 (art. 14);
of the latter, three were witnesses proposed by the respondent
Government who were heard by the delegates in London in the absence of
representatives of the Parties and without being subjected to
cross-examination.

147.  In its report, the Commission expressed the opinion:

(i) unanimously, that the powers of detention and internment without
trial as exercised during the relevant periods were not in conformity
with Article 5, paras. 1 to 4 (art. 5-1, art. 5-2, art. 5-3, art. 5-4),
but were "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" in
Northern Ireland, within the meaning of Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1);

(ii) unanimously, that Article 6 (art. 6) did not apply to the said
powers;

(iii) unanimously, that the facts found in relation to the relevant
periods did not disclose any discrimination contrary to Article 14
(art. 14) in the exercise of the said powers;

(iv) unanimously, that the combined use of the five techniques in the
cases before it constituted a practice of inhuman treatment and of
torture in breach of Article 3 (art. 3);

(v) unanimously, that violations of Article 3 (art. 3) occurred by
inhuman, and in two cases degrading, treatment of

- T 6, in an unidentified interrogation centre in August 1971,

- T 2, T 8, T 12, T 15, T 9, T 14 and T 10 at Palace Barracks,
Holywood, in September, October and November 1971,

- T 16, T 7 and T 11, at various places in August, October and
December 1971;

(vi) unanimously, that there had been at Palace Barracks, Holywood, in
the autumn of 1971, a practice in connection with the interrogation of
prisoners by members of the RUC which was inhuman treatment in breach
of Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention;

(vii) unanimously, that no practice in breach of Article 3 (art. 3)
had been found to exist in relation to the cases of T 16, T 7 and
T 11, including the general conditions at Girdwood Park in
August 1971;

(viii) unanimously, that the conditions of detention at Ballykinler in
August 1971 did not disclose a violation of Article 3 (art. 3);

(ix) by twelve votes to one, that Article 1 (art. 1), not granting any
rights in addition to those mentioned in Section I of the Convention,
cannot be the subject of a separate breach.

The report contains various separate opinions.

AS TO THE LAW

148.  Paragraph (d) of the application of 10 March 1976 states that
the object of bringing the case before the Court (Rule 31 para. 1 (d) of
the Rules of Court) is "to ensure the observance in Northern Ireland
of the engagements undertaken by the respondent Government as a High
Contracting Party to the Convention and in particular of the
engagements specifically set out by the applicant Government in the
pleadings filed and the submissions made on their behalf and described
in the evidence adduced before the Commission in the hearings before
them".  "To this end", the Court is invited "to consider the report of
the Commission and to confirm the opinion of the Commission that
breaches of the Convention have occurred and also to consider the
claims of the applicant Government with regard to other alleged
breaches and to make a finding of breach of the Convention where the
Court is satisfied that a breach has occurred".

In their written and oral pleadings before the Court, the Irish
Government allege breaches of Articles 1, 3 (art. 1, art. 3),
5 (taken together with Article 15) (art. 15+5), 6 (taken
together with Article 15) (art. 15+6) and 14 (taken together
with Articles 5 and 6) (art. 14+5, art. 14+6).

They also maintain - though they do not ask the Court to make a
specific finding - that the British Government failed on several
occasions in their duty to furnish the necessary facilities for the
effective conduct of the investigation.  The Commission does not go as
far as that; however, at various places in its report, the Commission
points out, in substance, that the respondent Government did not
always afford it the assistance desirable.  The Court regrets this
attitude on the part of that Government; it must stress the
fundamental importance of the principle, enshrined in Article 28,
sub-paragraph (a) (art. 28-a) in fine, that the Contracting States
have a duty to cooperate with the Convention institutions.

149.  The Court notes first of all that it is not called upon to take
cognisance of every single aspect of the tragic situation prevailing
in Northern Ireland.  For example, it is not required to rule on the
terrorist activities in the six counties of individuals or of groups,
activities that are in clear disregard of human rights.  The Court has
only to give a decision on the claims made before it by the Irish
Republic against the United Kingdom.  However, in so doing, the Court
cannot lose sight of the events that form the background to this case.

I. ON ARTICLE 3 (art. 3)

150.  Article 3 (art. 3) provides that "no one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".

A. Preliminary questions

151.  In their memorial of 26 October 1976 and at the hearings in
February 1977, the United Kingdom Government raised two preliminary
questions on the alleged violations of Article 3 (art. 3).  The first
concerns the violations which they no longer contest, the second
certain of the violations whose existence they dispute.

1. Preliminary question on the non-contested violations of Article 3
(art. 3)

152.  The United Kingdom Government contest neither the breaches of
Article 3 (art. 3) as found by the Commission (see paragraph 147
above), nor - a point moreover that is beyond doubt - the Court's
jurisdiction to examine such breaches.  However, relying inter alia on
the case-law of the International Court of Justice (Northern Cameroons
case, judgment of 2 December 1963, and Nuclear Tests cases, judgments
of 20 December 1974),they argue that the European Court has power to
decline to exercise its jurisdiction where the objective of an
application has been accomplished or where adjudication on the merits
would be devoid of purpose.  Such, they claim, is the situation here.
They maintain that the findings in question not only are not contested
but also have been widely publicised and that they do not give rise to
problems of interpretation or application of the Convention
sufficiently important to require a decision by the Court.
Furthermore, for them the subject-matter of those findings now belongs
to past history in view of the abandonment of the five techniques
(1972), the solemn and unqualified undertaking not to reintroduce
these techniques (8 February 1977) and the other measures taken by the
United Kingdom to remedy, impose punishment for, and prevent the
recurrence of, the various violations found by the Commission.

This argument is disputed by the applicant Government.  Neither is it
accepted in a general way by the delegates of the Commission; they
stated, however, that they would express no conclusion as to whether
or not the above-mentioned undertaking had deprived the claim
concerning the five techniques of its object.

153.  The Court takes formal note of the undertaking given before it,
at the hearing on 8 February 1977, by the United Kingdom
Attorney-General on behalf of the respondent Government.  The terms of
this undertaking were as follows:

"The Government of the United Kingdom have considered the question of
the use of the 'five techniques' with very great care and with
particular regard to Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention.  They now
give this unqualified undertaking, that the 'five techniques' will not
in any circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation."

The Court also notes that the United Kingdom has taken various
measures designed to prevent the recurrence of the events complained
of and to afford reparation for their consequences.  For example, it
has issued to the police and the army instructions and directives on
the arrest, interrogation and treatment of persons in custody,
reinforced the procedures for investigating complaints, appointed
commissions of enquiry and paid or offered compensation in many cases
(see paragraphs 99-100, 107, 110-111, 116-118, 121-122, 124, 128-130,
132, 135-139 and 142-143 above).

154.  Nevertheless, the Court considers that the responsibilities
assigned to it within the framework of the system under the Convention
extend to pronouncing on the non-contested allegations of violation of
Article 3 (art. 3).  The Court's judgments in fact serve not only to
decide those cases brought before the Court but, more generally, to
elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the
Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of
the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties
(Article 19) (art. 19).

The conclusion thus arrived at by the Court is, moreover, confirmed by
paragraph 3 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.  If the Court may
proceed with the consideration of a case and give a ruling thereon
even in the event of a "notice of discontinuance, friendly settlement,
arrangement" or "other fact of a kind to provide a solution of the
matter", it is entitled a fortiori to adopt such a course of action
when the conditions for the application of this Rule are not present.

155.  Accordingly, that part of the present case which concerns the
said allegations cannot be said to have become without object; the
Court considers that it should rule thereon, notwithstanding the
initiatives taken by the respondent State.

2. Preliminary question on certain of the contested violations of
Article 3 (art. 3)

156.  In their memorial of 28 July 1976, the Irish Government invited
the Court to hold, unlike the Commission (see paragraphs 125, 130 and
147 above), that violations of Article 3 (art. 3) had occurred in the
cases of T 3 (Ballykinler Regional Holding Centre, August 1971) and
T 5 (St. Genevieve's School, Belfast, August 1972) as well as in
numerous places in Northern Ireland from 1971 to 1974.

In addition to contesting the merits of these claims, the British
Government also raised a preliminary question in connection therewith
in their memorial of 26 October 1976 and at the hearings in
February 1977.  They argued that the complaints made did not expressly
concern a practice but individual cases in which effective domestic
remedies were available to the persons involved.  Accordingly, in their
submission, the said claims fell outside the area demarcated by the
Commission on 1 October 1972 when it accepted the allegation that "the
treatment of persons in custody ... constituted an administrative
practice in breach of Article 3 (art. 3)".

The Irish Government replied that this line of argument was based on
an incorrect interpretation of the above-mentioned decision and of the
manner in which the Commission subsequently carried out its rôle.

According to the delegates of the Commission, the Irish Government had
not made clear whether they were asking the Court to censure a
practice or merely to hold that certain persons had been subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3).  In the former case, but not
in the latter, their request would, in the delegates' view, be in
conformity with the decision of 1 October 1972.

157.  The Court recalls that its jurisdiction in contentious matters
is limited to applications which have first of all been lodged with
and accepted by the Commission; this is perfectly clear from the
structure of Sections III and IV of the Convention.  The Commission's
decision declaring an application admissible determines the object of
the case brought before the Court; it is only within the framework so
traced that the Court, once a case is duly referred to it, may take
cognisance of all questions of fact or of law arising in the course of
the proceedings (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of 18 June 1971,
Series A no. 12, pp. 29-30, paras. 49 and 51; Handyside judgment of
7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 20, para. 41; Stögmüller and
Matznetter judgments of 10 November 1969, Series A no. 9, p. 41, para. 7,
and no. 10, pp. 31-32, para. 5; Delcourt judgment of 17 January 1970,
Series A no. 11, p. 20, para. 40).

Again, Article 49 (art. 49) of the Convention provides that the Court
shall settle disputes concerning its jurisdiction.  It follows that, in
order to rule on this preliminary plea, the Court must itself
interpret the above-mentioned decision of 1 October 1972, in the
particular light of the Commission's explanations (see, mutatis
mutandis, the Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen judgment of
7 December 1976, Series A no. 23, pp. 22-24, para. 48).

The allegation accepted by the Commission under Article 3 (art. 3)
concerned a practice or practices and not individual cases as such.
Accordingly, the Court's sole task is to give a ruling on that
allegation.

However, a practice contrary to the Convention can result only from
individual violations (see paragraph 159 below).  Hence, it is open to
the Court, just as it was to the Commission, to examine, as
constituent elements or proof of a possible practice and not on an
individual basis, specific cases alleged to have occurred in given
places.

The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to take cognisance of the
contested cases of violation of Article 3 (art. 3) if and to the
extent that the applicant Government put them forward as establishing
the existence of a practice.

158.  Following the Order of 11 February 1977 (see paragraph 8 above),
the Irish Government indicated, at the hearings in April 1977, that
they were asking the Court to hold that there had been in Northern
Ireland, from 1971 to 1974, a practice or practices in breach of
Article 3 (art. 3) and to specify, if need be, where they had
occurred.  They also declared that they were no longer seeking specific
findings in relation to the cases of T 3 and T 5.

159.  A practice incompatible with the Convention consists of an
accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently
numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated
incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or system; a practice does
not of itself constitute a violation separate from such breaches.

It is inconceivable that the higher authorities of a State should be,
or at least should be entitled to be, unaware of the existence of such
a practice.  Furthermore, under the Convention those authorities are
strictly liable for the conduct of their subordinates; they are under
a duty to impose their will on subordinates and cannot shelter behind
their inability to ensure that it is respected.

The concept of practice is of particular importance for the operation
of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies.  This rule, as
embodied in Article 26 (art. 26) of the Convention, applies to State
applications (Article 24) (art. 24), in the same way as it does to
"individual" applications (Article 25) (art. 25), when the applicant
State does no more than denounce a violation or violations allegedly
suffered by "individuals" whose place, as it were, is taken by the
State.  On the other hand and in principle, the rule does not apply
where the applicant State complains of a practice as such, with the
aim of preventing its continuation or recurrence, but does not ask the
Commission or the Court to give a decision on each of the cases put
forward as proof or illustrations of that practice.  The Court agrees
with the opinion which the Commission, following its earlier case-law,
expressed on the subject in its decision of 1 October 1972 on the
admissibility of the Irish Government's original application.
Moreover, the Court notes that that decision is not contested by the
respondent Government.

B. Questions of proof

160.  In order to satisfy itself as to the existence or not in
Northern Ireland of practices contrary to Article 3 (art. 3), the
Court will not rely on the concept that the burden of proof is borne
by one or other of the two Governments concerned.  In the cases
referred to it, the Court examines all the material before it, whether
originating from the Commission, the Parties or other sources, and, if
necessary, obtains material proprio motu.

161.  The Commission based its own conclusions mainly on the evidence
of the one hundred witnesses heard in, and on the medical reports
relating to, the sixteen "illustrative" cases it had asked the
applicant Government to select.  The Commission also relied, but to a
lesser extent, on the documents and written comments submitted in
connection with the "41 cases" and it referred to the numerous
"remaining cases" (see paragraph 93 above).  As in the "Greek case"
(Yearbook of the Convention, 1969, The Greek case, p. 196, para. 30), the
standard of proof the Commission adopted when evaluating the material
it obtained was proof "beyond reasonable doubt".

The Irish Government see this as an excessively rigid standard for the
purposes of the present proceedings.  They maintain that the system of
enforcement would prove ineffectual if, where there was a prima facie
case of violation of Article 3 (art. 3), the risk of a finding of such
a violation was not borne by a State which fails in its obligation to
assist the Commission in establishing the truth (Article 28,
sub-paragraph (a) in fine, of the Convention) (art. 28-a).  In their
submission, this is how the attitude taken by the United Kingdom
should be described.

The respondent Government dispute this contention and ask the Court to
follow the same course as the Commission.

The Court agrees with the Commission's approach regarding the evidence
on which to base the decision whether there has been violation of
Article 3 (art. 3).  To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the
standard of proof "beyond reasonable doubt" but adds that such proof
may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and
concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact.
In this context, the conduct of the Parties when evidence is being
obtained has to be taken into account.

C. Questions concerning the merits

162.  As was emphasised by the Commission, ill-treatment must attain a
minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of
Article 3 (art. 3).  The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature
of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case,
such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects
and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim,
etc.

163.  The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's
conduct.  Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and
of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4 (P1, P4), Article 3 (art. 3) makes
no provision for exceptions and, under Article 15 para. 2 (art. 15-2),
there can be no derogation therefrom even in the event of a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation.

164.  In the instant case, the only relevant concepts are "torture"
and "inhuman or degrading treatment", to the exclusion of "inhuman or
degrading punishment".

1. The unidentified interrogation centre or centres

(a) The "five techniques"

165.  The facts concerning the five techniques are summarised at
paragraphs 96-104 and 106-107 above.  In the Commission's estimation,
those facts constituted a practice not only of inhuman and degrading
treatment but also of torture.  The applicant Government ask for
confirmation of this opinion which is not contested before the Court
by the respondent Government.

166.  The police used the five techniques on fourteen persons in 1971,
that is on twelve, including T 6 and T 13, in August before the Compton
Committee was set up, and on two in October whilst that Committee was
carrying out its enquiry.  Although never authorised in writing in any
official document, the five techniques were taught orally by the
English Intelligence Centre to members of the RUC at a seminar held in
April 1971.  There was accordingly a practice.

167.  The five techniques were applied in combination, with
premeditation and for hours at a stretch; they caused, if not actual
bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering to the
persons subjected thereto and also led to acute psychiatric
disturbances during interrogation.  They accordingly fell into the
category of inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3
(art. 3).  The techniques were also degrading since they were such as
to arouse in their victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority
capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their
physical or moral resistance.

On these two points, the Court is of the same view as the Commission.

In order to determine whether the five techniques should also be
qualified as torture, the Court must have regard to the distinction,
embodied in Article 3 (art. 3), between this notion and that of
inhuman or degrading treatment.

In the Court's view, this distinction derives principally from a
difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted.

The Court considers in fact that, whilst there exists on the one hand
violence which is to be condemned both on moral grounds and also in
most cases under the domestic law of the Contracting States but which
does not fall within Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention, it appears
on the other hand that it was the intention that the Convention, with
its distinction between "torture" and "inhuman or degrading
treatment", should by the first of these terms attach a special stigma
to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
suffering.

Moreover, this seems to be the thinking lying behind Article 1 in fine
of Resolution 3452 (XXX) adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 9 December 1975, which declares: "Torture constitutes an
aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment".

Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was
the extraction of confessions, the naming of others and/or information
and although they were used systematically, they did not occasion
suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word
torture as so understood.

168.  The Court concludes that recourse to the five techniques
amounted to a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment, which
practice was in breach of Article 3 (art. 3).

(b) Ill-treatment alleged to have accompanied the use of the five
techniques

169.  The applicant Government claim that the fourteen persons
subjected to the five techniques, or some of those persons including
T 6 and T 13, also had to undergo other kinds of treatment contrary to
Article 3 (art. 3).

The Commission has found such treatment only in the case of T 6,
although it regarded it as probable that the use of the five
techniques was sometimes accompanied by physical violence (see
paragraph 105 above).

170.  As far as T 6 is concerned, the Court shares the Commission's
opinion that the security forces subjected T 6 to assaults severe
enough to constitute inhuman treatment.  This opinion, which is not
contested by the respondent Government, is borne out by the evidence
before the Court.

171.  In the thirteen remaining cases examined in this context,
including the contested case of T 13, the Court has no evidence to
support a finding of breaches of Article 3 (art. 3) over and above
that resulting from the application of the five techniques.

172.  Accordingly, no other practice contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) is
established for the unidentified interrogation centre or centres; the
findings relating to the individual case of T 6 cannot, of themselves,
amount to proof of a practice.

2. Palace Barracks

173.  The Commission came to the view that inhuman treatment had
occurred at Palace Barracks in September, October and November 1971 in
seven of the nine "illustrative" cases it examined, namely those of
T 2, T 8, T 12, T 15, T 9, T 14 and T 10.  It considered that these
cases, combined with other indications, showed that there had been in
these Barracks, in the autumn of 1971, a practice in connection with
the interrogation of prisoners by members of the RUC which was inhuman
treatment.

The British Government do not contest these conclusions; the Irish
Government ask the Court to confirm them but also to supplement them
in various respects.

(a) Autumn 1971

174.  Insofar as the Commission has found that a practice of inhuman
treatment was followed in the autumn of 1971, for example in the cases
of T 2, T 8, T 12, T 15, T 9, T 14 and T 10, the facts summarised
above (paragraphs 110-111 and 115-116) bear out its opinion.  The
evidence before the Court reveals that, at the time in question, quite
a large number of those held in custody at Palace Barracks were
subjected to violence by members of the RUC.  This violence, which was
repeated violence occurring in the same place and taking similar
forms, did not amount merely to isolated incidents; it definitely
constituted a practice.  It also led to intense suffering and to
physical injury which on occasion was substantial; it thus fell into
the category of inhuman treatment.

According to the applicant Government, the violence in question should
also be classified, in some cases, as torture.

On the basis of the data before it, the Court does not share this
view.  Admittedly, the acts complained of often occurred during
interrogation and, to this extent, were aimed at extracting
confessions, the naming of others and/or information, but the severity
of the suffering that they were capable of causing did not attain the
particular level inherent in the notion of torture as understood by
the Court (see paragraph 167 above).

175.  In their memorial of 28 July 1976, the applicant Government
asked the Court to hold, unlike the Commission, that T 1 and
T 4 had also been victims of violations of Article 3 (art. 3)
(see paragraphs 112-114 above).

The delegates of the Commission argued that it would serve no purpose
to add these two cases to the list since, like the other seven, they
date from the autumn of 1971 and there is no longer any dispute
between those appearing before the Court as to the existence during
this period of a practice in breach of Article 3 (art. 3).

At the hearings in February 1977, the Irish Government acknowledged
the validity of this argument.  They declared that the Court would not
need to make a specific finding on the contested cases of T 1 and T 4
if it confirmed the Commission's non-contested conclusions.

The Court takes note of this declaration.  For the reasons given by
the delegates, it considers that an examination of these two
individual cases would be superfluous.

(b) From autumn 1971 to June 1972

176.  Finally, the Irish Government request the Court to hold that the
practice complained of continued until June 1972 when Palace Barracks
were closed down as a holding centre.  In their submission, there is
no proof to the contrary and there are indications that the practice
did so continue.

The respondent Government state, inter alia, that they do not perceive
how, by relying on nothing more than inferences, the Court could on
this issue reach a conclusion different from the Commission's.

177.  Concurring with the submission made by the delegates of the
Commission, the Court finds that, like the Commission, it lacks
sufficient evidence on which to decide whether or not the practice in
question continued at Palace Barracks beyond the autumn of 1971: the
only two cases dating from the first six months of 1972 (T 30 and
T 31) figured amongst the "41 cases" and not the "illustrative" cases
(see paragraphs 93, 109 and 116 above).  For the reasons explained
below (paragraph 184), the Court does not consider that it has to try
to obtain further evidence.  It therefore restricts its findings in
the same way as the Commission.

3. Other places

178.  According to the applicant Government, a practice or practices
in breach of Article 3 (art. 3) existed in Northern Ireland from 1971
to 1974, for example at Girdwood Park and at Ballykinler; this
allegation is denied by the respondent Government.

The Commission was of the opinion that T 16 and T 7 had been victims
of treatment that was both inhuman and degrading and T 11 of treatment
that was inhuman: T 16 on 13 August 1971 at Girdwood Park, T 7 on
28 October 1971 in a street in Belfast and T 11 on 20 December 1971 at
Albert Street Barracks, also in Belfast.  However, the Commission
considered that no practice in breach of Article 3 (art. 3) had been
established in relation to these cases, including the general
conditions at Girdwood Park (see paragraph 147 above) and, further,
that the conditions of detention at Ballykinler did not disclose a
violation of that Article (art. 3) (ibid.).

(a) Ballykinler

179.  The Court first examined the situation at the Ballykinler
military camp.  For this purpose, it did not have to investigate
separately the individual contested case of T 3 on which the Irish
Government are no longer seeking a specific finding (see paragraph 158
above).

180.  The RUC, with the assistance of the army, used Ballykinler as a
holding and interrogation centre for a few days early in August 1971.
Some dozens of people arrested in the course of Operation Demetrius
were held there in extreme discomfort and were made to perform irksome
and painful exercises; eleven of those persons subsequently received
compensation (see paragraphs 123-126 above).

There was thus a practice rather than isolated incidents.  The Court
found confirmation of this in the judgment of 18 February 1972 in the
Moore case.

181.  The Court has to determine whether this practice violated
Article 3 (art. 3).  Clearly, it would not be possible to speak of
torture or inhuman treatment, but the question does arise whether
there was not degrading treatment.  The Armagh County Court granted
Mr. Moore £300 by way of damages, the maximum amount it had
jurisdiction to award.  This fact shows that the matters of which
Mr. Moore complained were, if nothing else, contrary to the domestic
law then in force in the United Kingdom.  Furthermore, the way in which
prisoners at Ballykinler were treated was characterised in the
judgment of 18 February 1972 as not only illegal but also harsh.
However, the judgment does not describe the treatment in detail; it
concentrates mainly on reciting the evidence tendered by the witnesses
and indicates that the judge rejected that given on behalf of the
defence.  The Compton Committee for its part considered that, although
the exercises which detainees had been made to do involved some degree
of compulsion and must have caused hardship, they were the result of
lack of judgment rather than an intention to hurt or degrade.

To sum up, the RUC and the army followed at Ballykinler a practice
which was discreditable and reprehensible but the Court does not
consider that they infringed Article 3 (art. 3).

(b) Miscellaneous places

182.  There remain the various other places referred to by the Irish
Government (see paragraphs 119-122 and 127-132 above).  The
information before the Court concerning these places - for example the
large number of cases in which compensation was paid by the British
authorities and the many criminal or disciplinary sanctions imposed on
members of the security forces (see paragraphs 140-143 above) -
suggests that there must have been individual violations of Article 3
(art. 3) in Northern Ireland over and above the breaches already noted
by the Court (see paragraphs 167, 170 and 174 above).  However, the
Commission did not regard this information, which it had obtained by
using a method accepted by the Parties (see paragraph 93 above), as
being sufficient to disclose a practice or practices in breach of
Article 3 (art. 3).

The Court shares this view.  Admittedly, the evidence before the Court
bears out the Commission's opinion on the cases of T 16, T 7 and
T 11 which the respondent Government do not contest (see
paragraphs 120, 128 and 129 above).  However, these were incidents
insufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount to a practice,
even if one were to add the contested case of T 5 (St. Genevieve's
School, Belfast, 13 August 1972, paragraph 130 above), on which the
applicant Government are no longer seeking a specific finding (see
paragraph 158 above).

183.  The Irish Government stress, inter alia, that interrogations at
Palace Barracks and Girdwood Park were conducted by the same members
of the RUC on a rotating system (see paragraph 108 above).  The
Government regard it as improbable that these men observed Article 3
(art. 3) in the second of these centres when they contravened it in
the first.  There is some force in this argument, but it is only a
presumption and so cannot be taken as conclusive on its own.

184.  The Court would be empowered to obtain, if necessary proprio
motu, additional evidence (Rule 38 of the Rules of Court).  However,
such a course would oblige the Court to select a series of further
"illustrative" cases and to hear a substantial number of further
witnesses, failing which it might well, as the delegates of the
Commission emphasised, arrive at extremely tenuous conclusions.

It is not essential to re-open the investigation in this way in the
present case.  Indeed, the preventive measures taken by the United
Kingdom (see paragraphs 133-136 above) at first sight render hardly
plausible, especially as regards the period after the introduction of
direct rule (30 March 1972), if not the suggestion of individual
violations of Article 3 (art. 3) - on which the Court does not have to
give a specific ruling (see paragraph 157 above) -, at least the
suggestion of the continuation or commencement of a practice or
practices in breach of that Article (art. 3).  Furthermore, anyone
claiming to be the victim of a breach of Article 3 (art. 3) in
Northern Ireland is entitled to exercise the domestic remedies open to
him (Article 26 the Convention) (art. 26) and subsequently, if need
be, to apply to the Commission whose competence to receive
"individual" petitions has been recognised by the United Kingdom
(Article 25) (art. 25); this in fact often happened.  Finally, the
findings made in connection with the five techniques and Palace
Barracks, henceforth embodied in a binding judgment of the Court,
provide a far from negligible guarantee against a return to the
serious errors of former times.

In these circumstances, the interests protected by the Convention do
not compel the Court to undertake lengthy researches that would delay
the Court's decision.

185.  In conclusion, the Court does not find, as regards the places
concerned, any practice in breach of Article 3 (art. 3).

4. The Irish request for a consequential order

186.  In a letter dated 5 January 1977, the applicant Government
requested the Court to order that the respondent Government

- refrain from reintroducing the five techniques, as a method of
interrogation or otherwise;

- proceed as appropriate, under the criminal law of the United Kingdom
and the relevant disciplinary code, against those members of the
security forces who have committed acts in breach of Article 3
(art. 3) referred to in the Commission's findings and conclusions, and
against those who condoned or tolerated them.

At the hearings, the applicant Government withdrew the first request
following the solemn undertaking given on behalf of the United Kingdom
Government on 8 February 1977 (see paragraph 153 above); on the other
hand, the second request was maintained.

187.  The Court does not have to consider in these proceedings whether
its functions extend, in certain circumstances, to addressing
consequential orders to Contracting States.  In the present case, the
Court finds that the sanctions available to it do not include the
power to direct one of those States to institute criminal or
disciplinary proceedings in accordance with its domestic law.

II. ON ARTICLE 5 (art. 5)

188.  The substance of the Irish Government's allegations is that

- the various powers relating to extrajudicial deprivation of liberty
which were used in the six counties from 9 August 1971 to March 1975
did not satisfy the conditions prescribed by Article 5 (art. 5);

- those powers violated Article 5 (art. 5) since they failed to meet
in full the requirements of Article 15 (art. 15);

- those powers were furthermore exercised with discrimination and
consequently also violated Article 14 taken together with
Article 5 (art. 14+5).

189.  The applicant Government are not asking the Court to give a
ruling on the legislation subsequent to March 1975, the date of the
final hearings of the Parties before the Commission.  However, the
Emergency Provisions Amendment Act, certain of whose provisions
reintroduced the principle of detention by order of the Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland, did not enter into force until
21 August 1975 (see paragraph 90 above).  An ex officio examination of
those provisions is not called for: the information made available to
the Court suggests that they have not been used since 5 December 1975
(see paragraph 91 above) and, besides, does not indicate that resort
was ever had to them before that date.

190.  The legislation prior to March 1975 (see paragraphs 80-89 above)
is criticised by the Irish Government as regards both its terms and
its application.  However, the first aspect is a matter for, and must
be dealt with under, Articles 1 and 24 (art. 1, art. 24) (see
paragraphs 236-243 below).  Only the second aspect is relevant under
Article 5 (art. 5), taken alone or together with Articles 15
and 14 (art. 15+5, art. 14+5).  In addition, the scope of the Court's
review extends to the application of that legislation between
9 August 1971 and March 1975 only as a practice and not in a given
individual case; this is clear from the documents before the Court
read as a whole and, in particular, from the decision of
1 October 1972 on the admissibility of the original application of
16 December 1971.

191.  It will, of course, be necessary to have regard to Article 15
(art. 15) in deciding whether any derogations from Article 5 (art. 5)
were, in the circumstances of the case, compatible with the
Convention, but the Court considers that it should ascertain in what
respects the measures complained of derogated from Article 5 (art. 5)
before assessing them under Article 15 (art. 15).

A. Paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-1, art. 5-2, art. 5-3,
art. 5-4), taken alone

192.  Paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-1, art. 5-2, art. 5-3,
art. 5-4) read as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.  No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent
court;

(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with
the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of
any obligation prescribed by law;

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence
or fleeing after having done so;

(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of
educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority;

(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the
spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind,
alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;

(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his
effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or
extradition.

2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge
against him.

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1 (c) of this Article (art. 5-1-c) shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to
release pending trial.  Release may be conditioned by guarantees to
appear for trial.

4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his
detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered
if the detention is not lawful."

193.  In the Commission's opinion, the powers at issue - as exercised
by the competent authorities - did not comply with paragraphs 1 to 4
of Article 5 (art. 5-1, art. 5-2, art. 5-3, art. 5-4) on a number of
points.

The applicant Government agree with this conclusion; the respondent
Government do not contest it but indicate that they do not necessarily
accept all of the reasons.

1. Paragraph 1 (art. 5-1)

194.  Paragraph 1 of Article 5 (art. 5-1) contains a list of the cases
in which it is permissible under the Convention to deprive someone of
his liberty.  Subject to Article 15 (art. 15) - and without prejudice
to Article 1 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-1) which the United Kingdom has not
ratified -, that list is exhaustive: this appears from the words "save
in the following cases" and is confirmed by Article 17 (art. 17).

195.  The different forms of deprivation of liberty in this case
clearly did not fall under sub-paragraphs (a), (d), (e) and (f) of
paragraph 1 (art. 5-1-a, art. 5-1-d, art. 5-1-e, art. 5-1-f).

Neither were such deprivations covered by sub-paragraph (b)
(art. 5-1-b), since they had no connection whatsoever with a
"non-compliance with the ... order of a court" and were not designed
to "secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law"
(Lawless judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3, p. 51, para. 12; Engel
and others judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 28, para. 69,
third sub-paragraph).

196.  At first sight, the different forms of deprivation of liberty
may appear to bear some resemblance to the cases contemplated by
sub-paragraph (c) (art. 5-1-c).

However, a "suspicion" of an "offence" was not required before a
person could be arrested under Regulation 10, nor did it have to be
"considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing
after having done so"; arrest had merely to be "for the preservation
of the peace and maintenance of order" and was sometimes used to
interrogate the person concerned about the activities of others (see
paragraph 81 above).

On the other hand, the other three Regulations complained of by the
Irish Government did require a suspicion.  While Regulations 11 (1)
(arrest) and 11 (2) (detention) spoke both of an "offence" and of
activity "prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance
of order" (see paragraphs 82 and 83 above), and while this latter
concept alone appeared in Regulation 12 (1) (internment, paragraph 84
above), section 2 (4) of the Special Powers Act made such activity an
offence.

The Terrorists Order (interim custody and detention) and the Emergency
Provisions Act (arrest, interim custody and detention), for their
part, were applicable only to individuals suspected of having been
concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of
terrorism, that is the use of violence for political ends, or in the
organisation of persons for the purpose of terrorism; these criteria
were well in keeping with the idea of an offence (see paragraphs 85-88
above).

Irrespective of whether extrajudicial deprivation of liberty was or
was not founded in the majority of cases on suspicions of a kind that
would render detention on remand justifiable under the Convention,
such detention is permissible under Article 5 para. 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c)
only if it is "effected for the purpose of bringing [the detainee]
before the competent legal authority".  Yet this condition - if
interpreted, as must be done, in the light of paragraph 3 of Article 5
(art. 5-3) (Lawless judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3,
pp. 51-53, para. 14) - was not fulfilled; the Court refers, in this
connection, to paragraph 199 below.

2. Paragraphs 2 to 4

197.  Paragraphs 2 to 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-2, art. 5-3,
art. 5-4) place the Contracting States under an obligation to provide
several guarantees in cases where someone is deprived of his liberty.

198.  Under paragraph 2 (art. 5-2), "everyone who is arrested shall
be informed promptly ... of the reasons for his arrest and of any
charge against him".  However, there was no such provision either in
Regulations 10 and 11 (1) or in section 10 of the Emergency Provisions
Act.  In point of fact, the persons concerned were not normally
informed why they were being arrested; in general, they were simply
told that the arrest was made pursuant to the emergency legislation
and they were given no further details (see paragraphs 81 and 82
above).  This practice originated in instructions issued to the
military police in May 1970 and it continued at least until it was
declared unlawful by the courts (see the McElduff case, judgment
of 12 October 1971, and the Kelly case, judgment of 11 January 1973,
on Regulation 11 (1); the Moore case, judgment of 18 February 1972,
on Regulation 10).

199.  As for paragraph 3 (art. 5-3), taken together with
paragraph 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c) (see paragraph 196 above), the Court
finds that the impugned measures were not effected for the purpose of
bringing the persons concerned "promptly" before "the competent legal
authority", namely "a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power".

Persons originally detained under, for example, Regulation 11 (2)
were, in fact, sometimes brought before the ordinary courts (see
paragraph 83 above), but paragraphs 1 (c) and 3 of Article 5
(art. 5-1-c, art. 5-3) of the Convention are not satisfied by an
appearance "before the competent legal authority" in some cases since
such appearance is obligatory in every single case governed by those
paragraphs.  For its part, the advisory committee before which were
brought - on the occasions when they so consented - individuals
interned under Regulation 12 (1) did not have power to order their
release and accordingly did not constitute a "competent legal
authority" (see paragraph 84 above).

On the other hand, such a power was vested by the Terrorists Order
and, subsequently, by the Emergency Provisions Act in the
commissioners who adjudicated on cases of persons subjected to interim
custody orders made by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
However, even if such a commissioner is regarded as a judicial
authority ("officer", "magistrat"), appearance before him did not take
place "aussitôt", or even "promptly" (see paragraphs 86-88 above).

A person "arrested or detained" pursuant to one of the provisions
complained of was even less entitled to "trial within a reasonable
time" or to "release pending trial" conditioned, if need be, by
"guarantees to appear for trial", within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3
(art. 5-3).  Quite the contrary: the reason for the existence of those
provisions and of the related practice was the fact that the
circumstances prevailing at the time made it difficult, subject to
exceptions, to institute criminal proceedings which would in principle
have led to a judicial hearing ("audience") and to a "[decision] on the
merits" (Lawless judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3, p. 52, first
sub-paragraph).

200.  There remains paragraph 4 (art. 5-4) which is applicable to
"everyone who is deprived of his liberty", whether lawfully or not
(De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12,
pp. 39-40, para. 73).

Under Regulations 10, 11 (1) and 11 (2) there was no entitlement to
"take proceedings by which the lawfulness of [the] detention [would] be
decided speedily by a court" and "release ordered if the detention"
proved to be "not lawful" (see paragraphs 81-83 above).  As regards
Regulation 12 (1), the advisory committee to which internees had the
possibility of making representations could at most recommend, as
opposed to order, release, as the Court has already noted (see
paragraphs 84 and 199 above).  Moreover, the committee's procedure did
not afford the fundamental guarantees inherent in the notion of
"court" as used in Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp
judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, pp. 40-42, para. 76, second and
third sub-paragraphs, and para. 78; paragraph 84 above).

The last remark also applies, mutatis mutandis, to the commissioners
and to the appeal tribunal entrusted with supervisory functions by the
Terrorists Order and, subsequently, by the Emergency Provisions Act
(see paragraphs 87-88 above).  Here again, the Court does not consider
it indispensable to enquire further into the matter.  In fact, only
the Chief Constable and, in certain circumstances, the Secretary of
State were empowered to refer to a commissioner the case of a person
detained under an interim custody order (see paragraphs 86-88 above).
The detainee himself was not entitled to "take proceedings" in respect
of an interim custody order; he had no means of contesting the
"lawfulness" of his detention, either during its initial twenty-eight
day period or during its extension pending the commissioner's
adjudication (see paragraphs 86 and 88 above).  When that adjudication
resulted in a detention order, the individual could challenge the
order before the appeal tribunal; in general, however, that tribunal
did not give its decision "speedily", at least if, as must be done,
the length of the earlier proceedings before the commissioner is also
taken into account (see paragraphs 86-88 above).  Accordingly, the
commissioners and the appeal tribunal did not meet each of the
requirements of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4).

The respondent Government maintain that habeas corpus proceedings, on
the other hand, fully satisfied those requirements.  The Court has, in
fact, cognisance of a judgment delivered by a court before whom an
individual had challenged under common law his deprivation of liberty
pursuant to Regulations 11 (1) and 11 (2) (the McElduff case, judgment
of 12 October 1971).  However, the courts considered that their powers
did not go beyond the limits indicated in paragraphs 81-84 above.
The judicial review of the lawfulness of the measures in issue was
thus not sufficiently wide in scope, taking into account the purpose
and object of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the Convention.

201.  On paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-1, art. 5-2,
art. 5-3, art. 5-4), taken alone, the Court therefore arrives at
conclusions in line with those of the Commission.

B. On Article 5 taken together with Article 15 (art. 15+5)

202.  The applicant Government maintain that the powers relating to
extrajudicial deprivation of liberty which were applied in Northern
Ireland from 9 August 1971 to March 1975 were not in complete
conformity with Article 15 (art. 15) and, accordingly, violated
Article 5 (art. 5).

The Commission is unanimous in not accepting this claim and it is
disputed by the respondent Government.

203.  Article 15 (art. 15) provides:

"1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of
the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating
from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law.

2. No derogation from Article 2 (art. 2), except in respect of deaths
resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1)
and 7 (art. 3, art. 4-1, art. 7) shall be made under this provision.

3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of
derogation shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons
therefor.  It shall also inform the Secretary-General of the Council
of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions
of the Convention are again being fully executed."

204.  Article 5 (art. 5) does not appear amongst the entrenched
provisions listed in paragraph 2 of Article 15 (art. 15-2) and is
therefore one of the Articles subject to the "right of derogation"
reserved by the Contracting States, the exercise of which is regulated
by paragraphs 1 and 3 (art. 15-1, art. 15-3).

1. On the "public emergency threatening the life of the nation"

205.  Article 15 (art. 15) comes into play only "in time of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation".  The
existence of such an emergency is perfectly clear from the facts
summarised above (paragraphs 12 and 29-75) and was not questioned by
anyone before either the Commission or the Court.  The crisis
experienced at the time by the six counties therefore comes within the
ambit of Article 15 (art. 15).

2. On the "extent strictly required"

206.  The Contracting States may make use of their right of derogation
only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation".  The Irish Government consider the "extent strictly
required" to have been exceeded, whereas the British Government and
the Commission assert the contrary.

(a) The rôle of the Court

207.  The limits on the Court's powers of review (see judgment of
23 July 1968 on the merits of the "Belgian Linguistic" case, Series A
no. 6, p. 35, para. 10 in fine; Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976,
Series A no. 24, p. 22, para. 48) are particularly apparent where
Article 15 (art. 15) is concerned.

It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its
responsibility for "the life of [its] nation", to determine whether
that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so, how far it
is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency.  By reason
of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the
moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position
than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an
emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to
avert it.  In this matter Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1) leaves those
authorities a wide margin of appreciation.

Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this
respect.  The Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for
ensuring the observance of the States' engagements (Article 19)
(art. 19), is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone
beyond the "extent strictly required by the exigencies" of the crisis
(Lawless judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3, p. 55, para. 22, and
pp. 57-59, paras. 36-38).  The domestic margin of appreciation is thus
accompanied by a European supervision.

(b) Questions of evidence

208.  The Irish Government ask the Court to exclude from its
examination the following material:

- by reason of their origin, the Diplock report (see paragraphs 58-59
above), statements made before the Commission by the representatives
of the United Kingdom and the memorandum by the Northern Ireland
Office, annexed to the British memorial to the Court;

- for the reasons given in paragraph 210 below, the oral evidence
obtained by the Commission under Article 14 (art. 14), including that
of the witnesses G 1, G 2 and G 3, who were heard in London on
20 February 1975 (see paragraph 146 above).

209.  The Court is not bound, under the Convention or under the
general principles applicable to international tribunals, by strict
rules of evidence.  In order to satisfy itself, the Court is entitled
to rely on evidence of every kind, including, insofar as it deems them
relevant, documents or statements emanating from governments, be they
respondent or applicant, or from their institutions or officials.
Here, there can scarcely be any question as to the relevance of the
evidence which the Irish Government challenge.  In particular, the
fact that some of it was given in connection with Article 14 (art. 14)
rather than Article 15 (art. 15) is of little moment.

210.  The hearing of the evidence of G 1, G 2 and G 3 gives rise to
rather complex questions.  The applicant Government invite the Court
not to take account of that evidence beause it was heard in the
absence of the Parties and without cross-examination, as a result of
the wishes of the respondent Government who thereby allegedly failed
in their obligation to cooperate in establishing the truth
(Article 28, sub-paragraph (a) in fine, of the Convention)
(art. 28-a).

The Court finds in the first place that it does not have jurisdiction
to rule on the correctness of the procedure followed at that hearing.
The Commission, with its independence from the Court when carrying out
its fact-finding rôle (Lawless judgment of 14 November 1960, Series A
no. 1, p. 11, second sub-paragraph), is master of its procedure and of
the interpretation of its Rules of Procedure - in this case
Rule 34 para. 2 - which it draws up under Article 36 (art. 36) of the
Convention.

On the other hand, the Court, being master of its own procedure and of
its own rules (Article 55 of the Convention) (art. 55), has complete
freedom in assessing not only the admissibility and the relevance but
also the probative value of each item of evidence before it.  It
cannot attach to the evidence of G 1, G 2 and G 3 as much weight as to
the evidence of witnesses who have been cross-examined.  The Court
looks upon the evidence of G 1, G 2 and G 3 as no more than one source
of information amongst others and one which, being evidence coming
from senior British officials, falls into a similar category to the
respective statements made by the representatives of the two
Governments to the Commission and the Court.  Although that evidence
was given on oath, it was obtained under conditions which reduce its
weight.  Besides, its importance was not over-estimated by the
Commission which bore the absence of cross-examination in mind; the
delegates took care to emphasise this.

(c) Questions concerning the merits

211.  The Court has to decide whether the United Kingdom went beyond
the "extent strictly required".  For this purpose the Court must, as
in the Lawless case (judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3,
pp. 57-59, paras. 36-37), enquire into the necessity for, on the one hand,
deprivation of liberty contrary to paragraph 1 of Article 5 (art. 5-1)
and, on the other hand, the failure of guarantees to attain the level
fixed by paragraphs 2 to 4 (art. 5-2, art. 5-3, art. 5-4).

(i) On the necessity for derogation from paragraph 1 of Article 5
(art. 5-1) by extrajudicial deprivation of liberty

212.  Unquestionably, the exercise of the special powers was mainly,
and before 5 February 1973 even exclusively, directed against the IRA
as an underground military force.  The intention was to combat an
organisation which had played a considerable subversive rôle
throughout the recent history of Ireland and which was creating, in
August 1971 and thereafter, a particularly far-reaching and acute
danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the
institutions of the six counties and the lives of the province's
inhabitants (see paragraphs 16, 17, 20, 28-32, 35-42, 44, 47-48,
54-55, 58, 61, 63 and 67 above).  Being confronted with a massive wave
of violence and intimidation, the Northern Ireland Government and
then, after the introduction of direct rule (30 March 1972), the
British Government were reasonably entitled to consider that normal
legislation offered insufficient resources for the campaign against
terrorism and that recourse to measures outside the scope of the
ordinary law, in the shape of extrajudicial deprivation of liberty,
was called for.  When the Irish Republic was faced with a serious
crisis in 1957, it adopted the same approach and the Court did not
conclude that the "extent strictly required" had been exceeded
(Lawless judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3, pp. 35-36, para. 14, and
pp. 57-58, para. 36).

However, under one of the provisions complained of, namely
Regulation 10, a person who was in no way suspected of a crime or
offence or of activities prejudicial to peace and order could be
arrested for the sole purpose of obtaining from him information about
others - and this sometimes occurred (see paragraphs 38 and 81 above).
This sort of arrest can be justifiable only in a very exceptional
situation, but the circumstances prevailing in Northern Ireland did
fall into such a category.  Many witnesses could not give evidence
freely without running the greatest risks (see paragraphs 36, 53,
58-59 and 74 above); the competent authorities were entitled to take
the view, without exceeding their margin of appreciation, that it was
indispensable to arrest such witnesses so that they could be
questioned in conditions of relative security and not be exposed to
reprisals.  Moreover and above all, Regulation 10 authorised
deprivation of liberty only for a maximum of forty-eight hours.

213.  From 9 August 1971 to 5 February 1973, the measures involving
deprivation of liberty taken by the respondent State were used only
against Republican terrorism even though as early as this period
outrages, at first sporadic but later constantly more numerous, were
attributable to Loyalist terrorism; even after 5 February 1973, the
measures were applied against Republican terrorism to a much greater
extent than against Loyalist terrorism despite the latter's
organisation and extensive development shortly after 30 March 1972.

The Court will examine below (paragraphs 228-232) whether the
difference of treatment between the two types of terrorism was such as
to violate Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention.

This issue apart, it appears to the Court that the extrajudicial
measures brought into operation could, in the situation described
above, reasonably have been considered strictly required for the
protection of public security and that, in the context of Article 15
(art. 15), their intrinsic necessity, once recognised, could not be
affected by the restriction of their field of application.

214.  The Irish Government submit that experience shows extrajudicial
deprivation of liberty to have been ineffectual.  They contend that the
policy introduced on 9 August 1971 not only failed to put a brake on
terrorism but also had the result of increasing it (see paragraphs 42,
44 and 47-48 above).  Consequently, the British Government, after
attenuating the policy in varying degrees following the introduction
of direct rule (see paragraphs 50, 57 and 64 above), abandoned it on
5 December 1975: since then, it appears that no one has been detained
in the six counties under the emergency legislation, despite the
persistence of an intense campaign of violence and even though the
Emergency Provisions Amendment Act has remained in force (see
paragraphs 76 and 91 above).  This, claim the applicant Government,
confirms that extrajudicial deprivation of liberty was not an absolute
necessity.

The Court cannot accept this argument.

It is certainly not the Court's function to substitute for the British
Government's assessment any other assessment of what might be the most
prudent or most expedient policy to combat terrorism.  The Court must
do no more than review the lawfulness, under the Convention, of the
measures adopted by that Government from 9 August 1971 onwards.  For
this purpose the Court must arrive at its decision in the light, not
of a purely retrospective examination of the efficacy of those
measures, but of the conditions and circumstances reigning when they
were originally taken and subsequently applied.

Adopting, as it must, this approach, the Court accepts that the limits
of the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States by
Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1) were not overstepped by the United Kingdom
when it formed the opinion that extrajudicial deprivation of liberty
was necessary from August 1971 to March 1975.

(ii) On the necessity for derogation from the guarantees under
paragraphs 2 to 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-2, art. 5-3, art. 5-4)

215.  The Court must now examine under Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1) the
necessity for the far-reaching derogations found by it to have been
made from paragraphs 2 to 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-2, art. 5-3,
art. 5-4) (see paragraphs 198-200 above).

216.  Neither Regulations 10 and 11 (1) nor section 10 of the
Emergency Provisions Act afforded any remedy, judicial or
administrative, against arrests effected thereunder.  Although persons
arrested under Regulation 11 (1) could, before 7 November 1972, apply
to the Civil Authority for release on bail, the Terrorists Order
deprived them of this right by revoking Regulation 11 (4) under which
it arose.  However, the duration of such arrests never exceeded
forty-eight hours as regards Regulation 10, seventy-two hours as
regards section 10 of the Emergency Provisions Act and, in practice,
seventy-two hours as regards Regulation 11 (1) (see paragraphs 81-82
and 88 above).

217.  Similarly, Regulation 11 (2), Article 4 of the Terrorists Order
and paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the Emergency Provisions Act did not
provide for any remedy.  Detention under Regulation 11 (2) sometimes
continued for longer than twenty-eight days, but it was never to be
for an indefinite period and the detainee could, if the administrative
authority agreed, apply to the courts for release on bail
(Regulation 11 (4) and the McElduff case, judgment of 12 October
1971).  On the other hand, interim custody imposed under Article 4 of
the Terrorists Order, or subsequently under paragraph 11 of Schedule 1
to the Emergency Provisions Act, continued until adjudication by the
commissioner; the Chief Constable invariably referred the case to him
within the initial twenty-eight day time-limit but the commissioner
gave his decision after several weeks or even after six months (see
paragraphs 83, 86 and 88 above).

218.  Individuals deprived of their liberty under Regulation 12 (1),
Article 5 of the Terrorists Order or paragraph 24 of Schedule 1 to the
Emergency Provisions Act were in many cases interned or detained for
some years.  Nevertheless, the advisory committee set up by
Regulation 12 (1) afforded, notwithstanding its non-judicial
character, a certain measure of protection that cannot be discounted.
By establishing commissioners and an appeal tribunal, the Terrorists
Order brought further safeguards which were somewhat strengthened by
the Emergency Provisions Act (see paragraphs 84, 87 and 88 above).

219.  There was in addition the valuable, if limited, review effected
by the courts, when the opportunity arose, by virtue of the common law
(see, for example, the McElduff case, judgment of 12 October 1971 on
Regulations 11 (1) and 11 (2), the Moore case, judgment of
18 February 1972 on Regulation 10 and the Kelly case, judgment of
11 January 1973 on Regulations 11 (1), 11 (2) and 12 (1);
paragraphs 81-84 above).

220.  An overall examination of the legislation and practice at issue
reveals that they evolved in the direction of increasing respect for
individual liberty.  The incorporation right from the start of more
satisfactory judicial, or at least administrative, guarantees would
certainly have been desirable, especially as Regulations 10 to 12 (1)
dated back to 1956-1957 and were made under an Act of 1922, but it
would be unrealistic to isolate the first from the later phases.  When
a State is struggling against a public emergency threatening the life
of the nation, it would be rendered defenceless if it were required to
accomplish everything at once, to furnish from the outset each of its
chosen means of action with each of the safeguards reconcilable with
the priority requirements for the proper functioning of the
authorities and for restoring peace within the community.  The
interpretation of Article 15 (art. 15) must leave a place for
progressive adaptations.

The Northern Ireland Government sought in the first place
- unsuccessfully - to meet the most pressing problem, to stem the wave
of violence that was sweeping the region.  After assuming direct
responsibility for the future of the province, the British Government
and Parliament lost little time in moderating in certain respects the
severity of the laws applied in the early days.  The Court asked
itself whether those laws should not have been attenuated even more,
especially as regards interim custody (see paragraph 217 above), but
does not consider that it can give an affirmative answer.  It must not
be forgotten that the crisis experienced at the time by the six
counties was serious and, hence, of a kind that justified far-reaching
derogations from paragraphs 2 to 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-2, art. 5-3,
art. 5-4).  In view of the Contracting States' margin of appreciation,
the Court does not find it established that the United Kingdom
exceeded in this respect the "extent strictly required" referred to in
Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1).

221.  According to the applicant Government, the non-contested
violations of Article 3 (art. 3) are relevant under Articles 5
and 15 (art. 15+5) taken together.  They claim that deprivation
of liberty was sometimes imposed on the strength of information
extracted in conditions contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) and was thereby
rendered unlawful under Article 15 (art. 15).  The Irish argument is
also said to be confirmed by the existence of those violations since
they would probably have been prevented by the impugned legislation if
it had afforded genuine guarantees to the persons concerned.

The Court emphasises, as do the respondent Government and the
Commission, that Articles 3 and 5 (art. 3, art. 5) embody quite
separate obligations.  Moreover, the violations of Article 3 (art. 3)
found in the present judgment fail to show that it was not necessary
to apply the extrajudicial powers in force.

3. On the "other obligations under international law"

222.  Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1) in fine prohibits any derogation
inconsistent "with other obligations under international law".
There is nothing in the data before the Court to suggest that the
United Kingdom disregarded such obligations in this case; in
particular, the Irish Government never supplied to the Commission or
the Court precise details on the claim formulated or outlined on this
point in their application of 16 December 1971.

4. On the observance of paragraph 3 of Article 15 (art. 15-3)

223.  The Court finds proprio motu, in the light of its Lawless
judgment of 1 July 1961 (Series A no. 3, pp. 61-62, para. 47), that the
British notices of derogation dated 20 August 1971, 23 January 1973
and 16 August 1973 (see paragraphs 80, 85 and 88 above) fulfilled the
requirements of Article 15 para. 3 (art. 15-3).

5. Conclusion

224.  The Court has accordingly come to the conclusion that, since the
requirements of Article 15 (art. 15) were met, the derogations from
Article 5 (art. 5) were not, in the circumstances of the case, in
breach of the Convention.

C. On Article 14 taken together with Article 5 (art. 14+5)

225.  Article 14 (art. 14) provides:

"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status."

Before 5 February 1973, the extrajudicial powers were employed only
against persons suspected of engaging in, or of possessing information
about, IRA terrorism; later on, they were also utilised, but to a far
lesser extent, against supposed Loyalist terrorists.  According to the
applicant Government, the circumstances of the case show that the
United Kingdom thereby followed a policy or practice of
discrimination.

226.  The principal submission of the Irish Government is that it
would not be correct to apply here the criteria used by the Court, in
the field of Article 14 (art. 14) since its judgment of 23 July 1968
on the merits of the "Belgian Linguistic" case (Series A no. 6,
pp. 34-35, para. 10).  The Government's argument runs as follows: those
criteria are applicable only where a respondent State admits having
introduced a difference of treatment and where that difference is
expressly permitted by legislation; however, the British Government
pleaded before the Commission not the existence of an "objective and
reasonable justification" but rather the complete absence of such a
difference, and the inequalities found in the report of
25 January 1976 arose from the mere application of laws which
themselves created no inequalities; therefore the Commission was in
error in applying those criteria; the Court should depart therefrom
and rely on a number of inferences which, in the applicant
Government's view, indicate that those inequalities were
discriminatory.

The Court's case-law does not, in fact, make the distinctions which
the Irish Government seek to draw therefrom.  That case-law was
confirmed by the Court when, for example, it examined under Article 14
(art. 14) claims relating, like those in the present case, to the mere
application of a law (Swedish Engine Drivers' Union judgment of
6 February 1976, Series A no. 20, p. 17, paras. 45 in fine and 46; Schmidt
and Dahlström judgment of 6 February 1976, Series A no. 21, p. 17,
paras. 39 in fine and 40; Engel and others judgment of 8 June 1976,
Series A no. 22, p. 42, paras. 102 in fine, and 103 in fine; Handyside
judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, pp. 30-31, para. 66).  The
Court sees no reason for departing from that case-law on this
occasion.

227.  The applicant Government submit, in the alternative, that the
difference of treatment in question lacked an "objective and
reasonable justification".

228.  Before ruling on this submission, the Court must examine why, as
early as 1971, Loyalist terrorism was not fought with the same weapons
as Republican terrorism (see paragraphs 37-38 above).

The Court finds that there were profound differences between Loyalist
and Republican terrorism.

At the time in question, the vast majority of murders, explosions and
other outrages were attributable to Republicans.  Although Loyalists
had begun towards 1963 to perpetrate acts of violence, reaching a high
level in 1969 when the IRA was scarcely in evidence (see paragraphs
20-28 above), since 1970 the scale of their activities had been minute
in comparison with those of the IRA (see paragraphs 29-32, 37, 45 and
47 above).

In the second place, the IRA, with its far more structured
organisation, constituted a far more serious menace than the Loyalist
terrorists.  In 1970 and 1971 the Protestant community included
political pressure groups with extremist tendencies, but apparently
concealed within its ranks no underground military force akin to the
IRA.  At that time Loyalist terrorism was seen by the authorities as
the sporadic work of individuals or isolated factions (see
paragraph 37 above).

Lastly, it was as a general rule easier to institute criminal
proceedings against Loyalist terrorists than against their Republican
counterparts and the former were frequently brought before the courts.
Accordingly, although Loyalist terrorists were not extrajudicially
deprived of their liberty, they do not seem to have been able to act
with impunity.

229.  The later period (30 March 1972 - 4 February 1973) gives rise to
delicate questions.

When assuming direct rule of the province (30 March 1972), the United
Kingdom Government and Parliament wished, amongst other things, to
combat the discrimination long prevalent there in the area of
electoral rights, employment, housing, etc., in the hope of reaching
an equitable solution to the Northern Ireland problem (see paragraphs
50, 60 and 77 above).

However, this approach did not have a consequence which might have
been expected, namely a complete equality of treatment between the two
categories of terrorists in the exercise of the special powers.
Shortly after 30 March 1972, there was a spectacular increase in
Loyalist terrorism.  Furthermore, the UVF proved to have increased its
membership, expanded its holding of arms and improved its
organisation.  Towards the middle of the year, the police as a general
rule had reasonably good intelligence as to the identity of violent
elements on the Protestant side but there were cases in which it was
impossible to procure sufficient evidence to bring them before the
courts.  Nevertheless, about ten months elapsed before the first two
Loyalists were extrajudicially deprived of their liberty (see
paragraphs 52-53, 57, 61-62 and 66 above).

Several explanations for what is at first sight a surprising time-lag
are advanced by the respondent Government and the Commission, for
example the three combined facts that it had been decided to attempt
the phasing-out of internment, that the IRA were still responsible for
the great majority of serious acts of terrorism and that, broadly
speaking, the ordinary criminal processes remained far more suited to
the campaign against the Loyalist terrorists than to that against
their Republican opponents (see paragraphs 50, 54-58, 61 and 63
above).

The cause or causes behind the conduct of the Government and the
security forces at the time cannot be determined with certainty from
the evidence, but it seems beyond doubt that the reasons that had been
influential before 30 March 1972 became less and less valid as time
went on.

However, the Court considers it unrealistic to carve into clear-cut
phases a situation that was inherently changing and constantly
evolving.  The Court can understand the authorities' hesitating about
the course to take, feeling their way and needing a certain time to
try to adapt themselves to the successive demands of an ugly crisis.
On the basis of the data before it, and bearing in mind the limits on
its powers of review, the Court cannot affirm that, during the period
under consideration, the United Kingdom violated Article 14,
taken together with Article 5 (art. 14+5), by employing the emergency
powers against the IRA alone.

230.  To sump up, the aim pursued until 5 February 1973 - the
elimination of the most formidable organisation first of all - could
be regarded as legitimate and the means employed do not appear
disproportionate.

231. 5 February 1973 marked a turning-point.  Thereafter,
extrajudicial deprivation of liberty was used to combat terrorism as
such, as defined a few months previously by the 1972 Order, and no
longer just a given organisation.  In point of fact, the measures were
not applied against Loyalist terrorists to anything like the same
extent as against the IRA (see paragraph 69 above), but the IRA were
still committing the majority of the acts of terrorism (see paragraph
67 above).  Furthermore, Loyalist terrorists could still be brought
before the courts more easily than their Republican counterparts.
Criminal proceedings were opened against many of the former and often
led to convictions, above all in one particular field - sectarian
assassinations (see paragraphs 67, 70 and 76 above).  The Court cannot
reproach the United Kingdom for having attempted to avail itself as
far as possible of this procedure under the ordinary law.  Taking into
account, as it must, the full range of the processes of the law
applied in the campaign against the two categories of terrorists, the
Court finds that the initial difference of treatment did not continue
during the last period considered.

232.  Accordingly, no discrimination contrary to Articles 14
and 5 (art. 14+5) taken together is established.

III. ON ARTICLE 6 (art. 6)

233.  The substance of further claims made by the applicant Government
is that

- the various powers concerning extrajudicial deprivation of liberty
which were used in Northern Ireland from 9 August 1971 to March 1975
did not satisfy the conditions prescribed by Article 6 (art. 6);

- those powers violated Article 6 (art. 6) since they were not in full
conformity with the requirements of Article 15 (art. 15);

- those powers were furthermore implemented with discrimination and
consequently also violated Article 14 taken together with
Article 6 (art. 14+6).

234.  Article 6 (art. 6) provides as follows:

"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.  Judgment shall be pronounced
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of
the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national
security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or
the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice.

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights:

(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence;

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require;

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him;

(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court."

235.  The applicability of Article 6 (art. 6) to the present case is a
subject of controversy before the Court and is disputed by the
respondent Government and the Commission.  Argument has centred on
whether there is room for the cumulative application of Articles 5
and 6 (art. 5, art. 6), whether the right to liberty is a "civil
right" and whether the function of the commissioners and the appeal
tribunal, under the Terrorists Order and the Emergency Provisions Act,
was the "determination" of a "criminal charge".

The Court does not consider it necessary to give a decision on this
point.  The applicant Government are complaining here of the same
measures as under Article 5 (art. 5).  However, assuming Article 6
(art. 6) to be material, the derogations from the guarantees of a
judicial nature afforded by Article 5 (art. 5) perforce involved
derogating from those afforded by Article 6 (art. 6).  The Court has
already held that the derogations from Article 5 (art. 5) met the
requirements of Article 15 (art. 15) (see paragraph 224 above); in the
circumstances of the case, it arrives at the same conclusion as
regards the derogations from Article 6 (art. 6).  In addition, the
Court has held that no discrimination contrary to Articles 14
and 5 (art. 14+5) taken together is established (see paragraph 232
above); it likewise finds no discrimination with respect to Article 6
(art. 6).

IV. ON ARTICLE 1 (art. 1)

236.  The Irish Government's submission is as follows: the laws in
force in the six counties did not in terms prohibit violations of the
rights and freedoms protected by Articles 3, 5, 6 and 14 (art. 3,
art. 5, art. 6, art. 14); several of those laws, as well as certain
administrative practices, even authorised or permitted such
violations; the United Kingdom was thereby in breach, in respect of
each of those Articles (art. 3, art. 5, art. 6, art. 14),
of an inter-State obligation separate from its obligations towards
individuals and arising from Article 1 (art. 1) which provides:

"The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the]
Convention."

Neither the British Government nor the Commission in its report concur
with this argument.  They consider, briefly, that Article 1 (art. 1)
cannot be the subject of a separate breach since it grants no rights
in addition to those mentioned in Section I.

237.  In their memorial of 26 October 1976, the respondent Government
also stressed that the Commission had accepted only one of the two
issues raised by this claim, namely the issue concerning
administrative practices.

The applicant Government replied that the issue of the legislative
measures was also referred to in paragraph 7 of the reasons for the
decision of 1 October 1972, that the operative provisions of that
decision had not declared that issue inadmissible and that the
Commission had examined it on the merits.  The delegates expressed a
similar opinion.

At the hearings in February 1977, the British Government withdrew this
preliminary plea in the light, inter alia, of the Handyside judgment
of 7 December 1976 (Series A no. 24, pp. 19-20, para. 41).  The Court
takes note of this withdrawal; it does not consider that it has to
give a ruling on a question which does not concern public order (ordre
public), which apparently was not raised before the Commission
(De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12,
p. 30, para. 54) and which, anyway, appears to have been overtaken by
events.

238.  Article 1 (art. 1), together with Articles 14, 2 to 13
and 63 (art. 14, art. 2, art. 3, art. 4, art. 5, art. 6, art. 7, art. 8,
art. 9, art. 10, art. 11, art. 12, art. 13, art. 63), demarcates
the scope of the Convention ratione personae, materiae and loci; it is
also one of the many Articles that attest the binding character of the
Convention.  Article 1 (art. 1) is drafted by reference to the
provisions contained in Section I and thus comes into operation only
when taken in conjunction with them; a violation of Article 1 (art. 1)
follows automatically from, but adds nothing to, a breach of those
provisions; hitherto, when the Court has found such a breach, it has
never held that Article 1 (art. 1) has been violated (Neumeister
judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 8, p. 41, para. 15, and p. 44;
judgment of 23 July 1968 on the merits of the "Belgian Linguistic"
case, Series A no. 6, pp. 70 in fine and 87, para. 1; Stögmüller judgment
of 10 November 1969, Series A no. 9, p. 45; De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp
judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, p. 43, para. 80, and p. 47,
para. 4; Ringeisen judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13, p. 45, para. 109
in fine, and p. 46, paras. 5-6; Golder judgment of 21 February 1975,
Series A no. 18, p. 20, para. 40 in fine, p. 22, para. 45 in fine, and p. 23,
paras. 1-2; Engel and others judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22,
p. 29, para. 69 in fine, p. 37, para. 89 in fine, and p. 45, paras. 4, 5
and 11).

239.  However, the Irish Government's argument prompts the Court to
clarify the nature of the engagements placed under its supervision.
Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention
comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting
States.  It creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral
undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of the
Preamble, benefit from a "collective enforcement".  By virtue of
Article 24 (art. 24), the Convention allows Contracting States to
require the observance of those obligations without having to justify
an interest deriving, for example, from the fact that a measure they
complain of has prejudiced one of their own nationals.  By substituting
the words "shall secure" for the words "undertake to secure" in the
text of Article 1 (art. 1), the drafters of the Convention also
intended to make it clear that the rights and freedoms set out in
Section I would be directly secured to anyone within the jurisdiction
of the Contracting States (document H (61) 4, pp. 664, 703, 733 and
927).  That intention finds a particularly faithful reflection in
those instances where the Convention has been incorporated into
domestic law (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of 18 June 1971,
Series A no. 12, p. 43, para. 82; Swedish Engine Drivers' Union judgment
of 6 February 1976, Series A no. 20, p. 18, para. 50).

The Convention does not merely oblige the higher authorities of the
Contracting States to respect for their own part the rights and
freedoms it embodies; as is shown by Article 14 (art. 14) and the
English text of Article 1 (art. 1) ("shall secure"), the Convention
also has the consequence that, in order to secure the enjoyment of
those rights and freedoms, those authorities must prevent or remedy
any breach at subordinate levels.

240.  The problem in the present case is essentially whether a
Contracting State is entitled to challenge under the Convention a law
in abstracto.

The answer to this problem is to be found much less in Article 1
(art. 1) than in Article 24 (art. 24).  Whereas, in order to be able
to lodge a valid petition, a "person, non-governmental organisation or
group of individuals" must, under Article 25 (art. 25), claim "to be
the victim of a violation ... of the rights set forth", Article 24
(art. 24) enables each Contracting State to refer to the Commission
"any alleged breach of [any of] the provisions of the Convention by
another [State]".

Such a "breach" results from the mere existence of a law which
introduces, directs or authorises measures incompatible with the
rights and freedoms safeguarded; this is confirmed unequivocally by
the travaux préparatoires (document H (61) 4, pp. 384, 502, 703 and
706).

Nevertheless, the institutions established by the Convention may find
a breach of this kind only if the law challenged pursuant to
Article 24 (art. 24) is couched in terms sufficiently clear and
precise to make the breach immediately apparent; otherwise, the
decision of the Convention institutions must be arrived at by
reference to the manner in which the respondent State interprets and
applies in concreto the impugned text or texts.

The absence of a law expressly prohibiting this or that violation does
not suffice to establish a breach since such a prohibition does not
represent the sole method of securing the enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed.

241.  In the present case, the Court has found two practices in breach
of Article 3 (art. 3) (see paragraphs 168 and 174 above).  Those
practices automatically infringed Article 1 (art. 1) as well, but this
is a finding which adds nothing to the previous finding (see
paragraph 238 above) and which there is no reason to include in the
operative provisions of this judgment.

Examination in abstracto of the legislation in force at the relevant
time in Northern Ireland reveals that it never introduced, directed or
authorised recourse to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment.
On the contrary, it forbade any such ill-treatment in increasingly
clear terms (see paragraphs 134-136 above).  More generally, as from
the end of August 1971 the higher authorities in the United Kingdom
took a number of appropriate steps to prevent or remedy the individual
violations of Article 3 (art. 3) (see paragraphs 99-101, 133 and
137-143 above).

242.  With regard to Article 14 taken together with
Articles 15, 5 and 6 (art. 14+15, art. 14+5, art. 14+6), the applicant
Government do not challenge the legislation as such.  Moreover, it did
not introduce, direct or authorise any discrimination in the exercise
of the extrajudicial powers.  The claim concerns only the
legislation's application, in respect of which the Court has not found
any violation (see paragraphs 228-232 and 235 above).

243.  As for Article 15 taken together with Articles 5 and 6
(art. 15+5, art. 15+6), on the other hand, the legislation itself is
criticised by the Irish Government.

Certain aspects of the legislation do give rise to doubts.  Neither
Regulations 11 (1) and 11 (2), nor Article 4 of the Terrorists Order,
nor paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to Emergency Provisions Act set any
limit on the duration of the deprivation of liberty they authorised.
Furthermore, they did not afford to the persons concerned any judicial
or administrative remedy beyond the restricted right to apply for
bail, a right that was moreover abolished on 7 November 1972 with the
revocation of Regulation 11 (4) (see paragraphs 82, 83 and 85 above).
These provisions differed, on the first point, from Regulation 10
(forty-eight hours) and section 10 of the Emergency Provisions Act
(seventy-two hours) and, on the second, from Regulation 12 (1)
(advisory committee), Article 6 of the Terrorists Order (appeal
tribunal) and paragraphs 26 to 34 of Schedule 1 to the Emergency
Provisions Act (idem).

The first-mentioned shortcoming resulted, however, from the mere
silence of the legislation and was mitigated in practice (maximum of
seventy-two hours for Regulation 11 (1) and, in general, twenty-eight
days for Regulation 11 (2)).

The second shortcoming appears more serious, especially as regards
Regulation 11 (2), Article 4 of the Terrorists Order and paragraph 11
of Schedule 1 to the Emergency Provisions Act; preferably, it should
have been avoided.  However, the deficiency was in part made good by
the ordinary courts of the province by virtue of the common law (the
McElduff case, judgment of 12 October 1971, and the Kelly case,
judgment of 11 January 1973, Regulations 11 (1) and (2)).

Above all, one is dealing with special legislation designed to combat
a public emergency threatening the life of the nation; such provisions
cannot be torn out of context without leading to arbitrary results.
It was hardly possible for this legislation to forecast in a rigid and
inflexible manner the frontiers of the demands of an inherently fluid
and changing situation; the massive scale of the outrages and the
large number of the persons arrested, detained and interned prevented
the provision of guarantees similar to those required by the
Convention.  In 1972 and 1973, the British authorities attenuated the
severity of the original legislation, thereby demonstrating their
concern not to go beyond the "extent strictly required by the
exigencies" of the circumstances.  On this, a question of fact rather
than of law, the said authorities enjoyed a margin of appreciation
which they do not seem to have exceeded.  Here again, the Court
considers that it would be unrealistic to isolate the first from the
later phases (see paragraphs 220, first sub-paragraph, and 229,
sixth sub-paragraph, above); as regards the legislation as such, the
Court does not feel able to arrive at conclusions conflicting with its
decision on the application of that legislation (see paragraphs 214
and 220 above).

Accordingly, on this issue no breach of Articles 5, 6 (art. 5, art. 6)
- assuming the latter Article (art. 6) to be applicable in this case
(see paragraph 235 above) - and 15, taken together with
Articles 1 and 24 (art. 15+1, art. 15+24), is found to be established.

V. ON ARTICLE 50 (art. 50)

244.  Under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention, if the Court
finds, as in the present case, "that a decision or a measure taken" by
any authority of a Contracting State "is completely or partially in
conflict with the obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if
the internal law of the said [State] allows only partial reparation to
be made for the consequences of this decision or measure", the Court
"shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party".

The Rules of Court specify that when the Court "finds that there is a
breach of the Convention, it shall give in the same judgment a
decision on the application of Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention
if that question, after being raised under Rule 47 bis, is ready for
decision; if the question is not ready for decision, the [Court]
shall reserve it in whole or in part and shall fix the further
procedure" (Rule 50 para. 3, first sentence, read in conjunction with
Rule 48 para. 3).

245.  The President, acting on behalf of the Court, instructed the
Registrar to ask the Agent of the Irish Government to indicate "as
soon as possible whether it would be correct to assume, particularly
in the light" of certain passages in the Commission's decision on the
admissibility of the application and in the verbatim report of the
public hearings held in February 1977, "that [his] Government [were
not inviting] the Court, should it find a violation of the Convention,
to afford just satisfaction within the meaning of Article 50
(art. 50)".  This the Registrar did by letter of 8 August 1977.

On 14 October 1977, the Agent of the applicant Government replied as
follows:

"... the applicant Government, while not wishing to interfere with the
de bene esse jurisdiction of the Court, have not as an object the
obtaining of compensation for any individual person and do not invite
the Court to afford just satisfaction under Article 50 (art. 50), of
the nature of monetary compensation, to any individual victim of a
breach of the Convention.

 ..."

246.  The Court accordingly considers that it is not necessary to
apply Article 50 (art. 50) in the present case.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

I. ON ARTICLE 3 (art. 3)

1. holds unanimously that, although certain violations of Article 3
(art. 3) were not contested, a ruling should nevertheless be given
thereon;

2. holds unanimously that it has jurisdiction to take cognisance of
the cases of alleged violation of Article 3 (art. 3) to the extent
that the applicant Government put them forward as establishing the
existence of a practice;

3. holds by sixteen votes to one that the use of the five techniques
in August and October 1971 constituted a practice of inhuman and
degrading treatment, which practice was in breach of Article 3
(art. 3);

4. holds by thirteen votes to four that the said use of the five
techniques did not constitute a practice of torture within the meaning
of Article 3 (art. 3);

5. holds by sixteen votes to one that no other practice of
ill-treatment is established for the unidentified interrogation
centres;

6. holds unanimously that there existed at Palace Barracks in the
autumn of 1971 a practice of inhuman treatment, which practice was in
breach of Article 3 (art. 3);

7. holds by fourteen votes to three that the last-mentioned practice
was not one of torture within the meaning of Article 3 (art. 3);

8. holds unanimously that it is not established that the practice in
question continued beyond the autumn of 1971;

9. holds by fifteen votes to two that no practice in breach of
Article 3 (art. 3) is established as regards other places;

10. holds unanimously that it cannot direct the respondent State to
institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings against those members
of the security forces who have committed the breaches of Article 3
(art. 3) found by the Court and against those who condoned or
tolerated such breaches;

II. ON ARTICLE 5 (art. 5)

11. holds unanimously that at the relevant time there existed in
Northern Ireland a public emergency threatening the life of the
nation, within the meaning of Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1);

12. holds unanimously that the British notices of derogation dated
20 August 1971, 23 January 1973 and 16 August 1973 fulfilled the
requirements of Article 15 para. 3 (art. 15-3);

13. holds by sixteen votes to one that, although the practice followed
in Northern Ireland from 9 August 1971 to March 1975 in the
application of the legislation providing for extrajudicial deprivation
of liberty entailed derogations from paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 5
(art. 5-1, art. 5-2, art. 5-3, art. 5-4), it is not established that
the said derogations exceeded the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, within the meaning of Article 15 para. 1
(art. 15-1);

14. holds unanimously that the United Kingdom has not disregarded in
the present case other obligations under international law, within the
meaning of Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1);

15. holds by fifteen votes to two that no discrimination contrary to
Articles 14 and 5 (art. 14+5) taken together is established;

III. ON ARTICLE 6 (art. 6)

16. holds unanimously that the derogations from Article 6 (art. 6),
assuming it to be applicable in the present case, are compatible with
Article 15 (art. 15);

17. holds by fifteen votes to two that no discrimination contrary to
Articles 14 and 6 (art. 14+6) taken together, assuming the
latter Article (art. 6) to be applicable in the present case, is
established;

IV. ON ARTICLE 50 (art. 50)

18. holds unanimously that it is not necessary to apply Article 50
(art. 50) in the present case.

Done in English and French, both texts being authentic, at the Human
Rights Building, Strasbourg, this eighteenth day of January, one
thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight.

Signed: Giorgio BALLADORE PALLIERI
        President

Signed: Marc-André EISSEN
        Registrar

The separate opinions of the following judges are annexed to the
present judgment in accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 50 para. 2 of the Rules of Court :

Mr. ZEKIA;
Mr. O'DONOGHUE;
Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE;
Mr. EVRIGENIS;
Mr. MATSCHER.

Initialled: G. B. P.

Initialled: M.-A. E.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ZEKIA

With respect, I subscribe to the main part of the judgment of the
Court.  I maintain, however, a different view as to the notion and
concept of the word "torture" occurring in Article 3 (art. 3) of the
Convention.  Moreover, I entertain a lot of doubt whether the Court is
justified in setting aside a unanimous conclusion of the Commission in
respect of torture which has not been contested by the representatives
of the two High Contracting States who took part in the proceedings
before the Court.

I feel tempted also to deal briefly with the principle underlying the
onus of proof and the discharge of such onus in a case where a
Contracting State is alleged to have violated its obligation under an
Article of the Convention.

A. Torture

Admittedly the word "torture" included in Article 3 (art. 3) of the
Convention is not capable of an exact and comprehensive definition.
It is undoubtedly an aggravated form of inhuman treatment causing
intense physical and/or mental suffering.  Although the degree of
intensity and the length of such suffering constitute the basic
elements of torture, a lot of other relevant factors had to be taken
into account.  Such as: the nature of ill-treatment inflicted, the
means and methods employed, the repetition and duration of such
treatment, the age, sex and health condition of the person exposed to
it, the likelihood that such treatment might injure the physical,
mental and psychological condition of the person exposed and whether
the injuries inflicted caused serious consequences for short or long
duration are all relevant matters to be considered together and arrive
at a conclusion whether torture has been committed.

It seems to me permissible, in ascertaining whether torture or inhuman
treatment has been committed or not, to apply not only the objective
test but also the subjective test.

As an example I can refer to the case of an elderly sick man who is
exposed to a harsh treatment - after being given several blows and
beaten to the floor, he is dragged and kicked on the floor for several
hours.  I would say without hesi